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Abstract 
The global demand for energy has been predicted to rise by 56% between 2010 and 2040 due 
to industrialization and population growth. This continuous rise in energy demand has 
consequently prompted oil and gas firms to shift activities from onshore oil fields to tougher 
terrains such as shallow, deep, ultra-deep and arctic fields. Operations in these domains often 
require deployment of unconventional subsea assets and technology.   
 
Subsea assets when installed offshore are super-bombarded by marine elements and human 
factors which increase the risk of failure. Whilst many risk standards, asset integrity and 
reliability analysis models have been suggested by many previous researchers, there is a gap on 
the capability of predictive reliability models to simultaneously address the impact of corrosion 
inducing elements such as temperature, pressure, pH corrosion on material wear-out and failure. 
There is also a gap in the methodology for evaluation of capital expenditure, human factor risk 
elements and use of historical data to evaluate risk.  This thesis aims to contribute original 
knowledge to help improve production assurance by developing an integrated model which 
addresses pump-pipe capital expenditure, asset risk and reliability in subsea systems.  
 
The key contributions of this research is the development of a practical model which links four 
sub-models on reliability analysis, asset capital cost, event risk severity analysis and subsea risk 
management implementation. Firstly, an accelerated reliability analysis model was developed 
by incorporating a corrosion covariate stress on Weibull model of OREDA data. This was 
applied on a subsea compression system to predict failure times. A second methodology was 
developed by enhancing Hubbert oil production forecast model, and using nodal analysis for 
asset capital cost analysis of a pump-pipe system and optimal selection of best option based on 
physical parameters such as pipeline diameter, power needs, pressure drop and velocity of fluid. 
Thirdly, a risk evaluation method based on the mathematical determinant of historical event 
magnitude, frequency and influencing factors was developed for estimating the severity of risk 
in a system. Finally, a survey is conducted on subsea engineers and the results along with the 
previous models were developed into an integrated assurance model for ensuring asset 
reliability and risk management in subsea operations. 
A guide is provided for subsea asset management with due consideration to both technical and 
operational perspectives. The operational requirements of a subsea system can be measured, 
analysed and improved using the mix of mathematical, computational, stochastic and logical 
frameworks recommended in this work. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Oil and gas companies are shifting exploration and production activities from conventional 
fields to offshore fields due to increasing energy demand [Li X, et al, 2016]. The World’s 
energy consumption is predicted to grow by 56% from 2010 to 2040, from 524 quadrillion 
British thermal units (Btu) to 820 quadrillion Btu. Most of this growth will come from non-
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, where demand 
is driven by strong economic growth [Lacalle et al, 2015].  
 
Although, renewable and nuclear energy usage are increasing at a rate of 2.5% each year, 
making them the world's fastest-growing energy sources,  fossil fuels continue to supply nearly 
80% of world energy use through 2040[Lee et al, 2015; EIA, 2016]. Crude oil and natural gas 
still enjoy a large demand relative to upcoming supplies such as renewables and nuclear as 
shown in Fig 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Snapshot of energy growth trends across the world [EIA, 2016] 
 
 Historically, conventional oil and gas production systems have had an impressive performance 
history, however, complex subsea systems are now being exploited in ways that were rarely 
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experienced in previous development programmes. This rapidly increasing shift towards subsea 
production represents a higher level of risk exposure compared to conventional oil and gas 
operations. Subsea systems present a number of technical challenges because when normal 
technical systems are installed underwater, every traditional knowledge of material properties 
apparently vanishes. Due to the roughness and often remoteness of the marine domain, offshore 
production has experienced higher-lost-time incidents (LTI) and Total Recordable incidents 
than onshore drilling for instance. The fact that over 318 offshore accidents have occurred 
between 1970 till date is just a major indicator that offshore risks pose a lot more danger to 
efficiency, profitability and safety of offshore operations [OGP, 2010]. More recently, the 
mismanagement of risks in the arctic waters led to the Dec 2012 accident offshore Alaska; 
which attracted a fine of $12million dollars at a time of oil price slump [Sweet, 2015]. This is 
an indication that a potential operational risk may not only raise just safety and environmental 
concerns but also generate serious long-term economic consequences. Therefore, adopting a 
reliability-based approach can offer practical steps for forestalling and overcoming these risk 
challenges by ensuring that tolerable ranges of target reliability are achieved throughout an 
asset’s operational life [Kolios et al, 2012]. 
 
There are enormous valid reasons for embarking on this research. In subsea oil and gas drilling 
and production, many of the methods have a reactive approach rather than predictive approach 
for risks facing subsea operations based on available literature.  The existing industry standards 
such as the ISO 31000, the API 17N RP and the ISO proposed very robust suggestions and 
frameworks for risk analysis. However, people’s perception of risks, affective reactions to the 
risk, and perceived need to prepare for it still seems somewhat immature across the subsea 
industry in contrast to industries such as finance and nuclear. Production assurance, risk and 
asset reliability broadly considers the risks in an operating system and proactively proffers 
robust solutions to eliminate imminent dangers in a system for business continuity [Zafra-
Cabezaa et al, 2007, Torabi et al, 2016]. Operational risks in a conventional process industry, 
refer to those risks which originate from inadequacies or disturbances within the operational 
processes of an organisation [Wang et al 2016].  
In the past, reliability and risk management were passively implemented either by reliance on 
risk transfer options such as general insurance or detective options such as safety devices, fire 
extinguishers, alarm systems and protective gears in order to minimise losses [Sadgrove, 1996]. 
In the subsea industry where technical complexity and operational variations are rife, there is 
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no doubt that these strategy are merely reactive rather than preventive, thus, the need for a 
broad-based, diligent and preventative approach for managing subsea technical reliability and 
operational risks [Haugen et al, 2016]. 
 
Inquisitive minds may ask ‘What real value does reliability and risk management add to 
production assurance and profitability of a subsea firm?’ In response to that, from an operational 
viewpoint, subsea oil and gas firms make profits from revenue which comes from total sales 
minus the costs of sales. A high cost to sales ratio means that a low profit margin or complete 
loss is inevitable. This implies that risk, reliability analysis and a good production management 
model adds measurable economic value to an organisation by minimising the potential 
economic losses associated with unprecedented asset failures and unsatisfactory market 
positioning.  
 
More critical minds may further ponder on: ‘What is the essence of researching subsea 
operational risks when the risks that accrue in a North Sea oilfield is probably different from 
the one in West Africa?’  Indeed, regional risk dynamics and operational challenges vary from 
company to company and from location to location, thus there is no one size fits all approach. 
This study does not argue that; rather, it attempts to reveal some of the areas where these risks 
may appear within a system, while suggesting an integrated approach for quantitatively and 
qualitatively addressing them from a predictive viewpoint. It is interesting to know that risk 
management research has been applied to various economic and subsea assets with tangible 
improvement in efficiency recorded in these systems [Yang et al 2016]. 
 
In a typical subsea production setting, key operations are those internal processes which directly 
impact production and efficiency. Lewis (2003) suggested that, internal risks, spring up from 
production capacity plans, information technology, supply chain, process system, human 
influence, and control systems. This suggests that operational risks emerge from the complex 
interaction between process, people, products or assets [Popov et al, 2016]. In a subsea 
environment this could mean time to repair, reliability of equipment, safety, environmental 
issues, competence of subsea operative or cost efficiency. 
 
In the course of this research, various articles are explored for a good understanding of the 
nature of operations risk, technical reliability requirements and optimization. Subsea field 
development case studies on well production forecasting, artificial lift selection, pump-pipe 
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efficiency evaluation, risk calculation and asset accelerated life testing were numerically 
analysed with the aid of stochastics, physics and software models. Thereafter, an investigation 
is carried out to find out how subsea production companies address subsea risk and reliability 
management. This is subsequently followed by the proposition of an integrated model and 
recommendations for the best practice based on the research findings. 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Many offshore accidents occur due to lack of risk culture and inadequacy of many of the 
existing risk or reliability assessment approach to properly address operational risks from both 
technical and enterprise-wide viewpoints. There is an urgent need for adopting an integrated 
reliability-based model that addresses both technical and enterprise risks in order to improve 
efficiency, profitability and safety in subsea oil and gas production. 
 
An uncontrolled explosion caused the surge of water, mud, oil, gas and other toxic materials to 
rush out of the drilling riser on a semi-submersible vessel at approximately at 5000ft of water 
in the Northern Gulf of Mexico, offshore the coast of Louisiana on April 20th, 2010. This 
disaster killed 11 workers and 4 billion barrels oil leaked into the sea for 87 days [Christou et 
al , 2012]. 
 
‘On March 7, 2016, two kilometres of pipe that connects an offshore drilling rig to a wellhead 
deep under the ocean broke off and sank in a storm off Nova Scotia's coast Saturday, prompting 
concerns from an advocacy group over the risks of deep-water accidents caused by harsh ocean 
conditions. Based on that, the Director of the Clean Ocean Action Committee, said the incident 
is a reminder of the enormous power of huge offshore waves on the Scotian Shelf — and the 
risks of an offshore accident in one of North America’s most productive fishing grounds. “It’s 
another indicator to us that we need a regulatory regime that makes sense, and … basically 
takes notice of the fact we’re at the edge of our technological ability,” he said in a telephone 
interview’’ [Turton, 2016]. 
 
Similarly, on 10 August 2011, an oil leak was reported from the Garnet F field resulting from 
the failure in a subsea flow line, 176km east of Aberdeen (Department of Energy & Climate 
Change, 2011). Based on an initial investigation by Health and Safety Executives, it was 
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revealed that an assessment of the safety management system for the leaking pipeline was due 
in 2008 but was not conducted before the incident [Ramasamy et al, 2015].  
 
When a subsea system or asset is submerged into the marine environment for a long time, many 
traditionally known properties about material behaviour tend to vanish because these assets get 
battered by myriads of risks and reliability factors which stress-out the production assets and 
shorten their life-span resulting in economic losses and fatalities sometimes. Today, the 
pressure is to move from a reserved, narrow and silo-based approach to a cross-disciplinary, 
organisation-wide analysis of uncertainty [Subramaniam et al, 2011, Aven et al, 2014, Wu et 
al, 2016]. In view of this, a handful of regulations, standards and policies have been developed 
to help subsea operators towards systematic management of the inherent risks in their systems. 
 
The problem is not just the scarcity of user-friendly integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA) models for analysing both the technical reliability and the operational risk management 
in a subsea oil and gas production lifecycle. The standards are either highly generic or too 
polarised on various stand-alone basis and not clear on implementation requirements. This is 
part of the gap which this research bridges. 
 
In order to understand the complexities of system failure due to inadequate risks and reliability 
analysis program, it is important to develop a whole-system model consisting of physically 
tested mathematical models and validate them through case studies to determine the various 
failure modes of a subsea technical and operational system plus their severities.  The proposed 
methodology is an aggregated mix of numerical evaluations and specialist computer 
simulations as established in each of the case studies. Data was obtained from a range of sources 
including questionnaires, interviews, industry field data, and OREDA handbook. These reflect 
the enhanced attributes of the over rall model. 
 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
This techno-economic research seeks to develop an integrated model for subsea risk, 
reliability and production analysis and management. To achieve this overall aim, the research 
focuses on identifying the key risk vulnerabilities in the operations of a subsea production, areas 
of inadequacy in existing methodologies for risk management, and the challenges faced by 
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subsea production companies in managing these uncertainties so that an enabling optimisation 
solution is developed. 
 
The main objectives of this research are; 
• Examine the strengths and weaknesses of the existent models and also measure the risk 
and reliability implementation levels in industry. 
 
• To propose a method for selecting the optimal pump-pipe option for subsea fluid lift 
based on overall system efficiency. 
 
• To develop a model for asset reliability analysis and optimisation by incorporation a 
corrosion covariate stress on Weibull distribution of MTTF data. 
 
• To propose a risk severity matrix method which considers and iterates multiple risk 
influential factors (RIF) with basic operational factors.  
 
• To develop an integrated model for the implementation of risk and reliability 
management. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is arranged as follows.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction. This is the introductory chapter of this work. The research motivation, 
research aims and objectives were explicitly declared as well as the research focus and scope. 
The relevance and importance of the research were also highlighted in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review. This chapter provided considerable insights on the research 
topics. It contains an extensive literary review on the definitions of risk, methods for asset and 
operations risk management and reliability of subsea production firms. Discussion on the 
current standards for managing these risk sources was also presented as well as the benefits. 
This chapter also contains information on the types of approach being currently used for subsea 
risk and reliability analysis. Popular risk management frameworks such as API 17N RP, DNV 
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306 OSS, COSO-ERM framework, ISO 31000 were duly discussed. A critical analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the framework was presented plus an update on the current 
challenges experienced in risk management globally. Thereafter, a concise summary was 
provided leading to the development of the research question. 
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology. This is the chapter where the research question was 
declared. The type of data to be gathered, the methods of gathering data and the reason for each 
choice of approach was discussed and justified. The analysis approach for data collected was 
also highlighted. The rationale for the data gathering approach and analysis were all explained 
in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4: Reliability Analysis and Optimization of Subsea Gas Compression System. This 
chapter describes the development of a novel Weibull Corrosion Covariate model which was 
applied to a Subsea Gas Compression System. The baseline OREDA Mean Time to Failure 
(MTTF) of the system components were stressed with factors of CO2 fugacity, temperature and 
time and pressure. To optimize the system, it was decomposed using Reliability Block 
Diagrams into its 39 sub-components. An enhanced Fusell-Vesely analysis was applied to 
determine the failure mode of each sub system and the amount of life needed to meet optimal 
reliability index targets. This will help firms in predicting how assets would behave in a subsea 
environment based on physical and statistical stress forces for deployment of adequate controls. 
 
Chapter 5:  Efficiency-based selection of Artificial Lift Systems for Production Assurance.  
This chapter presents an enhanced methodology and guide for choosing subsea multiphase 
pump-pipe system based on factors of power requirements, pipe diameter, costs and overall 
efficiency. First, it contains the enhancement of a Hubbert forecast model which was used to 
predict capacity of production. Nodal fluid flow analysis is then applied to subsea pump 
configuration to compare two popular pumps, an Electrical Submersible Pump (ESP) and a 
Progressive Cavity Pump (PCP) in terms of flow output, efficiency, power needs and pressure 
drop. Using fluid mechanics models for the design of flow rate and velocity and efficiency 
relationship is developed. This is applied to the pump-pipe case and the efficiency index proves 
that the ESP gives a higher volumetric efficiency in deep water, supporting the reason why it is 
popular in reality. Recommendations and advice were also provided so that subsea production 
companies can tackle field development challenges based on the quantitative analysis with due 
consideration to cost. 
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Chapter 6: Risk Severity Analysis by Matrix Method based on Historical Events and Risk 
Appetite Analysis. This chapter contains a risk severity analysis based on historical components 
of frequency and magnitude. Nine risks at nine subsea drill spots were analysed using a matrix 
analysis consisting of Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs), magnitude and frequency. The event 
magnitude was generated by a Poisson distribution and the frequency mean was obtained by a 
lognormal distribution of events mean. The risk severity was derived from the product of the 
two matrices.  
 
Chapter 7: This chapter provided the results and analysis of the survey carried out to discover 
the industry awareness, trends and implementation appetite of subsea reliability engineers and 
operators 
 
Chapter 8: Research Synthesis: This chapter contains in-depth discussions and recommended 
solutions based on the inference from the entire research.  
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion. This chapter provided the formal summary and justification of the 
research. The strengths of the research and the recommended future research were also 
highlighted. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art in research and industry 
practice related to risk, asset integrity and reliability with a focus on subsea oil and gas 
production system. It discusses subsea production and how to determine production targets 
based on historical data. It explores some of the existing methodologies for ensuring production 
assurance based on reliability and particularly operational risk analysis. It also critically reviews 
the various methods for reliability and enterprise-wide risk assessment and management. A 
critical analysis of popular risk management and reliability models was performed; probing 
along their pros and cons followed by an audit of the most recent risk challenges. This set the 
stage for the identification of knowledge gaps and the consequent research questions. Table 1 
links to the structure of the literature review with the rest of the thesis. 
 
Table 1: Structure of the Literature Review 
 
  
 
2.1 Subsea Production and Reliability 
Subsea Engineering is a specialised area of engineering which deals with the design, 
operation and maintenance of the underwater components and systems used to produce offshore 
oil and gas. Figure 2 is a trend of offshore production over the last 50 years. 
 
No Literature Review Title Refers To Chapter
2.1 Subsea Production and Reliability 4
2.2 Production Assurance and Artificial Lift Selection 5
2.3 Advances in Reliability Analysis Strategy 4
2.4 Risk Management 6, 7
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Figure 2: Expansion of Subsea Oil and Gas Production (Kohl, 2014) 
 
  The key benefits of subsea production are as follows, 
• It offers a cost-effective solution in terms of Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
• It reduces operational costs (OPEX)  
• It is safer to install the components closer to the well. 
• It improves production and project value.  
• It enables low CO2 emissions due to lower power consumption.  
• It preserves marine life due to less disposal and disturbances at sea 
• Process is safer due to unmanned operation.  
• It facilitates the transport of well stream over long tiebacks. 
 
The core of this research is centred on ensuring subsea production assurance through risk-based 
proactive methods. Figure 3 shows the distribution of subsea technology across the world. The 
key considerations for a typical subsea project focuses on; 
• What to Produce? - Production Forecast 
• Technology to produce it? - Process Capacity Plan 
• How Reliable is it? - Asset Reliability 
• How Safe and Sustainable is it? - Risk 
• What does it Cost to run? Cost- efficiency 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Subsea Systems across the world [Intersea 2014] 
 
2.2 Production Assurance and Artificial Lift Selection  
During the production life cycle of an offshore oilfield, there comes a point where natural 
reservoir fluid pressure drops so low that artificial lift becomes inevitable for crude oil to flow 
from well head through the subsurface to the topside for further processing or storage [Huacan 
2014]. Over the years, it has become a necessity to make adequate contingent strategy for 
recovery of reservoir fluid during the operational life of a field. In subsea engineering circles, 
these technical solutions commonly referred to as artificial lift methods or enhanced recovery 
methods involve the use of subsea pumps, compressors and valve controls in a range of 
configurations for fluid pressure boost [Mitra, 2012]. 
 
With artificial lift solutions, ageing deep water reservoirs which are ordinarily abandoned due 
to high back pressure are further depleted thereby improving the economic value of an oilfield 
significantly [Bai, 2012]. In fact, experts claim that modern pumps can perform impressively 
at tougher depths of up to 15000ft and temperatures of up to 232℃°C [Bates, 2004]. A well-
informed capacity plan and a robust optimization strategy for production life of an offshore 
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oilfield facing declining pressures and tough subsea conditions are essential for enhanced 
profits, efficiency and safety on subsea oil fields. 
 
One complex challenge in subsea field development is the ability to decide which pump-pipe 
system to install and ensuring that flow rates correspond with production demands, pipe 
capacity, cost and overall efficiency variables. This requires an efficiency evaluation using a 
range of parameters including subsea temperatures, costs, risks, expected flow rates and of 
course reservoir properties. Unfortunately, not many studies have specifically provided a time-
saving analytic method for evaluating efficiency in subsea oil and gas with respect to the 
mentioned parameters. To a large extent, this work is the result of an exiguous furtherance of 
the works of [Shadizadeh,et al 2009; Takacs 2012; JOGMEG 2012; Asim et al 2016] with new 
originality made; through the incorporation of artificial lift pumps placed at new depths, 
analysis of overall flow system efficiency, and consideration of costs of various pipe diameter-
and pump system in the subsea domain. A new guidance is further provided on the selection of 
artificial lift and the procedure for evaluation of least-cost option for supporting pipe network. 
The costs incurred during a system overhaul for a pump fix at mid-life of field or 
mismanagement of flow as in the case of Piper Alpha in 1988 and Ekofisk B 1977 accidents 
[Christou 2012] could have been minimized by systematically predicting production 
performance at project kick-off.  
 
A number of stand-alone contributions have been made to address efficiency and capacity 
planning. To forecast oil and gas production, Ebarhimi et al [2015] presented a variance of the 
Hubbert Peak Theory with consideration for multiple influential variables such as new 
technology, shocks and production profile. The empirical success of the Hubert Model was also 
enhanced by Benes et al [2015]’s a priory views which considered a linearized Hubbert model 
and its relationship with oil price wherein an increase in global oil price increases oil 
production. Efficiency and least cost principles were studied by Ramana et al [2009] wherein 
efficiency, demand for power and cost of a range of power infrastructure were modelled for 
selecting the optimally efficient option. 
 
Willersrud et al [2013] proposed a non-linear predictive control model for short term 
optimization of oil and gas facilities after investigating unreachable set points and infeasible 
soft constraints. Ribero et al [2016] improved on it by investigating the effect of efficiency on 
separators, energy loss and friction.  Vieira et al [2015] carried out theoretical study of the 
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various pressure losses in order to predict the actual head by an ESP pump, considering various 
flow phases. Nian et al [2015 proposed a propitious inversion method for evaluating the flow 
rate of a production well, the heat capacity developed using temperature data and a heat transfer 
model. Mohammadzaheri et al [2015] proposed algorithms based on artificial neural networks 
for estimation of head, brake horse power and profitability of Electrical Submersible Pumps 
(ESPs) for gaseous fluids. 
 
Xinfu et al [2011] suggested that a proper pipe-pump selection process must consider four 
primary components of the pumping systems which consist of well inflow performance, pump 
setting depth, water production rate, and rod string design. The components of the system are 
defined as a function of these four basic design parameters.  
 
Meanwhile, Vogel [1968] was the first to suggest the Inflow Performance Relationship (IPR) 
technique for the prediction of flow output in vertical wells, more improvement was done by 
Lik [2007] to predict flow performance in saturated reservoirs. The works of Childs [1962] and 
Stepanoff [1957], Abdelaziz and Shen [2012] suggested a step-by-step approach for the design 
and optimization of cold-climate heat pumps wherein optimal designs for two different systems 
were discussed and analysed. It was discovered that optimization flexibilities of a system play 
a very significant role in the process of system design. 
 
Ventrone et al [2000] put forward a striking methodology for the prediction of the whole head-
capacity curve and the efficiency capacity curve of a turbine provided the geometrical 
parameters and the performance curves of a given pump are known. Even though the method 
appears smart it may not be easily applied without knowing the geometry of the system and in 
this regard it is useless for a cost-focused system designer. The subsea production system 
illustrated in Fig 4 shows a cross-section cut through two subsea pumps.  
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PCP  Pump  Section [Bachin, 2015] 
 
ESP Pump Section [Frank 2015] 
 
Figure 4: Pump Cross-Section  
2.2.1 Subsea Artificial Lifts 
Artificial lifting is the process of adding energy to a stream of well fluid in order to charge 
the fluid with more pressure to achieve higher flow outputs. Subsea artificial lifts have 
continued to play a crucial role in resolving the flow assurance challenges encountered at subsea 
fields [McAllister 2014; Mohammedzaheri 2016]. With recent improvement in technology, 
lifting costs have been decreasing due to increasing availability of components that offer 
enhanced chemical resistance, lower power demands and certainly high reliability [Fleshman 
1999]. However, not much is yet known about the relative efficiency, cost and risk profile of 
two popular artificial lifts; Progressive Cavity Pumps (PCP) compared to Electrical 
Submersible Pumps (ESP) for subsea oil and gas production. 
 
Progressing Cavity Pumps (PCP) are reciprocating positive-displacement type of pumps 
consisting of a piston fitted with special valves which facilitate the displacement of a fixed 
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quantity of fluid into the bottom-hole tubing and in turn discharges at the wellhead. PCP is a 
relatively recent artificial lift technology compared to others. It is not considered complex 
technology even though it is mainly used in lifting heavy oil [Chen et al 2013]; however, its 
application is sometimes confusing and misleading resulting in poor performance and low-
efficiency operations [Nguyen et al 2014]. The guidelines for the deepest subsea well pump yet, 
an API 675 positive-displacement and reciprocating subsea pump was recently launched at the 
Offshore Technology Conference 2014 conference to enhance productivity in the harshest of 
existent subsea wells [World Pumps 2014].  
 
Flexibility is a key consideration when choosing pumps for offshore operations and an electrical 
submersible pump (ESP) seemingly performs well. An ESP refers to a dynamic–displacement 
centrifugal pump whose pump displacement rate depends on the pressure head generated, and 
is becoming a popular option for offshore application [Hua et al 2012]. While Fig 5 shows that 
its usage trend is on the rise across the globe as more deep water and arctic fields are being 
explored across the globe, Table 2 shows that both ESPs and PCPs can be applied offshore. 
Modern models of ESP are auto-dynamic, re-adjust displacement pressure in line with 
fluctuating reservoir pressures and displace both gas and liquids at impressive high flow rates 
and pressures. 
 
Figure 5: Artificial lift utilization across the world [Bates 2004] 
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Table 2: Brief Comparison of PCP against ESP 
Artificial Lift Pump Progressive Cavity Pump 
(PCP) 
Electrical Submersible 
Pump (ESP) 
Displacement Type Positive displacement Dynamic Displacement 
Operating Temperature 100-500 100-400 
Overall Efficiency Pulling Rig/Workover Pulling Rig/Workover 
Maintenance 45-60 35-60 
Gas Handling Gas or Electric Electric only 
Depth Difficulty at great depths Less difficulty 
Offshore Application Applied offshore especially 
at heavy oil wells.  
Unlimited. It can lift 
multiphase fluids but there is 
risks of corrosion over time. 
 
2.2.2 Nodal Analysis 
Nodal analysis technique, a method originally developed by renowned Dutch Engineer, 
Gilbert, is one of the methods that is currently widely used to comprehensively analyze a given 
oil production system [Gilbert, 1954]. It usually consists of splitting a given system at certain 
points known as nodes and evaluating the flow conditions at each half, with an overall aim of 
combining all components of the production system of various wells in order to estimate 
petroleum production rates and optimize configurations of the production system [Takacs 
2012]. 
 
While Gilbert laid the foundation for systematic analysis of production rates with his work on 
gas-liquid ratio control, his postulation at the time was largely insufficient because it lacked 
refined correlations for reliably modelling fluid-lift or inflow performance in either vertical, 
horizontal pipes and network of subsea pipes with a processing equipment. Years later, further 
work by Mach et al [1979], gave rise to what we know today as Nodal analysis.  
 
Typically, nodal analysis on a flow line point is carried out by plotting the IPR and TPR curves, 
and graphically locating the solution at the point where the two curves intersect [Guo et al, 
2007]. However, sophisticated software tools lessen the task by applying the same nodal 
principle across an entire flow system to evaluate the average flow output, pressure and other 
parameters of interest. 
 17 
 
 
This research sheds more light on the application of a graphical nodal analysis approach for the 
optimization of a subsea petroleum production system. The proposed model is original in a 
number of aspects. Starting from catalogue information and using design techniques [Makinde 
2012, Fleshman 1999], it computes a virtual geometry and then it calculates fluid dynamic 
losses. For obvious economic reasons, the flexibility of nodal approach reasonably thumps that 
of conventional numerical solutions because an engineer can readily observe the big picture 
and the effect of alternating the oil and gas production parameters. More importantly, the 
engineer can investigate trends and compare hidden patterns such as velocity drop, costs, 
material costs, throughput and efficiency in order to save costs in far less time than conventional 
pipeline flow simulations can offer. 
 
2.2.3 The Subsea Compression System (SCS) 
 The emergence of subsea gas compression technology has been one of the most significant 
technology advancements in the offshore oil and gas industry. The first of its kind of project 
was planned to take off in 2015 at Asgard field Norway [Terdre, 2008].  This undoubtedly 
represents a technological forward leap by the upstream industry as it holds huge potential for 
further improvement in field recovery rates in marginal fields.  
Subsea compression refers to the process of increasing well stream pressure by means of a 
compressor located underwater [Henri et al, 2010]. It is a crucial part of the ongoing global 
strategy to eventually run full-fledged petroleum factories underwater in order to save cost, 
reduce human-machine contact and also accelerate oil recovery rate. 
 
The concept is predicted to be more environment – friendly with lower risk since it is unmanned 
unlike platform based solutions [Fantoft, 2005]. Conventionally, gas is separated from well 
stream, compressed at topside and re-injected to well, flared or tapped off [Kennedy, 1993; Bai, 
2005]. The new technology eliminates the need for topside compression as it separates and 
compresses fluid straight out of the well and delivers directly to the storage or processing 
facility.  
 
According to its design, the compression station will be located closer to the well on the seabed 
thereby requiring lower inlet pressure and less overall cost for fluid lift [Berg, 2010]. 
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A typical subsea compression system consists of three main sub-systems: the process system, 
the HV powers system and the control system [Berg, 2010]. The sub-systems can further be 
split into several components which interface with one another to make a complete functional 
production system.  
 
Compared to 1 year for a topside facility, the average maintenance interval for a subsea 
compression system is anticipated to be 4-5 years [Aker, 2014]. This imposes a challenge to 
design and development of the hardware with significantly improved system reliability. The 
keen interest on reliability of the SCS further stems from the fact that vulnerable units of the 
system might require more caution in terms of design, installation and maintenance to ensure 
high availability which is paramount for a profitable operation.  
 
Field experiences of failure from existing subsea technologies suggest a significant impact on 
both costs and schedule of operations for oil and gas production firms [Skogdalen et al, 2011]. 
The new model proposed in this research directly addressed the issue by predicting the 
reliability of the components in a realistic operational environment. Experience has shown that 
comprehensive tests alone will never be the same as having the unit working subsea for a longer 
period. This is because field reliability performance is not usually modelled into the reliability 
feedback loop but reliability can be achieved and lifecycle reliability simulations by taking into 
consideration, the boundary conditions of the operating environment [Gao et al, 2010]. 
 
2.3 Advances in Reliability Analysis Strategy 
The huge loss and sanctions experienced in the 2010 Macondo oil spill due to the failure of 
Subsea Blow-out Preventer, the 2011 Bonga incident and a host of recent offshore failures has 
sparked accelerated efforts towards improvement of reliability, risk management and asset 
integrity for subsea systems [Skogdalen et al, 2011; Cai  et al 2013; Vadachalam, 2016]. 
 
An investigation conducted by the UK Health and Safety Executive [HSE, 2014] indicated that 
nearly 80% of risk posed to offshore workers emanate from process-related failures. These 
failures which often cause accidents, downtimes and serious economic losses emanate from the 
complex interaction between human factor and technical factors which cause approximately 
70% and 30% of offshore incidents respectively [Cai et al, 2011].  
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With an increasing appetite for subsea processing installations, risk exposure could even be 
higher due to lack of standardized reliability data and the fact that underwater assets are exposed 
to additional stresses brought about by dynamic influencing factors of the sea when deployed 
to the marine environment [Bai et al, 2012; Vedachalam et al, 2015]. This justifies any study 
which seeks to understand the equipment failure behaviour in subsea conditions to ensure 
maximum uptime. The highly specialized subsea sector is not exactly known for standardized 
asset life cycle reliability procedures [Antonsen et al, 2012] because there seems to be a lope-
sided focus on the technical reliability qualification at manufacturing stages of subsea modules 
by several scholars; whilst appearing to neglect lifecycle asset reliability especially during the 
operational stages where the intertwine between human, equipment, environment has a great 
influence on asset performance [El-ladan et al, 2012]. 
 
Although risks and failure cannot be completely eradicated from any system, they certainly can 
be controlled through enhanced risk management strategies throughout the lifecycle of the 
project. As the world’s first subsea compression system - a joint industry project is currently 
underway at the Asgard field offshore Norway and planned to commence operations in 2015 
[Lima et al, 2011, Vedachalam et al;,2014], major concerns raised by stakeholders bother on 
reliability, corrosion and production assurance due to past experiences and losses encountered 
[Nelson, 2009].  
 
This study presents an enhancement of a concept known as Accelerated Life Testing (ALT); an 
analysis procedure whereby basic system failure data is subjected to a high level of operational 
stress (covariate) and used to forecast the behaviour of a system in certain situations [Dorner, 
1999]. The new approach which adopts a two-prong methodology for both technical and human 
reliability analysis consists of further development of the works of [Zhang et al, 2014; Barabadi, 
2014; Sklet et al, 2006; Bai, 2005; Hassani et al 2014; Kaczor, 2016] wherein important 
contributions were made on Weibull-based covariate relationships for technical reliability 
analysis and human factor analysis respectively. 
 
Deep water production hardware are exposed to high CO2 pressure and temperature conditions 
which directly affect the degradation and performance of such materials [Zio et al, 2007]. At 
temperatures below 5℃ and pressures much higher than 7.38 MPa, CO2 could be in its 
supercritical state. In the absence of water, supercritical CO2 is not corrosive, however, under 
normal deep water production operations, water is always present. When CO2 dissolves in 
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water, carbonic acid (H2CO3) is formed which significantly increases the corrosion rate of 
carbon steels and other materials. The mechanisms of CO2 corrosion under supercritical 
conditions do not change compared to those identified at lower partial pressure [Lund, 2000]. 
 
The behaviour of a subsea system is better understood from a system reliability viewpoint 
[Jablonowski et al, 2010] which may connote a reliability study on equipment availability times, 
an asset integrity assessment, a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study dealing with operability 
of a system or even a profitability analysis of a system in terms of production capacity and 
revenue appraisal. In other contexts, it could imply Net Present Value (NPV) of a project, 
economic and management measures. 
 
At the forefront of reliability analysis techniques is Monte Carlo’s simulation which has been 
widely used over decades to quantitatively capture the realistic multi-state dynamics and 
stochastic behaviour of components and systems in reasonable computing times [Norris et al, 
2016; Lin et al, 1998]. 
 
Lund, [2000], developed a statistics-based dynamic model for analysing offshore petroleum 
projects considering a number of uncertainty factors. The model incorporates several types of 
flexibility such as drilling options, uncertainties and capacity expansion uncertainties. A case 
study was carried out using the model and it shows that flexibility in capacity improves a 
project’s economic value especially when there are many uncertainties surrounding the offshore 
reservoir. Unfortunately, considerations for human error estimation were not considered in the 
proposition. 
 
Jablownosky et al [2010], modelled subsea reservoir uncertainty and measured the value of 
flexibility of assets for various capacities that could be expanded in the future in order to 
maximize the project’s net present value. The major deficiency of the proposed model was its 
lack of explicit consideration for operational safety in a subsea scenario as it largely focused on 
the economic aspect of the oil field. Norris et al [2016], incorporated physical parameters into 
risk analysis by coupling laboratory-derived probabilistic nucleation model with existing 
deterministic calculations for hydrate growth. 
 
The works of Lin [1998] and Lin [2008] suggested flexibility models for deep water oil field 
systems which were simulated using Monte Carlo’s model to determine the value of specified 
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flexibilities under the uncertainty conditions of reservoir and production capacity. The models 
did not address the severity of risk influence on CAPEX and OPEX in significant contrast to 
Lee et al [2016] wherein a design procedure for offshore installations life cycle cost analysis 
under various environmental load stresses was presented. 
 
Chen [2016] developed a stochastic methodology for structural reliability analysis of a Floating 
Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) hull girder using an enhanced Smith Method. The 
model incorporates the severity impact of still-water bending moment, wave-induced bending 
moment and corrosion propagation mechanism. To understand wave-structure interaction of 
offshore structure and highlight lessons for reliable designs, Tao et al [2009] performed a 
classical parametric study on a three dimensional short-crested wave with a porous cylindrical 
break-water based on linear potential wave theory. 
 
Leira et al [2016], suggested an enhanced Monte Carlo method for reliability analysis of 
pipeline systems facing multiple corrosion defects. The method presented failure analysis and 
frequency estimations of a corrosion-based failure but did not advise on optimisation of the 
local corrosion induced failure.  
 
Choi et al [2016], developed an enhanced method based on fault-tree analysis for reliability and 
availability assessment of seabed storage tanks. The work suggested underwater storage tanks 
for subsea production and proposed a four-step procedure for defining system boundary, 
collection of reliability data, constructing a reliability tree and estimating the reliability of the 
subsea tank. 
 
Thies et al [2016] applied accelerated testing by exposing static submarine power cable, fitted 
with an articulated pipe bend restrictor, to mechanical load regimes exceeding the allowable 
design loads in order to provoke accelerated wear and component failure in order to improve 
its design and operational life curve. 
 
Lee et al [2016], developed a pragmatic model for determining the optimal load tolerance and 
reliability of a newly developed offshore asset based on return periods on environmental loads 
of waves, currents, and winds. The model is distinctive because it established a relationship 
between expected load and structural reliability and also applied a probabilistic procedure for 
estimating capital expenditure and risk expenditure based on load tolerances. Similarly, 
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Vedachalam et al, [2015] modelled and analysed the reliability of a long step-out subsea 
boosting system using the fault-tree-analysis method and further recommended optimisation of 
some of the components such as the seal by means of pressure compensation technique. 
 
Kolios et al [2016], developed an enhanced TOPSIS (Technique for Order of Preference by 
Similarity to Ideal Solution) and applied it for decision making on reliable structural 
configuration for offshore wind turbine support on the basis of stochastic data from experts and 
associated weighting. Human reliability in offshore operations was similarly addressed by 
Akyuz et al [2016] using an enhancement of the human error assessment and reduction 
technique (HEART) which incorporated, interval type-2 fuzzy sets in order to override more of 
the uncertainty of experts’ judgement and expressions in decision-making. 
 
 
In a bid to enforce reliability practice across the subsea industry, ISO 20815 standard stressed 
the need for representation of stochastic variations related to lifetimes and restoration times 
using probability distributions while AP1 17N RP provided a structured approach which 
organisations can adopt for management of uncertainty throughout project lifecycle [Emmet et 
al, 2012]. 
 
Modelling complications are encountered when process variables such as temperatures, mass 
flows, pressures, affects the probability of occurrence of the events in resonance with human 
and organisational influence [Norris et al, 2016; Zoe, 2009; Anthonovsky, 2016]. 
 
An accelerated life testing (ALT) reliability analysis is meant to help operators ascertain the 
difference between the reliability warranty values suggested by the manufacturers and the 
realistic asset performance [Naseri et al, 2016] being that risk influencing factors such as seabed 
temperature of 5℃ at 4000 meters of depth, PCO2 fugacity, and pH which are prevalent and are 
major agents of asset degradation at seabed need to be considered. Unfortunately, literatures on 
reliability of subsea compression technology are barely available at this time due to the nature 
of its very recent development. This perceived vacuum inspired this work whose main aim is 
to propose an assessment model that links failure distribution to influencing covariates using 
Weibull analysis; in order to forecast asset survival rate and reliability.  
 
This research combines the statistical confidence bounds of a two parameter Weibull model and 
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a covariate model to create a new reliability model technical failure assessment, this study 
demonstrates that the lifecycle operational requirements of a subsea system can be understood 
and improved by analysing the effect of a corrosion stress on a Weibull failure data in addition 
to fuzzy scaling of human and operational barriers. A case study on a subsea compression 
system was used to demonstrate the applicability of the model. The poor reliability of a subsea 
system can be optimized by breaking down component systems using Reliability-Block-
Diagrams (RBD) and prioritizing the components based on Fusell-Vesely reliability 
importance. 
 
2.3.1 OREDA and Accelerated Failure Testing (AFT) 
 Offshore Reliability Database (OREDA) is a unique data source of mean failure rates, failure 
mode distribution and repair times for equipment used in the offshore industry from a wide 
variety of geographic areas, installations, equipment types and generic operating conditions 
between year 2000 and 2009 [OREDA, 2009]. OREDA is a joint industry project for the 
aggregation and storage of equipment failure times and associated data. With over 17000 
equipment units of subsea oil and gas equipment recorded up to date, there is no doubt that it is 
indeed the largest data bank for offshore equipment at present.  
 
Ideally, real historical failure data are the most suitable for reliability modelling. Unfortunately, 
such data only become available towards the end life of a system and that justifies the use of 
OREDA values for MTTF in place of real field data. This means that OREDA may not be 
completely relied upon for accurate prediction of failure times of emerging technology and 
components which have little or no historical records but could be used for failure prediction. 
 
It is true that the latest version of OREDA consists of some consolidated failure data based on  
subsea-based installations. However, OREDA handbook reports the parameters of the hazard 
rate and average active repair time of a variety of the equipment units installed on offshore oil 
and gas platforms operating mainly in the North and Norwegian Seas. These areas are 
considered the base areas and are often used as the baseline. [Naseri et al, 2016]. Whilst 
OREDA is a very useful book due to its massive database, it hardly does report full 
comprehensive data for other areas across the world where substantial new subsea production 
activities have been carried out in offshore fields with harsh weather conditions. More 
specifically, OREDA data only consists of various failure rates (MTTFs) of selected subsea 
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components. From a reliability perspective, these data are far from sufficient for the prediction 
of overall failure rate since it does not tell much about the cumulative failure rate and reliability 
of the entire system at a given time. The various parts fail at their mean lifetimes, therefore the 
comprehensive analysis reported in this work is a crucial step forward to identify those critical 
parts for enhancement 
 
 As part of the effort to address the gap, the system analysed in this thesis is for the West African 
Offshore environment with the covariate physical conditions being incorporated into the 
Weibull model of OREDA data in order to predict realistic failure time of the asset.  
 
MTTF is the mean of distribution of a product’s life calculated by dividing the total operating 
time, accumulated by a defined class of components within a given period of the total number 
of failures in that time period. It must be noted that it is based on a statistical sample and is not 
intended to predict any one specific unit’s reliability, in order words, MTTF is not a necessarily 
warranty statement but manufacturer’s statistical prediction devoid of usage environment 
variations. Table 3 shows some of the data sources which are used for reliability analysis. 
 
Table 3 : Table of Various Reliability Data Sources 
 
Various Reliability Data Sources Focus
CCPS Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability 
Data, AIChE, 1989 Process Reliability
EiReDA - European Industry Reliability Data Both and Mechanical and Electrical data of mainly nuclear plant components.
EPRD - Electronic Parts Reliability Data (RIAC) Mainly components in nuclear power plants
Subsea Master Exprosoft
Many data for with enabling software tools for analysis. : Components in subsea oil/gas 
production systems
Failure in the electro-power supply system Power System In Norwegian
FIDES Mainly electronic components
FMD-97 Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions (RIAC)
GIDEP (Government-Industry DataExchange Program)
Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for 
Mechanical Equipment - Mechanical equipment - 
military applications Mainly for military and high precision designs
IEC/TR 62380 Reliability Data Handbook Universal model for reliability prediction of electronics components, PCBs and equipment
IEEE Std. 500-1984
IEEE Guide to the Collection andPresentation of Electrical, Electronic, Sensing 
Component, and Mechanical Equipment Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating 
Stations
MIL-HDBK-217F Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
NPRD-95 Non-electronic Parts Reliability 
Data (RIAC)
OREDA - Offshore Reliability Data Specifically for offshore oil and gas data
PERD - Process Equipment Reliability Data(AIChE) Process equipment
PDS Data Handbook Reliability Data for Process Control and Safety Systems (PDS)
EXIDA Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook (exida), 
SPIDR System and Part Integrated Data Report  (System Reliability Center)
Telecordia SR-332 Reliability Prediction for Electronic Equipment (Telcordia Technologies)
T-Book Reliability Data of Components in Nordic Nuclear Power Plants (ISBN 91-631-0426-1)
 25 
 
In AFT, the covariates act multiplicatively at the failure time by some constant, so its effect is 
to accelerate or decelerate failure time. This assumption provides a physical or chemical 
interpretation for the effect of covariates on the failure time. Hence, the AFT can be more 
appealing in many cases due to this direct interpretation [Gao et al, 2010]. Furthermore, unlike 
proportional hazards models, the regression parameter estimates from AFT models are robust 
to omitted covariates, and they can be used to quantify the effect of time-dependent covariates. 
Such induced stress normalizes the data set and makes it suitable for stochastic analysis and 
prediction of reliability. 
 
System failure data are usually gathered from historical performance archives, but in practice, 
these data are insufficient and do not reflect the real operational conditions of its purposed 
domain [El Abassy et al, 2014]. 
 
In further attempts to account for these life cycle conditions, a number of numerical models 
consisting of life-covariate relationship such as the Arrhenius model, Proportional Hazard 
Model (PHM), Eyring model Extended Hazard Regression, Inverse Power Law had been seen 
to provide acceptable results [Nelson,  2009]. Reliability analysis had been carried out using 
experimentally or field-sourced failure data and applying predictive models in order to 
extrapolate results of system reliability beyond the given data range [Goode, 2016; Volk et al, 
2004; Barabadi et al, 2011; Barabadi et al, 2014, Tsoukalas, 2016; Gómez Fernández, 2016;   
Chiaccio, 2016; Peng et al, 2016; Naseri, 2016; Gao, 2016]. For example, in PHM, the 
operational conditions are considered to be a covariate, such that the reliability of the system is 
a product of time and covariates. The covariate acts multiplicatively on the threshold hazard 
rate by some constant [Zhang et al, 2014].  
 
The major limitation of asset life covariate models such as PHM is that it usually has many 
assumptions which are not applicable in many real world cases. It can only be applied to time-
independent covariates; notwithstanding, it is still the most frequently used due to its simplicity 
and commercial application [Barabadi, 2014]. 
 
One of the most important applications of AFT is analyses of failure data whereby collected 
data is subjected to high level of operational stress (covariate) is used to predict the behaviour 
of a system [Tsoukalas, 2016, Naseri, 2016]. 
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The analysis of ALT data consists of (i) selection of an underlying life distribution that describes 
the system such as Weibull analysis (ii) incorporating a life-covariate relationship development. 
The first step towards AFT is understanding the operation mechanism of the system. 
Accelerated life testing (ALT) is a procedure that exploits the fatigue properties of materials to 
aid in the design and validation process (Lawless, 2003). The general trend is to use ALT as a 
method to demonstrate the suitability of a particular design and/or system for field usage. 
Another useful application for the ALT data is to aid in determining the effect of operating a 
system outside its original design conditions. Generally, this allows the development of 
reasonably accurate estimates of life when operated at higher  loads. 
 
This is done in order review the various components that make up the system and their failure 
mode through data collection. Failure data is sourced from a combination of expert opinion, 
archived reliability databases or manufacturers’ prediction about equipment failure times. In 
this work, failure data values were obtained from OREDA data bank while failure modes were 
obtained from expert opinion using interviews and short questionnaires. 
 
Due to the fact that Accelerated Life Testing has to be designed and performed in order to 
generate the failure behaviour of the whole system, it may involve performing Weibull analysis 
on the collected failure data to determine the model parameters ‘α’ the scale parameter and ‘β’ 
the shape parameter of the data. These parameters are then integrated into the covariate 
expression generated from a corrosion profile of subsea hardware and the exponential of the 
new model gives the hazard rate and reliability of the system. 
 
To verify the appropriateness of the ALT reliability model and check its validity, a number of 
methods are used in several ways, however, the most common way of doing it is by using the 
quartile-quartile plot. A straight line through the origin of the Kaplan-Meier estimated values 
for failure data indicates that AFT model is alright. 
 
2.3.2 Weibull Modelling 
 The reliability distribution of the subsea processing system can be effectively modelled after 
a two- parameter Weibull distribution together with a certain life covariate parameter. Weibull 
distribution is one of the most widely used lifetime distributions in reliability engineering. 
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Arguably, there are a number of methods for modelling failure rate. These include Weibull, 
log-logistic, gamma, log-normal, exponential models (Lawless, 2003). All of them are 
acceptable dependent on data set distributions, however, Weibull two-parameter modelling was 
the made the choice baseline model because it offers best fit plot for failure data; in contrast to 
others in the list which are usually associated with some form of skewness making them more 
suitable for queuing theory data modelling (Ebeling, 1997). The two parameter Weibull was 
chosen because it accommodates distributions with zero values while the 3 parameter Weibull 
distribution does not have accommodation for zero lower bound which implies that for failures 
less that the lower bounds, there is no chance of failure. The third parameter (location) is often 
used when data point do not fall on a straight line but a sharp concave or convex curve. The 
two- parameter Weibull distribution can take on the characteristics of other types of 
distributions, based on the value of the shape parameter. It is often used for modelling data sets 
containing values greater than zero, such as failure data.  
 
In Engineering, Weibull analysis can make predictions about a product's life, compare the 
reliability of competing product designs, statistically establish warranty policies or proactively 
manage spare parts inventories, to name just a few common industrial applications (Mohammad 
et al, 2014). 
 
In academic research, Weibull analysis has been used to model diverse phenomena such as the 
length of labor strikes, AIDS mortality and earthquake probabilities and several other 
probabilistic events (Nakhaee et al, 2009; Hristopoulos et al, 2014). These prove that Weibull 
modelling is a robust tool for failure analysis. 
Table 4 shows the various categories of techniques and tools for reliability and risk analysis.  
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Table 4: Reliability Analysis Techniques  
 
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR RELIABILITY 
1 Fault Tolerance  
 
Parts De-rating and Selection 
 
Stress-Strength Test 
2 Methods for Architectural Analysis and Dependability 
 
Bottom-Up Method 
 
Event Tree Analysis 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
 
Hazard and Operability Study 
 
Top-Down Approach 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 Artificial Neural Networking, Fuzzy and Bayesian Systems 
 
Markov Analysis 
 
Petri Net Analysis 
 
Truth Table (Structure Function Analysis) 
 
Reliability Block Diagram 
3 Methods for Estimating Reliability Parameters of Basic Events  
 
Failure Rate Prediction 
 
Human Reliability Analysis 
 
Statistical Reliability Method 
 
Software Reliability Method 
 
2.3.3 Asset Integrity Management 
Asset integrity could be described as a situation whereby an asset performs its designated 
function effectively and efficiently while sustaining its operations and processes in such a way 
that there is no harm. (Khan et al, 2016).  Asset integrity ensures that subsea production 
facilities are designed in compliance with regulations and specified safety standards without 
undermining operability, safety, availability and maintainability (Ramasamy, 2015).   
 
The main aim of asset integrity management is to make sure that subsea oil and gas operators 
safely abide by all regulatory policies and standards; both local and international which are 
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designed based on best-fit industry requirements and regulations; this enables the equipment to 
remain fit for purpose, reliable and operational under designed threshold. Many subsea oil and 
gas firms employ an asset integrity strategy at various phases of an asset lifecycle which may 
consists of design, installation, commissioning, operation and decommissioning stages.  
 
The operational stage of an asset often requires routine reappraisals for additional retrofits in 
terms of processes and equipment because asset failure frequency tends to increase after initial 
design life. A number of research have been performed on asset integrity with focus on oil and 
gas offshore. 
 
Baby (2008) suggested that an assets operational integrity is directly linked to technical barriers 
of the system such as required experience, appropriate knowledge, competent manpower 
adequate manning and reliable data for decision making during an assets’ lifecycle. 
 
Khan (2016) argued that predictive maintenance is always more effective and recommended 
that material deterioration and associated cost be modelled in terms of a time- dependent 
stochastic process as it prevents failure uncertainties.  
 
A Bayesian method was proposed by Zarei et al (2016) incorporating new information such as 
near misses and mishaps and using algorithm to map the risk. Though the method is robust, it 
appears static and seems inadequate for complex situations. The Fuzzy Multiple Criteria 
Decision Making (MCDM) developed by AlNajjar et al (2003) for evaluating a mix of 
approaches and selecting the most adequate maintenance approach presented a well-structured 
method for integrity management strategy selection. Bevilacqua et al (2005) applied an 
enhanced Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) for asset failure rate and integrity 
optimization.  
 
El-Abbasy et al [2014] designed a condition assessment and prediction model which is used to 
analyse expected deterioration curves for offshore oil and gas pipelines while Ossai et al [2016] 
applied Markovian analysis on the operational parameters and pit depths of pipelines in a way 
that predicts crack initiation times for various corrosion rates.  Lundteigen et al [2009] outlined 
a new approach which incorporated Reliability, Availability and Maintenance and Safety 
(RAMS) into the life cycle of an assets operating at high pressures environments.  
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Aven [2016] buttressed that the future of risk and integrity management would be based on 
balanced risk-based approaches, cautionary/precautionary (robustness, resilience, adaptive), 
and discourse-based approaches. The review was a suggestion for mixed decision making 
approach that entails both quantitative, probabilistic and non-probabilistic concepts. 
 
The contribution by  [Netto et al, 2013], presented a subsea flexible pipe integrity management 
tool which is based on  data enveloping analyses (DEA). This allows linear programming to 
maximize relative risk by coupling  subjective weights of input for the main observed failure 
mechanisms with objective expected failure modes.  
 
A comprehensive approach was put forward by Rahim et al [2010] suggesting a Cause-Effect-
Action-Outcome chain analysis using a 5C integrity model which consists of Competence, 
Compliance, Communication, Collaboration and Control. 
 
A more robust framework for asset integrity will be useful for achieving the goal of ensuring 
that assets meet their full life cycle usage requirements or intention. Subsea asset integrity 
framework requires the systematic and continuous monitoring of activities from concept 
selection, detail engineering, procurement, manufacturing, construction, installation, 
commissioning, operation, inspection and maintenance to meet asset integrity objectives.  
 
2.4 Risk Management. 
 Risk management is the systematic application of policies, procedures, methods and 
practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating and monitoring risks’ (BS 
6079: 3-2000). Operational risk in a subsea environment refers to the probability of misfortune 
within a subsea asset and these include safety concerns, explosions, environmental danger, loss 
of production, and associated costs [Okoh et al, 2016].  In practical terms, it refers to those sub-
set of risks which are usually generated by the Assets, People, Processes, Products. 
   
According to Burduk et al, (2006), the effectiveness of a risk management program hugely 
depends on a firms’ ability to identify the inherent hazards in its systems, the situations that can 
generate them, the vulnerable areas of uncertainty, and whether it can exercise control over 
these risk generators. 
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Many times, operational risk management is formally implemented by the adoption of defined 
risk management standards, guidelines or policies. Whilst there exists a range of specific risk 
management approaches and standards at the moment for subsea application, the risk analysis 
process itself consists of a number of well-defined steps which are broadly the same across all 
available risk management guidelines. A close look at the structure of most risk management 
approaches takes after the PDCA flow diagram which is further broken down to the Fig 6.  
 
Figure 6: Basic Risk Management Procedure  
 
Identification of the risk source involves unravelling the root causes in order to make proper 
plans for treatment. Risk estimation is another vital part of the risk management process because 
it helps to quantitatively and qualitatively predict the certainty associated with a risk’s 
manifestation as well as its magnitude (Okaabe et al, 2009).  
 
There are several methods for quantitative risk analysis which may include Monte Carlo 
simulations, Poisson distribution, Pareto distributions, Log normal distributions, gamma 
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distributions (Chiaccio et al, 2016, Tsoukalas 2016) and several other stochastic approaches 
which are used to model and predict the possibilities and impacts of a risk or group of risks.   
 
Whilst, these statistical estimates help to model and predict risk, they all have their peculiar 
strengths and limitations because they are actually mere guides for estimates and assumptions, 
which may not be exact with reality. All the methodologies have their pros and cons, but Monte 
Carlo simulations seems to be quite flexible and effective because it makes it easy to understand 
many risks variable; once the parameters and scatter plot are created (Okabe et al, 2009). 
 
Risk controls are the strategic responses deployed towards an identified risk based on the results 
from risk identification analysis and predicted severity on a firms’ short-term or long-term 
objective [Vinnem et al,2016]. A firm could either; exploit the risky situation with some 
positive expectation, avoid the risks, transfer the risks or accept it while communication is 
maintained throughout the whole process as duly pointed out in Fig 6. 
 
For many centuries in the past, risk management was traditionally done by experience, guesses 
and feel. Although the approach worked in certain cases, it was found to be broadly ineffective 
as proved by the huge losses encountered by firms towards the end of the last century (Williams 
et al, 2006).  
 
Risk-based evaluation analysis have been utilized to determine the optimal repair or 
replacement times of subsea process equipment, hinged on the likelihood and consequence of 
failure caused by time-dependent degradation mechanisms [Thordi et al, 2013]. 
 
Aven, Sklet [2006], developed a method for barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon 
releases by combining qualitative and quantitative data to predict platform specific hydrocarbon 
release frequency. Similarly, Shafiee et al [2015], presented a Multi-Criteria-Decision-Making 
(MCDM) method which is based on Analytic Network Process (ANP) method for choosing the 
best risk mitigation strategy for offshore wind assets. 
 
The risks in an offshore production environment can be modelled and analysed in terms of 
monetary value per cycle of operator to determine whether a predicted risk exceeds a predefined 
target risk tolerance [Aljaroudi et al, 2015]. Although limit state approach was applied to 
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determine the probability of failure for a pipe however, the methodology did not consider 
human influence on risk vulnerability. 
 
Li et al [2016], presented a concise review of the current situations and risk impacts of offshore 
oil spills, as well as the policies and technologies in offshore oil spill response and 
countermeasures. The increasing risk of oil spills in the northern regions from the expansion of 
the Arctic Passage was addressed with specific recommendations. 
 
A methodical approach based on operational procedures and numerical analyses of allowable 
operational risk limits in sea state has been applied to identify critical events and decide the 
corresponding semi-probabilistic response parameters during the planning phase of offshore 
installation [Acero et al, 2016]. 
 
Hughes et al [2016], developed a very interesting method which combines qualitative and 
quantitative data to measure, analyse and potentially improve a system’s energy security based 
on well-known properties of events such as the frequency of occurrence and expected stress 
and that of entities such as flows, time-to-recover, and stress-tolerance.  
 
Haugen et al, [2016], provided a brilliant discussion on the concept of black swans and stressed 
that it is better to be aware of events which may come as unprecedented surprises, and create 
uncertainty in risk assessment process. [Li X, et al 2016], presented a Bayesian-based 
quantitative risk analysis method which was used to model cause and effects relationships of 
uncertainties surrounding a subsea pipeline. 
 
Johannessen et al [2015], studied the high-risk work involved in subsea operations and provided 
in-depth insights on how the subsea operators can readily respond to disruptive events by 
balancing of organisational structure and flexibility through informal leadership redundancy. 
The recommended approach encouraged the decentralisation of silo-structured risk 
management strategy and the implementation of risk management at the grassroots level of an 
organogram for efficient operations. 
 
In several subsea oil production companies, there are no specific rigid rules for managing 
operational risks but information gathered from available literature depicts that risk 
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management initiatives are maximized through the application of any of the category of broad 
approaches under-listed. 
 The Enterprise- Wide Risk Management Approach (ERM) 
 Generic Risk Management Approaches 
 Stand Alone Approaches. 
 
2.4.1 The Enterprise-Wide Risk Management (EWRM) 
 Enterprise-Wide Risk Management is the process whereby an organisation’s top 
management and other distinguished persons involved in strategy setting across an enterprise; 
put up certain strategies for managing risk within the firm’s risk appetite and drive the firm 
towards realizing its corporate objectives. (Steinberg et al, 2004; Lam, 2014).  
 
According to Gupta (2006), Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is rapidly emerging as the 
powerful tool which helps in making better decisions across the organisation as regards risk 
identification, measurement and treatment. A candid example of an ERM framework is the 
COSO-ERM framework that was designed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisation of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO) in a bid to encourage and enhance the ability to manage 
internal risks in industrial systems. According to Samson et al (2008), this well-structured 
framework is the most widely adopted and utilised approach for risk identification, assessment 
and mitigation of risk. It further stresses that most of the other risk management are either 
enhancement of this original format or simply sprung out of it.  
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Figure 7: The COSO Enterprise Risk Management Cube. (COSO,  2004). 
 
Fig 7 depicts the ORM system framework which contains the synchronisation of three different 
divisions. The framework is categorised into three main divisions A, B, C.  
(A) The first division focuses on the following elements of an organisation as discussed in 
detail by [Moeller, 2011]: 
 Strategic – Deals with goals and missions of the organisation. 
 Operations- Allocation and utilisation of resources.  
 Reporting – Special focus on reliability of data. 
 Compliance- focuses on laws and regulations (Steinberg et al, 2004). 
(B) The second division  focuses on the application of risk management based on the   
complexity and of the organisation by categorising into the following: 
 Subsidiary 
 Business unit,  
 Division 
 Entry level. 
(C) The third division focuses on the actual implementation process of the COSO  
framework which consists of the following eight interrelated steps: [Tricker, 2015] 
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 Internal Environment: This refers to a philosophical approach whereby risk culture and 
risk appetite, culture and awareness is established in an organisation. 
 Objective setting:  refers to the establishment of a well-structured strategy guiding the 
setting of a firm’s objectives. 
 Event Identification: Identification of the internal and external factors that bring risks 
and opportunities in a firm. 
 Risk Assessment: The process in risk management whereby the possibility of a risk 
occurring and its impact is determined. 
 Risk Response:   The process of determining the tolerance level for a risk by deciding 
whether to avoid, accept, reduce, or share the risk.  
 Control Activities:  The application of procedures and policies in order to ensure that 
appropriate action is taken. 
 Information and Communication: This refers to the dissemination of information 
concerning risk management whereby information move up down, across and through 
the entirety of the firm. 
 Monitoring: Routine monitoring of the applied process and modifications made if 
necessary (Steinberg, 2004, COSO, 2004). 
 
In practical terms, COSO-ERM framework was designed to help manage the risks across 
various sectors of any organisation for strategic enterprise wide risk management. Lam [2014] 
noted that the advantages of ERM includes organisational effectiveness, improved risk 
reporting and business performance. After pondering on the third division of the cube 
(implementation phase), it is clear that the implementation procedure closely relates to the 
robust Deming’s Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle as shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: The Relationship between COSO Framework and PDCA Cycle 
Stage PDCA Cycle 
 Internal Environment 
 Objective Setting 
 
PLAN 
 Event Identification 
 Risk Assessment  
DO 
 Risk Response 
 Control Activities 
CHECK 
 Information and Communication 
 Monitoring 
ACT 
 
Interestingly, many researchers have criticised the COSO-ERM approach citing that the cube 
is overtly confusing, failed to give adequate and specific advice concerning operations 
management and had the following fault lines; (Gates, 2006, Andersen 2006): 
 It seems to have a lot of flavour for financial risks thereby neglecting technical risks. 
 It did not clearly extrapolate risk discussions to strategic levels as par being proactive. 
 It did not provide a two-way top to down and bottom to up approach with full support 
from top management. 
 It failed to produce a wholesome view of enterprise in order to trap a variety of risk 
throughout the firm.  
 Failed to give practical advice and does not treat risk pro-actively hence could be 
misleading 
 
In industries, top management have expressed their dissatisfaction towards the COSO ERM 
framework by considering it too detailed, non-value adding hence little need to waste time and 
resources on such an activity. A survey by Beasley et al (2010) found that 41% of the companies 
believe the cube is theoretically sound while 25.4% declared that it is too complex, failed to 
address the core operational needs and causes negative reaction to the use of the framework. 
Notwithstanding the report, it is still the most widely cited, adopted and utilised approach for 
identifying, assessing and mitigating risks. At this stage in this research, it is quite early to argue 
about the efficacy of COSO-ERM framework in handling operational risks. Therefore, later on 
in this work, we shall investigate and discuss the efficacy of COSO – ERM and its application 
towards risk management via a survey.  
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2.4.2 The Generic Risk Management Frameworks  
 Many generic risk management approaches have been used in the past when risk 
management became an issue of concern. Currently, the most popular ones are the ISO 31000 
and the AZ/NZS 4360. 
 
The AS/NZS 4360:2004 is basically an Australian standard for management of risk. According 
to Rasmussen et al (2007), its approach is more flexible and mature than older standards such 
as the COSO ERM. It is viewed as an approach which provides considerable resources for 
managing different risk scenarios. It is achieved by focusing on both external and internal 
factors of risk, with priority given to stakeholders through proper consultation and 
communication. A major flaw detected in the standard is in the preface where it was mentioned 
that the standard applies to both opportunities and threats. That is a confusing statement and 
there was no further explanation pertaining to this in the body of the standard details as pointed 
out by Razz et al ( 2005). 
 
A very popular approach is the ISO 31000: 2009. It is a general guideline developed by the 
International Standard Organisation to be used by public, private, groups, individual and 
communities for management of risk. Unlike other ISO standards, ISO 31000 is not a certifiable 
standard, but provides guidelines regarding strategic management of risks in an environment. 
It was designed to take into account the various needs of a company in terms of objectives, 
operations, projects, products and services and all the inter-related tasks (ISO 31000, 2009). It 
is also hinged on the PDCA ideology whilst combining several best aspects of the other existing 
risk management, such as the Canadian CSA Q850, Australian AZ/NZS 4360 and the COSO 
framework which makes it relatively comprehensible compared to the others (Hortreed, 2010). 
Even though, the implementation is carried out across the entirety of an organisation, the core 
responsibility of RM lies on the shoulders of two or three persons of which one is a chief risk 
officer. Though these titles are important in a subsea production firm, it could be seen as 
promoting the much dreaded silo-based approach which often does not allow other employees 
to learn or participate actively in the risk management process. The job of risk custodians is to 
always enforce, review and embed risk culture within the organisation. 
ISO 31000 lays particular emphasis on the following areas:  
 Application of risk management in all decision making 
 Continual Improvement  
 Full accountability for risks from top management to the bottom 
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 Continual communication 
 Full integration into the organisations’ governance structure  
(ISO 31000:2009). 
 
Figure 8: ISO 31000 Risk Management Model (ISO 31000 Standard, 2009) 
 
From the diagram presented in Fig. 8 and from the contents of the ISO 31000 document, the 
ISO 31000 explicitly supported the following: 
 
 Risk management should be known by the key decision makers in the organisation and 
adequately applied during decision making. 
 It supported that top management should be committed towards risk management by 
making sure the procedures are embedded in governance and organisational activities.  
 Linkage between risk management and information flow through information 
technology as an essential part of risk management. 
 Professional trainings and establishment of audit teams and boards as custodians of the 
risk framework and the register helps to embed risk culture across an organisation. 
(Hortreed, 2010, Banks, 2012).  
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The ISO 31000 standard is comparatively clearer than the cuboid COSO framework. Experts 
have expressed optimism about the robustness of ISO 31000; suggesting that it is more robust 
than COSO ERM and AZ/NZS 4360 because it provides systematic, logical and quick 
instructions and as such well-balanced in terms of scope [Tsiouras, 2015]. A study conducted 
by the ISO 31000 professional body discovered that 40% companies develop their own in-
house framework while 36% of the sample population use the ISO 31000 (ISO 31000, 2012). 
This issue shall be re-visited later on in later chapters. 
 
It is quite true that some of the risk standards mentioned are either project specific, operation 
focused or enterprise wide focused, but that does not suppress the fact that they are basically 
generic in outlook and are not specifically designed for the subsea production industry. 
Interestingly, a closer examination at all the frameworks discussed shows that they all took after 
the outline as the Deming’s PDCA cycle, suffice to say they took their roots from the much 
effective management cycle. 
 
Apart from the major strong points and remarks made in the table above, a number of slight 
differences were found amongst the risk standards. For instance, in the terminologies used, 
some of the frameworks used the words ‘risk evaluation’ or ‘risk estimation’, while others 
simply say ‘risk analysis’ meanwhile they all stand for risk analysis in the process. There were 
also differences in the definition of risk; some standards defined it as ‘threat’ or ‘hazard’, while 
other defined it as a possibility of both ‘threats’ and ‘opportunities’.  
 
A close look at the framework suggested by COSO, and ISO 31000 bodies readily shows some 
remarkable similarity between the two standards in terms of implementation structure. Both 
presented an integrated, step-by-step, generalist approach for the management of risk.  A review 
of both standards indicate that, ISO 31000 was developed from the best aspects of the COSO 
ERM and AZS 4360: 2004. Results from a survey indicated that most risk practitioners showed 
that 52% of the population preferred the ISO 31000 against 15% who opted for the COSO ERM 
framework [Marks, 2012]. The points highlighted by the respondents is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Comparison between ISO 31000 AND COSO-ERM framework 
 
The COSO ERM Framework The ISO 31000 Framework 
  It is comprehensive and has stood the 
test of time. 
 
 Is the standard that has been adopted 
by their regulators? 
 
 
 Their organization previously 
adopted it. 
 
 It leads to the COSO internal control 
framework. 
 
 
 It has a better discussion of risk 
appetite. 
 
 It is stronger on corporate 
governance. 
 
 
 There is a better linkage to strategies 
and objectives 
 
 Easier to understand and explain to 
others. It is user-friendly. 
 
 Written by practitioners instead of 
accountants and auditors 
 
 Clear, logical, intuitive, and practical 
 
 
 A better ‘how to’ guide, easier to use 
when implementing risk management 
 
 More focused on risk and less on 
audit and controls than COSO 
 
 Represents best practice and the 
collective wisdom of global risk 
leaders. 
 
 
 Flexible, less prescriptive, easily 
tailored. 
 
 Has a top-down approach to risk 
management 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, among all risk frameworks reviewed, none provided specific advice regarding 
the role of human aspects in implementation of risk management and its contribution to its 
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effectiveness. The human aspects include issues such as human reliability, bias, training and 
awareness, the role of top management and stakeholders. Incorporation of these aspects would 
have made these standards more user-friendly, practical and easy to adopt. The most pressing 
issue about the framework is its generalist tone which makes no mention of any key areas to be 
considered for application. In doing so, it failed in its capacity to provide adequate information 
which can pose a serious challenge to its potential users (say a subsea production firm) whom 
may find it difficult deciding how and where to apply risk management frameworks in their 
various systems. 
 
Furthermore, majority of the standards except ISO 31000 did not emphasize the need to 
routinely examine the effectiveness of the risk framework implementation and the need for 
noting the lessons learned for continuous improvement. It would have been more valuable to 
have clearly stated the ‘Dos and Don’ts’ plus possible challenges and limitations to be 
encountered when adopting any of the risk standards, code or recommended guideline. 
 
Finally, it was observed that all the risk management frameworks take after a basic procedure 
which normally starts with risk identification, risk analysis and risk treatment irrespective of   
variation in the sub activities contained in these three basic processes. A commendable attempt 
was made in the new ISO 31000 which stressed much on risk appetite and communication. 
Meanwhile, some informal sources have highlighted that a supplementary standard; a possible 
ISO 31001 is currently being developed to address more lapses in the previous ISO 31000 in 
terms of application.  
 
2.4.3 Subsea Risk Management Based On Stand-Alone Systems Standards. 
 The spate of rapid globalisation and continuous increase in market competition has 
continued to pose a serious challenge to organisations with respect to their management 
practices. In response to this, the International Organisation for Standard (ISO) and several 
other national standard institutes have developed a few management standards for regulation of 
specific aspects of the subsea production chain which may include quality, environment, 
occupational health and safety, business continuity and many more. 
  
Risk management could be managed quite subtly, but effectively through adherence to some 
well-defined international, national, industry-specific and operation specific standards and 
 43 
 
policies. Within the past couple of years, a lot of companies use a company-tailored standard 
which consists of a combination of several management or regulatory standards such as 
environmental standards, occupational health and safety standards, quality standards and some 
undocumented company specific standard to suit their needs. In the context of this research, 
these systems are termed ‘Stand Alone’ systems because they often focus on a subset of 
operational activity, in other words, they are less integrated. The standards include: 
 
DNV 306 OSS: Verification of Subsea Facilities 
The standard was designed for subsea engineers to focus on reducing risks in a pipeline, riser 
and subsea facilities and thus reduce risk at optimum cost. The document contains detailed risk-
based guidelines for the selection of appropriate verification scopes for subsea systems. One of 
the key strengths of the DNV 306 OSS is its combination of simplified analysis, inspections, 
quality controls and test to mitigate the risk of asset failure during operation. The major focus 
of the DNV standards include 
 
 Structural and pressure containment design reviews 
 Flow assurance design review 
 Process safety and control system design review 
 Type of independent calculations required 
 Fabrication requirements 
 Installation requirements 
 Commissioning requirements. 
 
The major con of the guideline is its apparent neglect for human factors and enterprise risks 
even though there was a mention that risk is not only related to physical failure modes, but also 
to operational errors, human errors and so on. For some risks the functional failures or physical 
failure modes contribute less than 20% while more than 80% of the risk relates to other devices 
(DNV OSS 306, 2004). It did not clearly discuss how any tool, statistical or otherwise could be 
used to trace organisational risks and whose responsibility it is to manage and chart-out these 
risks. 
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API 17 RP N: Subsea Production System Reliability  
The main aim of the standard is to identify the best practice and enhancements needed for 
the management and assessment of subsea reliability, technical risk and operational Integrity in 
the Subsea industry [Strutt et al 2014; API 2009]. It is also intended to present a guidance on 
management practices and tools to assess, optimise, manage and meet safety, environment and 
production goals.  
 
Its aim is to identify improvements to the alignment of reliability and integrity management 
activities during design and operational stages. There are two key major strengths of API 17RP 
N. Firstly, it provides an update section on the use of Technology Readiness Level (TRL) in 
qualification of new technology, and it is highly integrated with standard ISO 20815 – the 
production assurance standards for petrochemical companies, which is a very robust standard 
that has been in use for a longer period of time in the oil and gas industry. Other advantages 
include;  
 The API 17N schema provides a prepopulated network with links to key performance 
specific networks (with appropriate notation)  
 Using principle of modular Global Safety Network. 
 Gives structure to the application of API 17N reliability activities  
 Provided dashboard for monitoring status of current activities and managing 
documentation  
 Provided templates for supporting evidence and assurance documentation  
 Facilitated creation of assurance reports (plugin) for operators, investors and regulatory 
bodies dynamic link to supporting evidence such as the FMECA and qualification plan. 
 
However, it did not adequately discuss the reliability assessment of emerging subsea assets due 
to lacking of proper historical data. It could have provided advice on the kind of stressed 
stochastic analysis that may be needed to predict reliability performance of subsea systems in 
water. 
 
ISO 20815: Production Assurance and Reliability Management  
 According to the ISO 20815 standard, the petroleum and natural gas industries require large 
capital investment as well as operational expenditures ISO 20815 [2012]. The profitability of 
these industries is dependent upon the reliability, availability and maintainability of systems 
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and components that are used. Therefore, for optimal production availability in the oil and gas 
business, a standardized, integrated reliability approach is required. The concept of production 
assurance, introduced in this International Standard, enables a common understanding with 
respect to use of reliability technology in the various life-cycle phases and covers the activities 
implemented to achieve and maintain a performance level that is at its optimum in terms of the 
overall economy and, at the same time, consistent with applicable regulatory and framework 
conditions. 
 
This international standard designates 12 processes out of which seven are defined as core 
production assurance processes. The remaining five processes are denoted as interacting 
processes and are outside the scope of this International Standard. The interaction of the core 
production-assurance processes with these interacting processes, however, is within the scope 
of this International Standard as the information flow to and from these latter processes is 
required to ensure that production-assurance requirements can be fulfilled. 
 
DNV 0002: Subsea Integrity and Reliability Management 
The RP (DNV GL-RP-0002 ‘Management of Subsea Production Systems) is the result of a two 
year joint industry project (JIP) involving DONG Energy, FMC Technologies, GDF Suez, 
Norske Shell, Statoil, Talisman, Petroleum Safety Authority and Norwegian Oil and Gas. The 
JIP project explored the typical failure modes of existing subsea equipment and how the 
integrity of subsea equipment could be managed. 
 
The recommended practice has been developed to provide guidance for operators and suppliers 
for the establishment and maintenance of an integrity management system (IMS) for subsea 
production systems. A description of the overall IMS with the core integrity management 
process (IMP) is provided respectively considering the IMP in a lifecycle perspective. It further 
describes the four main activities that form the IMP and gives recommendations on how to 
establish and maintain integrity by carrying out these activities: [DNVGL-RP-0002, 2014] 
  
A. Threats and failure modes  
B. Risk assessment and IM planning working process  
C. Recommendations with regards to corrosion and erosion. 
D. D: Integrity reporting template. 
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Failures in subsea production systems can arise from inadequate design, manufacturing or 
installation. In operation, material degradation as well as structural threats, natural hazard and 
operational threats, might cause failure of the system. The standard demonstrated that 
information management and documentation is a particular challenge and organisational 
interfaces can also impede clear communication and exchange of operational data across 
operators’ organisations. 
 
The subsea industry is challenged by high cost levels and complexity therefore integrity 
management is not only a matter of operational control on a daily basis, it should start from the 
outset of the design phase and continue through the entire life span of the system [Turander, 
2014].   
 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Guidance Notes: ABS is one of the largest 
classification society in the world. The standard is termed risk assessment applications for the 
marine and offshore oil and gas industries. It suggested many positive recommendations for 
risk management in the offshore industry. Firstly, it presented a distinction between broad 
focused risk analysis and narrow focused risk management and methods for selecting the best 
fit method for a case.  It provided a clear overview of many widely recognized risk management 
tools such as FMECA, FTA, ETA Bayesian and many others. The key advantage of the standard 
is that it is written in a clear and simple language which is easy to understand. It also 
incorporates the merits of deterministic and prescriptive regulatory requirements based mostly 
on experience, testing programs and expert judgment. [ABS 2000]. ABS rules and guides 
contains over 254 publications for various aspects of offshore oil and gas production  ranging 
from subsea pipelines, to human factors and safety assessment.  
 
 
BS OHSAS 18001 is an international management standard for management of occupational 
Health and Safety risks (OHS). It provides a structured framework for identifying, prioritising, 
evaluation, treatment and monitoring of OHS risks. It was designed to help protect workers, 
customers, and the public from health hazards and it can be applied to all categories of subsea 
organisations ranging from small, medium and large enterprises. It has been viewed to be 
compatible with   ISO 9001 and 14000 (British Standards Institution, 2008). 
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IEEE 1540-2001: This standard was developed by the International Electrical Electronics 
Association; a United States-based organisation whose standards and frameworks have often 
been adopted and used internationally. Besides advocating for the normal risk identification, 
assessment and treatment processes, it laid special emphasis on the need for adequate 
communication with the organisations’ stakeholders in the risk management process (Razz et 
al, 2005). 
 
IEC 62198: 2001: This standard was established by the International Electro technical 
Commission (IEC). It is a standard for managing risks in projects and operations containing a 
technological content. Its main emphasis lies on the need for communication across the various 
disciplines involved through risk reporting and treatment (Razz et al, 2005). 
 
BS 6079:3-2000:  This is a British Standard for project risk management released in the year 
2000. Its major strong points include the emphasis on stakeholder analysis and alignment of 
risk management measures towards business objectives and strategy (Razz et al, 2005). 
 
CAN/CSA Q850-97: This emphasises the importance of communication at all stage in the 
process, including close proper communication with all the stakeholders. In the UK, most of 
these standards are often used as supplementary “stand alone” standards.  
 
2.4.4 Global Outlook on Reliability and Risk Management. 
  
A study was carried out on 450 risk practitioners and business executives in 31 major 
industries across the globe by issuing questionnaires and conducting interviews on risk 
practitioners and business executives across a wide range of companies including energy firms 
globally. The survey exposed mostly the current trends as regards the current practice of risk 
management in many industries [Accenture and Oxford, 2013].  One of the key findings of the 
study is that risk management is increasingly being integrated with the rest of the organisation 
on an organisation-wide basis for decision making. 
 
Firstly, it was observed that most companies valued risk management more than they valued it 
in 2011 with 46% highlighting operational risks as a key external pressure and energy firms 
ranking operational risks among the top two key risks expected to rise within two years. 
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Secondly, up to 85% of the global companies surveyed considered risk management central and 
strategic for dealing with the growing competition and plan to enhance corporate risk handling 
capability through proper operational risk management. The third key information in the report 
is that 62% of the respondents from energy firms confirmed the adoption of Enterprise Risk 
Management program while 21% confirmed that none is being applied at their firms but there 
is plan to adopt a risk program in 1-2 years. Meanwhile, a similar survey conducted by ISO 
revealed that only 40% percent of companies manage their risks in-house (using self-tailored 
frameworks) while other companies manage risks with any of the local or international 
standards [ISO 31000, 2012].  
 
 ‘In terms of unsafe practices and conditions, there is zero tolerance on such risk,” notes RK 
Mehra, Head of International Trade and Risk Management at Bharat Petroleum, one of the 
largest state-owned oil and gas companies in India. “I have been working for 25 years in 
resources, and there has been a night-and-day change in the focus on risk,” agrees Accenture’s 
Mr. van ’t Noordende. “Risk incidents today impact your ‘license to operate,’ and if you have 
a bad enough incident, you can be shut down’ [Accenture and Oxford, 2013].   
 
Even though the majority of companies use one form of risk management program or the other, 
the data gathered from risk respondents indicated that a number of challenges has been 
encountered in the implementation of risk management so far.  Among all the risk types being 
investigated, operational risks were found to constitute a very high proportion of the risks posed 
to the companies. 
 
The challenges encountered are highlighted below: 
 The magnitude and size of risks are increasing: Among the major concerns expressed 
by executives is the continuous and rapid pace at which risks emerge and change its 
forms and the corresponding change in regulatory requirements. Inflexible company 
policies, lack of risk culture, structure and governance could be blamed for this. 
 There is insufficient proactive engagement of the organization with regulators and 
governments and this brings about lack of an integrated risk culture and reform by 
business units or senior management.  
 Organisational silos are preventing effective integration of risk management structures 
and responsibilities: Up to 46% of the executives surveyed expressed that operational 
risk management is only somewhat integrated into company systems while 50% 
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expressed that risk operational risk management. ‘somewhat’ here means averagely. 
Firm’s structural and governance structure is to be blamed for inability to integrate with 
other risks for effective operational risk management. 
 Lack of skilled staff to develop the right analytical models and the difficulty in 
embedding risk analytics in management processes..  
 Cost reduction and alignment of risk management with business strategy are ongoing 
executive concerns: This was rated the most challenging concern by 40% of the risk 
practitioners. This challenge is justified because the ultimate aim of risk management is 
to forestall and reduce unnecessary costs thereby saving money for the organisation 
save.  
 
2.5 Research Gaps and Summary 
 
• Many of the existing reliability standards are either too broadly advisory or have gaps 
for reliability assurance of emerging subsea oil and gas technology. 
• OREDA data is not sufficient for application at other areas. At subsea, material become 
too vulnerable due to extreme stresses from temperature, pressure, pH, corrosion and 
human factors which force the assets to degrade sharply, fail, explode or even cause 
deaths. Ideally, real historical failure data are the most suitable for reliability modelling. 
Unfortunately, such data only become available towards the end life of a system and 
OREDA data only contains conventional data which were gathered from the North Sea 
and as such may not apply to the Arctic or West African offshore. 
• Many of the existing methods for reliability prediction considered either only the impact 
of a single element such as temperature or cost or current load on the marine facilities. 
This research considers temperature, pressure,Co2 fugacity simultaneously within a 
corrosion profile model used as covariate stress ON basic failure data from OREDA. 
This is presented in chapter 4. 
• Offshore reliability database (OREDA) only listed the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) 
of individual subsea components but did not explicitly advice or consider the cumulative 
failure times of the components at system level. This is investigated in chapter 4. 
• There is need to measure how the subsea industry implement reliability and risk 
standards comprising of standards such as API, ISO, and DNV codes on risk, reliability 
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and production assurance respectively. A survey was conducted and presented in 
chapter 7. 
• Availability of practical methods for the selection of the right pump and pipe 
configuration based on expected flow output and cost, power requirements is still 
challenge and this is addressed in chapter 5. 
• Quantitative estimation of multivariate risk in the subsea oil and gas industry is still a 
huge challenge and this was further investigated and a method proposed in chapter 6. 
 
 
This chapter provided a basic understanding of how reliability, asset risk and integrity affect 
subsea production assurance. Definitions of risk from various authors were reviewed before 
narrowing down to the meaning of operational risks and its forms of manifestation in subsea 
production companies. Operational risk in the context of this research refers to those risks 
arising from the internal systems of subsea oil and gas firms.  
 
Several modern technologies for exploiting underwater hydrocarbons are being designed and 
deployed in deeper waters where they are faced with many harsh physical elements which may 
shorten their lifespan. The reliability of a subsea asset could be improved by modelling and 
considering several risk factors to prevent unprecedented failure, fatality and economic losses. 
An analysis method known as accelerated life testing has been shown to give more realistic 
results for equipment performance. Pumping and boosting of fluid from underwater reservoir 
to topside has also proved to facilitate oil recovery, however, the selection method for the best 
option is still unclear. These will be investigated in the next few chapters and a new 
methodology proposed.   
 
A comprehensive discussion was presented about the key areas in subsea production operations 
in accordance with available literature and the frameworks for risk management was 
extensively discussed and analysed. Consequently, the most commonly used risk management 
approaches; categorised into the generic approach, the enterprise wide approach and operations 
management systems approach were reviewed alongside their applications. The literature 
reviewed shows that many firms that practise risk management, either choose from any of the 
fore-mentioned standards or develop one to suit their operations and targets.    
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Recent risk reports were reviewed in order to pin-point the current trends and challenges facing 
organisations in terms of managing risks in operations. The core message emphasised in the 
literature was identification of the key risk areas and an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses 
of risk management frameworks and also identification of the current challenges in the 
operational activities of subsea production companies. Based on the literature review, the 
following issues can be summarised as: 
 The increasing volatility and growing complexity in business operations makes risk 
management critical and central to all industries operating in today's business world. 
 
 Awareness of practitioners and organisation’s governance structure has a big role to 
play for the success of risk management. 
 
 Although heightened awareness about risk management exists, critical exposures persist 
due to poor understanding and poor implementation. Hence, the benefits of enhanced 
risk capabilities are yet to be fully realized. 
 
 The failure to link up operational risk management with the key operational activities is 
like ‘leaving money on the table’ which eventually causes the failure to achieve high 
performance. 
 
 Effective risk management requires an infusion of risk culture, risk alertness, 
decentralisation of the silo-approach and an integration with other risks because 
operational risk is not exhaustive. It takes different forms and changes from operation 
to operation irrespective of the fact that there are key areas where they normally occur. 
A top-to-bottom approach is most suitable for improved results.  
 
 Subsea companies still face implementation problems with risk management, regardless 
of whether they use standardised ‘integrated systems’ or ‘stand-alone’ systems which 
prompts more companies to adjust the risk management approaches being used by 
tailoring to their own peculiar systems. 
 
In order to ascertain the validity of the mentioned points, recent information from a sample 
population of subsea companies shall be captured and analysed so that the various details 
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discussed in the literature review can either be confirmed or discarded and possible new 
discoveries made about status of operational risk management practice in Subsea companies. 
The next chapter discusses the strategy with which the data collection would be achieved.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the methodologies and procedures employed in the course of this research 
were explicitly described as well as the reasons behind the choices made. This chapter also 
goes as far as describing the type of data collected, how they were collected, from whom they 
were collected and how they would be analysed. The core methodologies applied in the thesis 
was meant to take care of subsea asset lifecycle.  Firstly, the reliability and optimization model 
for a subsea asset is developed from the combination of 2-parameter Weibull model and 
corrosion profile covariate to generate an Accelerated Life Testing model. Human reliability is 
analyzed using an enhanced BORA method. Secondly, Hubbert oil production prediction 
method was enhanced for determining production targets at pre-feed phase of project and the 
impact of artificial lifts on the economics of subsea wells facing hyperbolic decline in flow 
rates and pressure was examined. An efficiency-based methodology based on nodal analysis 
was then developed for the comparison of optimal design of subsea pipe-pump network with 
special considerations for parameters such as flow rate, pipe diameter, efficiency and pressure 
drop. Surveys were run to discover the trends with subsea risk practice in the subsea industry. 
Finally, a stochastic method for evaluating risk severity as a product of multivariate event 
magnitude and frequency was developed. All these methodologies were built into an integrated 
model for subsea production assurance and asset reliability management. 
 
3.1 Research Rationale 
The main reasons for starting the doctoral research project was to: 
1. Acquire and propose advanced and up-to-date knowledge within areas of; Subsea asset 
reliability and production assurance management.  
2. Be able to develop and apply new methods for reliability analysis.  
3. Enhance research skills involving cradle to grave management of subsea research projects, 
4. Writing of coherent scientific articles and articulate communication of research results.  
5. Propose and contribute beneficial new concepts and methods to existing body of 
knowledge.  
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6. Develop further international and local networks with reliability, project management, 
industrial engineering, management and production engineering experts. The overall 
approach for meeting these objectives are outlined in the following sections.  
 
3.2 Research Questions 
 
1. Can a method proposing an enhanced QRA model scope (which includes the supporting 
processes) adequately address the usefulness of reliability and risk simulation as a 
management tool in the context of the development and implementation of subsea 
production systems? 
2. What are the main physical and operational stresses that affect the reliability of a subsea 
production plant in a given location? 
 3. How can the overall efficiency of a subsea lift pump system be predicted considering the 
limitations of technical specifications such as power, diameter, pressure drop and cost? 
4. How do subsea companies respond to reliability and implement standard API, ISO, and 
DNV codes on risk, reliability and production assurance respectively. 
 5. Does organisational operational risks in the subsea sector really influence uptime or 
downtime? 
6. How can production assurance be ensured in depleting subsea wells. 
7. Does the size of a company affect the implementation strategy of risk and reliability 
management? 
 
 
3.3 Research Type 
 This study can best be described as a hybrid of explanatory and descriptive research. 
According to [Adler et al, 2015], a descriptive research allows the researcher to describe a 
phenomena, a group, attitude or events with keen focus on structure or attitude; often with the 
aid of some statistics. In line with the description, this research seeks to investigate the practice 
level of risk and asset reliability management across the subsea production sector and also use 
case studies which contain rigorous and detailed examination of a single case with an 
underlying assumption that the case represents many other such cases [Thomas, 2011]. An 
explanatory research is a research that attempts to find the cause and effect relationship about 
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a phenomenon which could lead to hypothesis or theory generation. It justifies the reliability 
modelling. 
 
These methods were chosen over other methods because the target environment for survey data 
was not controlled, survey-interviews were not open-ended, and the interview data being 
sought was not highly detailed (causal variables and confidence intervals) as obtainable in 
experimental, and explanatory methods respectively Production assets reliability and failure 
analysis were investigated with an explanatory philosophy in mind to establish cause and 
effect. 
 
 The overall aim was to obtain authentic and systematic data which could be used in averages, 
frequencies, consubstantial statistical predictions and develop best practice integrated model.  
 
3.4 Research Approach 
  The research entails a mixed approach consisting of qualitative and quantitative approach. 
Both deductive and inductive reasoning were applied at various stages in this research starting 
by developing concrete empirical evidence from OREDA, literature among other sources – a 
deductive approach; model developments/case studies and statistical analysis of the survey-
interview results before generalisation of the patterns found; based on the observation. The 
application of this sort of reasoning is justified considering the fact that the literature review 
was made up of abstractive observations of the key issues with subsea production management, 
whilst other technical data about equipment failure such as the OREDA data, had defined 
statistical forms. An inductive approach offers a good dose of flexibility with regards to the 
research outcome which may or may not agree with the initial premises and at such generates 
general conclusions or theory while a deductive reasoning requires narrowing down from 
general conclusions to specifics particularly statistical and empirical answers [Flick, 2015; 
Adams et al 2015]. Both approaches helped the researcher to properly investigate the 
contributions of metrics such as subsea temperatures, cost and pressure on asset life. They also 
helped in analysing key risk influencing areas in basic operations of subsea production and 
developing a tentative hypothesis whilst exploring the efficacy of the dominant risk 
management standards. These led to the consequent proposition of a better production 
assurance model for subsea oil and gas production companies. 
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3.4.1 Research Strategy  
 Research strategy is the systematic procedure, sequence and the research techniques 
employed in carrying out a research (Barbie,2010).  It is an expression of justification for the 
decisions made towards planning the research work. The details and justification for the 
strategy is presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Research procedure 
 
S/N Steps Area of Focus 
Stage 1 The Theoretical Foundation Literature reviews identifying Patterns, 
Challenges and State-of-the art 
Stage 2 Research design Design of data needs,  
Stage 3 Data collection methods Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches| 
This included primary and secondary data 
Stage 4 Execution  Target audience selection and 
choosing of sample size 
 Questionnaire design 
 Launch of survey 
 Follow up on respondents 
 Review of data collected/discard of 
inappropriate ones 
Stage 5 Modelling and Data Analysis Model development and interpretation of 
data 
 
Stage 6 Validation Testing of results through case studies, 
presentation to conferences, and journal 
submissions.  
Stage 7 Final thesis write-up Aggregation of all original research work 
done into a concise and comprehensive 
thesis 
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3.4.2 The Theoretical Base. 
 The theoretical base refers to the literature reviews which formed the foundation for this 
research as proved by elaborate subsea production management issues discussed. The 
theoretical part was not only meant to expose the contemporary methods for reliability analysis 
and risks in operations for subsea production companies but to also critically appraise the major 
risk management standards, technical and non-technical, thereby effectively fulfilling the 
objectives of this research work. The research question was developed at the end of the 
literature review and it focuses on what causes subsea assets to fail and how subsea production 
organisations respond to whole-system risk management in production operations. 
 
3.4.3 Research Design 
 Research design refers to the logical structure used by the researcher to answer the research 
question and justify whatever had been done in research to reach valid conclusions. Since the 
research question has been declared, the next step is to determine the type of data which would 
be gathered and analysed in order to deduce conclusions. This research made use of both 
primary data and secondary data. The combination of both primary and secondary data was 
aimed at getting a robust and reliable data about operational risk challenges as encouraged by 
Mattews’s (2010).  
 
3.4.4 Primary Data. 
 The primary data was obtained from interviews and questionnaires at various intervals 
during the years of the doctoral research. The main questionnaire in chapter 7 was a web-based 
questionnaire which was designed and distributed in order to gather more recent, reliable and 
data from respondents who are very familiar with subsea oil and gas and risks management, to 
assess the current Reliability, Asset Integrity Management and Operational Risk Practices in 
their various industries, the critical operational risk areas, awareness level of risk, reliability 
and integrity standards, and personal opinion about success factors for production assurance. 
The use of questionnaire was selected because it is comparatively convenient, less expensive, 
has wider reach, and offers greater level of anonymity (Adams, et al, 2015, Kumar, 2005). In 
addition, the researcher believes that the response would have a higher degree of accuracy 
because people seem to give even highly sensitive information when their identities are 
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unknown and there are less physical contacts. The extraction of primary data using 
questionnaires was also intended to enhance the originality of work rather than relying solely 
on historical data. The smaller questionnaire type structures were also used in Chapter 4 to 
gather data on human reliability. 
 
3.4.5 Secondary Data 
 The secondary data used in this research was gotten from reviews of articles, journals, 
books, internet sources and publications from various authors. The secondary data came mainly 
from OREDA handbook because the reliability data was meant to compliment the primary data 
earlier mentioned since it treated the issue of asset failure from a broader perspective involving 
a larger sample population. The use of secondary data was further justified by Hair et al (2007) 
who expressed that secondary data is used to compliment a primary data thereby minimising 
the time spent in gathering the raw data for the sake of  justifying the research appropriately. 
 
On critical review, it was found that even though the secondary data contained information 
about risks on a broad level, it contained very little information with regards to the realistic 
information on subsea production industry which informed the decision to obtain some primary  
data. 
 
3.4.6 Data Collection 
 There are two known systematic approaches for data collection in empirical social research. 
They are the qualitative and the quantitative approaches. A quantitative data-gathering 
technique is a method which is generally concerned with counting and measuring a 
phenomenon through structured observations, questionnaires, structured interviews and 
content analysis of documents (Blaikie, 2009). On the contrary, a qualitative method is the one 
which is more concerned with producing discursive descriptions and exploring social meanings 
and interpretations through participant observation, in-depth interviews, oral histories and even 
content analysis of document. Even though these are two distinct approaches; Miller et al 
(2003) stressed that researchers can combine both quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
either series or parallel as deemed fit for sourcing of data. 
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3.5 Quantitative Data 
In this research, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were utilised to gather the data. 
The combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods were used during the course of 
this research. The author carried out extensive review of existing literatures and industry 
reports in order to broadly understand the major asset risks in subsea production operations and 
their effects plus an assessment of the capabilities of existing methodologies and standards for 
their management. 
 
OREDA data was also stressed statistically to develop an Accelerated Life Testing model based 
on the numerical robustness of a Weibull Corrosion Covariate stress. This helped to analyse 
and optimize a Subsea Gas Compression used as case study. Thereafter, an enhanced Hubbert 
model was used to predict oil production in an offshore field for capacity planning. Nodal 
analysis was then applied on configurations of multiphase pumps for multiphase lifting from a 
subsea well. This was further analysed for the selection of the most efficient option based on 
power requirements, pressure differential, pipe diameter and cost efficiency.  
 
Furthermore, a Monte Carlo-style method was proposed to analyse the risks on a Subsea Drill 
Rig based on historical information. Structured questionnaires were distributed in order to 
amass expert opinions on the challenges being experienced in industry in terms of subsea risk, 
reliability and production management. The questionnaire method was used as a validated 
research tool because it was the most convenient way to collect information from a fairly large 
number of people in industry or large population. 
The work scope mainly deals with the following concepts which overlap and were often 
interchangeably used in the thesis 
 
 Subsea Asset Reliability and Risk 
 Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
 Production Assurance 
 
The focus is enhancing production efficiency, mitigating losses and enhancing firm’s 
profitability in a subsea production setting. The target is process improvement of subsea 
systems performance. All the sub-models developed in the chapters were assembled into an 
integrated model for subsea asset reliability, risk and production assurance. 
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3.6 Qualitative Data 
On the other hand, the qualitative data used; consisted of  literary reviews. It provided very 
broad details and critical analysis of  asset reliability and risk management standards policies 
relating to the operational aspects of subsea production firms. It also contained various 
scholarly views as relates to the key areas gullible to operational risks. At literature review, the 
author identified some of the key challenges affecting subsea operations risk management and 
decided to develop research questions which led to an investigation on subsea companies to 
discover trends in the practice of operations risk management, reliability and general asset 
integrity. The qualitative data was gathered with the aid of a well-structured questionnaire 
which aligns with the quantitative approach while the secondary data was made up of  
qualitative  analysis of a published document. The choice of a quantitative data was informed 
by the need to focus on and measure the opinions of the respondents about the problems facing 
risk management in operations of  subsea production  companies in order to make conclusions 
and generalise the result for the firms. Both qualitative and quantitative data were critically and 
statistically analysed respectively, to derive the conclusions and recommendations made at the 
later part of this work. 
 
3.6.1 Target Population and Sample Size Selection 
 The study population of this research has been identified as the West Africa subsea 
production  companies because it is a deep water region and has one of the major hot spots for 
many of the subsea technology being developed. Therefore an opinion from experts in the 
region could be used to understand technology gaps and needs. Sampling is the selection of a 
few  from a larger group to become the basis for estimating or generalising the dominance of 
an unknown chunk of information (Kumar, 2005). Recalling the initially stated research 
objectives and the research question, the focus sample size was established to include small, 
medium and large scale West African subsea oil and gas production companies. The inclusion 
of small and medium scale companies was borne out of the discovery that even SME’s employ 
formalised methods for strategic planning whilst maintaining high flexibility due to their small 
size; in response to change in their environments (Gibbons et al, 2005).  
 
Due to the enormous population of  subsea production  companies, the world wide web was 
chosen as the best way of capturing meaningful data from the research target population. The 
sample population was gotten from ‘LinkedIn’; a professional social networking platform 
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where professionals from all works of life meet to exchange ideas pertaining to their respective 
fields. A search was made on Linked with the words ‘Subsea Engineering, Asset Reliability 
and Integrity, Operational Risk Management’.The questionnaire was posted to a forum for  
subsea engineers and asset integrity experts with over 20,000 active members 
altogether.Distributing questionaire using the questionnaire on ‘LinkedIn’ was deemed best fit 
for capturing opinions from the target population because  it was the most convenient, genuine 
and relatively fast way of getting useful information from West African risk management and 
subsea firms. 
 
3.6.2 Questionnaire Design 
 Questionnaires are one of the most widely used  research methods and involves the 
formulation of precisely written queries  for  respondents whose views are needed to understand 
an attitude or behavior [Blaxter et al, 2010; Creswell 2014]. In academic circles, it is seen as a 
very convenient strategy for getting a wide-range of opinions about a phenomenon.  While 
there is nothing like an ideal questionnaire , some basic guidelines regarding wording and 
laying out of questionnaires were  well adhered to in accordance with Blaxter, et al (2010)  
during the development of the questionnaire. 
 
Questionnaires have always been used in operations strategy researches as well as other social 
researches. The core contents of the questionnaire was mainly developed out of the theoretical 
backgrounds of this work; with the intention of either confirming the assertions in the literature 
review or discovering new trends. The questionnaire was well-structured questions with inbuilt 
choice of answers.This was considered proper because, it made the survey easier for the 
respondents and also allowed the researcher focus on a limited number of variables considering 
the scope and time frame of the research. 
3.6.3 Ethical Consideration. 
 Ethics refers to an attempt to formulate codes and principles of moral behaviour for the 
conduct of social research (May, 2011). Ethical policies are established to guide researchers in 
ensuring that the privacy of the respondents is not abused in any way. The British Sociological 
Association code of ethics states that ‘Guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity given to 
the research participants must be honoured, unless there are clear and overriding reasons to do 
otherwise (British Sociological Association , 1996). Bearing the above rule in mind during the 
questionnaire design, no part was designed to get personal details of the participant. The 
 62 
 
introductory instructions to the survey clearly assured respondents of guaranteed anonymity 
and confidentiality of their responses during and after the dissertation life cycle. The intended 
respondents were also meant to understand that completing the survey is quite optional. 
3.6.4 Pilot Testing 
 A pilot test refers to a pre-test which is used to gauge the reaction and response rate of the 
intended population sample. According to Neuman (2011) pilot tests are designed to allow the 
supposed subjects uncover  certain aspects of the survey that needs refinement as well as help 
the researcher deduce the threats to the validity of the survey/interview so that they could be 
avoided. 
 
For the pilot test of the questionnaire, an informal piloting approach as recommended by  
Blaxter et al (2010) was  first applied to this work. This was carried out by sending the survey 
to five senior experts in the area of asset integrity and technical risk.The response rate was 
above 100% in a matter four weeks. Some of the experts offered recommendation on how to 
tweak some of the questions to get better results. These comments boosted the researcher’s 
morale and indicating that the questionnaire made sense.  
 
3.6.5 Questionnaire Launch 
 An introductory note explaining the purpose of the survey-interview, intended audience, 
contact details and an anonymity assurance statement was affixed to the survey and made 
available to experts in the field via the online platform ‘LinkedIn’. 
 
The web based approach through the use of ‘LinkedIn’ was chosen in order to gather as much 
responses as possible for sound data analysis bearing in mind that response rates of 
questionnaires have been known to be relatively low, especially when there is no sort of 
incentive for the respondents (May, 2011). Questionnaires are known to have a wider reach 
and ensures anonymity of the respondent which probably helps to get their innermost opinion 
about risk influencing factors in their respective companies. 
 
Overall, a total of 82 responses were gotten within a six month period. At this point, the sample 
gotten was found to be 33% of the initially projected sample size of 250. At this stage, the 
author deemed the sample size fit for analysis considering the time constraints and the fact that 
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Visser et al. (1996) discovered that surveys with response rates closer to 20% were found to be 
more accurate than the ones with about 60% response rates. 
 
Holbrook (2007) also expressed a similar view after evaluating a national survey with response 
rates ranging between 5% to 50% and discovered that the lower rates were just negligibly less 
accurate in terms of statistics. 
 
3.6.6  Data Entry And Analysis Approach. 
 The data collected were analysed using a range of parametric analysis approach. The 
parametric analysis consisted of running exponential regressions, descriptive statistics and 
factorial analysis and to interpreting the survey-interview. Parametric analysis is a robust and 
stronger statistical approach towards data analysis because it allows inferences to be made 
about the parameters of a distribution (Cox, 2006; Gupta, 2014). Parametric analysis was 
applied to this work as evident in the defined distribution such as Weibull among others and 
informed by technical equipment failure times, others had to do with fluid flow details, risk 
severity and respondents opinions concerning risk management practice across the focus 
subsea production firms.  
 
The questionnaire data was interpreted by taking  the ‘means’ of the responses across the 
sample, represents respondents’ opinion regarding a question. For instance, testing the 
responses of small scale industries and large scale against their views on occupational/safety 
risks based on an earlier hypothesis. 
 
3.6.7 Validation And Reliability Of Research 
 The validation of the Weibull reliability model was performed using a cox regression model. 
Appropriate discussions were provided for the severity and least cost models in subsequent 
chapters. The raw survey data were processed straight away without censoring. The internal 
validity of the research is balanced because procedures used in the research identified and 
measured what they were supposed to measure – equipment behaviour in subsea domain and 
operational risk influencing factors. The external validity also stands because the proposed 
model and methodology for reliability and risk assessment can be generalized beyond the 
immediate study based on the results obtained from the case studies and survey. Content and 
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criterion validity shows that all the analysis were related to the outcome, however, due to time 
constraints the results and propositions had not been tested in many more case studies. 
 
Reliability of research refers to the probability of achieving the same result using the same 
methodology by another researcher elsewhere. In this study, well-proven and universal 
empirical data from OREDA handbook was used, proven physical relationships were also 
integrated in the mathematical formulations for reliability performance analysis of subsea 
assets. Furthermore, the data collection, analysis and model development followed a clear 
logical sequence which conforms to the required research. Validation of the reliability model 
was done using the Cox model of proportionality as shown in Chapter 4.  
  
3.7 Summary  
 The essence of this chapter was to provide insight into the research methods that apply to 
the Research. Full details of the research strategy were presented, and justification was given 
for each choice made. In summary, the Weibull covariate model developed was validated using 
a case study for subsea compression system. Efficient and least-cost configuration of subsea 
pump-pipe system was validated using a combination of computer software-pipesim and 
deterministic physical calculations. A stochastic method was developed for evaluating 
multivariate risk based on severities of event magnitude and frequency and also validated using 
a case study based on a drill rig.  
 
Primary data was gathered from surveys while the secondary data was collected from OREDA 
database and literary reviews. The target population is subsea production firms and the research 
question aimed to find out how ORM is being practiced. 
 
Limitations were identified in the cause of data sourcing, however, these did not hinder analysis 
of the data. In conclusion, the research strategy applied to this research is a significant fresh 
addition to existing knowledge because it proposed a systematic way of identifying risks, 
evaluating reliability and ensuring that adequate risk controls are applied to the critical failure 
modes of a subsea system whether human, operational or equipment risk. 
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CHAPTER 4 
  Reliability Analysis and Optimisation of Subsea Compression System facing 
Operational Covariate Stresses.  
 
 
The scarcity of field-sourced reliability data for many of the new and emerging subsea 
technology coupled with the rough conditions of the subsea environment raises serious 
challenges for accurate prediction of reliable operating windows for subsea assets. This chapter 
highlights the current industry practice with regards to accelerated failure testing (AFT) and 
proposes an enhanced Weibull-Corrosion Covariate model for reliability assessment of a 
system bound to face operational stresses.  
 
The newly developed reliability model is applied to a case study of a Subsea Gas Compression 
System planned for offshore West Africa to predict its reliability index. System technical 
failure was modelled by developing a Weibull failure model and incorporating a physically 
tested corrosion profile as stress in order to quantify the survival rate of the system under 
additional operational covariates such as marine pH, temperature and pressure. Using 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) and enhanced Fusell-Vessely formulations, the whole 
system was systematically decomposed to its sub-systems in order to analyze the reliability 
importance of each component and optimize them. Human reliability was addressed using an 
enhanced barrier weighting method on data recorded from interviews. A rapid degradation 
curve is obtained on a subsea system relative to the base case when subjected to a time-
dependent corrosion stress factor. This indicates that subsea system components failed faster 
than their Mean time to failure (MTTF) specifications from Offshore Reliability Database 
(OREDA) and manufacturers as a result of cumulative marine stresses exertion. The case study 
demonstrated that the reliability of a subsea system can be systematically optimized by 
modelling the system under higher technical and organizational stresses, prioritizing the critical 
sub-systems and making befitting provisions for redundancy and tolerances. 
 
4.1 Methodology 
In the proposed reliability analysis model, it is assumed that subsea equipment or systems 
installed in the marine environment are subject to corrosion-induced degradation and human 
 66 
 
factor impact. A Weibull hazard rate relationship is derived and merged with a corrosion profile 
expression to produce the new reliability assessment model. Human and operation reliability 
are also evaluated using a barrier analysis method. Reliability analysis starts from definition of 
targets; however, actual quantitative assessment involves the following distinct tasks. 
 Derive formulations for selected reliability assessment method. 
 Calculate the basic scale and shape parameter of the failure data. 
 Determine the Corrosion profile and Corrosion Weibull Reliability Index. 
 Decompose system using Reliability Block Diagram and evaluate failure frequencies. 
 Optimize system by analysing Fusell-Vesely reliability importance of components 
based on failure frequencies and achievable reliability. 
 Evaluate human-factor reliability using Barrier and Operational Analysis (BORA) 
method. 
 
The flow chart in Fig 9 shows the process of reliability analysis adopted for this work  
Define Reliability 
Goal
Define 
Acceptance 
Criteria
Conduct Reliability 
Assessment
Technical
Assessment 
Operational 
Assessment
Collate and 
Analyse Results
Reliability 
Improvement 
Activities
Weibull 
Covariate 
Analysis
BORA
 
Figure 9: Flowchart of Reliability Assessment Process.  
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4.1.1 Mathematical Formulation of Weibull Hazard Rate Model. 
The basic Weibull model assumes that the family of the equation has two parameters where 
a basic failure rate of a distribution can be expressed as [Dorner 1999; McCool 1970]. 
Weibull unreliability can be expressed as, 
  
                                                  𝑄(𝑡) = 1 −  𝑒
−(
𝑡
𝛼
)
𝛽
                                                    (1)                                                                                                     
 
The function can be linearized to appear in the form of  𝑦 = 𝑚𝑥 + 𝑐  in order to obtain and 
understand the regression wherein the constant α represents the scale parameter which is often 
termed the characteristic life of a system because it rates the time variable t and constant β 
representing the slope of the distribution as it determines the shape of the rate function.  
 
The principle is such that if β is greater than one, the rate function increases with t, whereas if 
β is less than 1 then the rate function decreases with t. When β = 1, the rate function is constant 
and assumes an exponential distribution.  
 
 ln(1 − 𝑄(𝑡)) = ln [𝑒−(
𝑡
𝑛
)
𝛽
]                                                                                 (2) 
 
    ln(1 − 𝑄(𝑡)) =  − (
𝑡
𝑛
)
𝛽
                                                                                      (3) 
 
ln(− ln(1 − 𝑄(𝑡))) =  𝛽 (𝐼𝑛 (
𝑡
𝑛
))                                                                          (4) 
 
Stochastically, the first failure can happen before the expected number of failures reaches 1, 
thus the need to select an appropriate benchmark time between failures. Given a population of 
n components, with each possessing the same failure density f (t), the probability for each 
individual component failing by time F(tm) is 
 
𝐹(𝑡𝑚) =
𝑁(𝑡)
𝑛
 
     (5) 
 
Denoting the failure probability value by 𝜑, the probability that certainly j components failed 
and (n− j ) did not fail at time tm is 
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 𝑃⌊𝑗; 𝑛⌋ =  (
𝑛
𝑗 ) 𝜑
𝑗(1 − 𝜑)𝑛−𝑗   (6) 
 
It then follows the Median Rank which is the probability of j components or more failing at the 
time tm is given by Benard’s approximation equation for median ranks. [Dorner, 1999], where 
j represents the column rank or failure and n is the sum of failed components being considered.  
 
 
𝐹(𝑡𝑚) =  
𝑗 − 03
𝑛 + 04
 
 (7) 
 
This is also known as the median rank formula. 
 
On deriving the natural log of the two sides and negating, we get 
 
ln
1
1 −
𝑁(𝑡)
𝑛
=  (
𝑡
𝛼
)
𝛽
 
(8) 
 
Then taking the natural log again, we have  
 
ln (ln
1
1 −
𝑁(𝑡)
𝑛⁄
) =  𝛽 ln(𝑡) −  𝛽 ln(𝛼)  
 (9) 
To illustrate the equations, assume a population of n has 100 components (at time t = 0), which 
has been in continuous operation.  Assuming the first failure occurs at a time t = t1, then the 
estimated number of failures at the time of the first failure equals 1 [Dorner, 1999]. This means 
that  F(t 1) = N(t1)/n = 1/100 .  
Then by setting y = 𝑙𝑛 (ln (
1
1−𝑄𝑡
)) and mx = 𝛽 ln(𝑡)  and C = 𝛽 ln(𝛼)  
 
As an extension to the basic Weibull model, a regression analysis on failure data proposed by 
[Wells, 1996] gives model parameters of shape (β), scale (α) and intercept (b) which are used 
to estimate the hazard rate. The survival rate of an item is a measure of the probability of an 
item not to fail at about a specific time t, in the presence of a covariate factor c, provided it has 
been available up to time t [Kumar et al, 1994]. 
 
Hence the hazard rate considering the covariate factor c, is defined as [Wells, 1996] 
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𝑆(𝑡, 𝑐) = lim
∆𝑐→0
(𝑃𝑟
(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + ∆𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑐)
∆𝑡
) 
 (10) 
 
If t represents time to failure. Then the hazard rate can be expressed as   
 𝑆(𝑡, 𝑐) = 𝑆0(𝑡𝜔(𝑐𝛼))𝜔(𝑐𝛼)  (11) 
 
where cα = c1α1 + c1α1…. crαr, and α is the regression coefficient of the corresponding r 
covariates. It then follows that when 𝜔(𝑐𝛼) = 1, the covariate factor c = 0 and Equation (10) 
will give the hazard rate So(t) [Misra, 2008]. 
 
The function 𝜔(𝑐𝛼)  can represent a wide range of functions, although it is considered an 
exponential function made up of product of the regression coefficient and the covariate. 
Since the reliability assumes a Weibull distribution, the hazard rate in the presence of covariate 
can be expressed as 
 
𝑆(𝑡, 𝑐) = 𝑆0  (
𝛽
𝜆
) (
𝑡𝜔(𝑐𝛼)
𝜆
)
𝛽−1
𝜆(𝑐𝛼) 
(12) 
 
where λ and β are scale and shape parameters in the order laid out. 
 
If (𝜆/𝜔(𝑐𝛼) =  𝜃(𝑐𝛼)), the hazard rate can be rewritten as  
  (13) 
𝑆(𝑡, 𝑐) =
𝛽
𝜃(𝑐𝛼)
(
𝑡
𝜃(𝑐𝛼)
)
𝛽−1
 
 
 
4.1.2 Model Formulation of the Weibull Corrosion-Covariate Stressor 
The corrosion covariate profile entails physical parameters such as marine pH, temperature 
and CO2 pressure which are the key forces that affect an asset wear-out curve based on 
corrosion. The effects of corrosion whether external, internal or uniform are widely known to 
cause wear-off and leakage. The extrapolation of regression analysis results beyond available 
data range requires accurate, justified, and tested covariate-life models [Naseri, 2016]. To 
model the system in full water-wet condition, the Norsok’s Corrosion profile model was 
adopted and merged with the developed Weibull hazard expression guided by the principle of 
Arrhenius reaction model for accelerated life reliability analysis. 
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The Norsok corrosion model was chosen as the covariate factor because an increase in the CO2 
partial pressure usually results in a drastic increase in the corrosion rate, a behaviour that is 
enhanced with temperature and causes the major degradation (failure) of both steel and non-
steel units of the subsea compression system. It is a reliable physical relation developed, tested 
and proven to represent the oxidizing and corrosive impact of physical factors such as (CO2) 
partial pressure, temperature and flow [Naseri, 2016]. 
 
The corrosion profile relationship for a deep water asset located in a zone with temperature 5℃  
can be estimated using;  
 𝑣 =  𝐾𝑇  ×   𝐹𝐶𝑂2
0.36   ×  𝐹(𝑝𝐻)𝑡 (14) 
where KT = Temperature Constant      
FCO2 = Fugacity of CO2 pressure  
F(𝑝𝐻)𝑡 = Fugacity of pH  
 
The Arrhenius asset life model is governed by the principle that life of a system is directly 
proportional to the inverse reaction rate. The Arrhenius equation is given by [Misra, 2008]. 
 
𝐿(𝑉) = 𝐶𝑒
𝑏
𝑣  
(15) 
 
L signifies a quantifiable life measure while V stands for the covariate factor, developed for 
thermal-corrosion related variables in absolute units. C and b represent model parameters 
which can be calculated from analysis of variance of data.  
 
If scale parameter is regarded as a function of the covariate, then hazard rate, h becomes, 
 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑣) =
𝛽
𝐶𝑒
𝑏
𝑣
(
𝑡
𝐶𝑒
𝑏
𝑣
)
𝛽−1
 
(16) 
 
 
Since temperature profile could give a life measure, it also makes sense for a corrosion profile 
stress to be part of the life covariate functions. On substituting the corrosion profile variable v 
into the survivability equation, system hazard rate under the influence of corrosive stress 
becomes, 
 
ℎ(𝑣, (𝑡)) =
𝛽
𝛼𝑒
𝑏
(𝑣)
(
𝑡
𝛼𝑒
𝑏
(𝑣)
)
𝛽−1
 
(17) 
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Reliability can thus be expressed as, 
 
𝑅(𝑣, (𝑡)) =  𝑒
−(∫
𝑒
𝑏
(𝑣)
𝛼
𝑡      
0 𝑑𝑡)
𝛽
 
(18) 
 
Reliability can also be expressed as a function of the hazard rate as; 
 𝑅 = 1 − ℎ (19) 
                                                                 
4.1.3 Decomposition with Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Optimisation 
 Reliability analysis with block diagrams is an evaluation method which is used when a 
system is being evaluated based on the contribution of each component to failure. (Fig 2). It is 
used to represent the complex connections and reliability interactions of the system’s 
components.  
 
Fig 2: A typical system with both series and parallel relationships. 
 
4.1.4 Reliability Optimisation 
To develop an optimisation model, consider a system with x amount of components and the 
target is to apportion reliability improvement to meet reliability without over-designing certain 
components to the detriment of other critical ones to minimise cost. A concept known as 
ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Possible) is applied.  
 
Optimality factor: The optimality factor is the ratio of targeted reliability index for a system 
and its Weibull-corrosion covariate reliability index multiplied by the failure time or basic 
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Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of a system. 
 
Mathematically, Optimality factor (OF) is, 
 
   
(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹) X  (Target Reliability)
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
                                                                (20) 
 
Reliability Importance: The reliability importance (𝐼𝑅 ) of a system is defined as the ratio of 
system reliability (𝑅𝑆) to minimum reliability value (𝑅𝐼). It refers to the criticality a certain 
component exerts on overall reliability. Mathematically, Reliability Importance (IR) is 
expressed as [Mettas, 2000, Feng et al, 2016].  
                      𝐼𝑅 =
𝜕𝑅𝑆
𝜕𝑅𝐼
                                                                                                  (21) 
 
 
The Benchmark Minimum Failure (Minimum MTTF): This is the product of the optimality 
factor and the reliability importance of a component. It is an expression that is used to 
arbitrarily extract resources from the over-designed components and evenly add to the under-
designed or early failure ones. Two assumptions are made when evaluating the minimum time 
to failure. 
 An assumption that if a component’s life expectancy is more than three standard 
deviations beyond the statistical control limits (especially if beyond upper control 
limits) of the unstressed failure distribution, then the excess life would be extracted 
from the over-designed component and evenly shared among less reliable components 
within a sub-system. 
 If the reliability importance of a component is 0 or less than 0.1, the minimum time to 
failure remains the same as unstressed failure data. (See Table 5) 
 
Optimal Time to Failure (Optimal MTTF): This is an expression that is derived from by 
dividing-up the extracted life values obtained from over-designed among other components, 
thereby optimizing and extending its life to failure.  
 
 
4.1.5 Human-factor Analysis. 
Several investigations into offshore mishaps show that technical, human, operational as well 
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enterprise-wide factors contribute to accidents. Despite all these, many works on quantitative 
risk analysis of subsea system focus just on the technical reliability of the systems thereby 
neglecting the influence from humans [Vinnem et al, 2005]. Several models have been 
propounded for Human reliability analysis. These include, methods such as Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction – THERP,  Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
– HEART, Success Likelihood Index Method Multi-attribute Utility Decomposition – SLIM-
MAUD and more recent techniques which are often referred to as second generation, or 
advanced methods  such as Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method – CREAM, 
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis – SPAR-H, Information, 
Decision and Action in Crew context – IDAC, in addition to probabilistic ones such as 
Bayesians models [Cai et al, 2013; Vedachalam, 2016] , Organisational Risk Influence Model- 
ORIM, Model of Accident Causation using Hierarchical Influence Network-MACHINE. The 
major challenge is that many of these models were not particularly designed with reference to 
offshore risk inputs and industry average occurrence rate of those accidents [Sklet et al, 2006, 
Nsimah et al, 2016]. 
 
The method employed for human factor analysis in this chapter is a simplification of the Barrier 
and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) model by [Sklet et al, 2006] which is a very 
comprehensive framework for modelling and optimising barriers on offshore production 
installations. The introduction of severity measure in this paper is a major enhancement of the 
BORA methodology because it readily compares and presents the monetary consequence of 
impeding system risk. Industry average probability was decided by calculating the mean of 
participant’s rating for each category. The status of these factors for the specific oil field was 
also obtained in the same manner.  
 
A Risk Influencing Factor (RIF) template was designed to collect rate and code human factor 
data. It comprises of five categories of human factor risks which relate to Personnel factors, 
Task factors, Technical elements, Administrative and Operational Philosophy. No special root 
cause event was modelled in this work; rather a generic exposure to human factor risk was 
quantified alongside the severity implication across the whole system. The technical element 
will embed the stressed reliability index that is generated from the initial Weibull corrosion 
covariate expression. 
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In line with BORA recommended approach, the formula for calculating the revised Risk 
Influencing factor P(rev) is given by  [Vinnem et al 2005]. 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑣)(𝑋) =  𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒 (𝑋) ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑄𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0  
 
(22) 
where Pave (X) represents the industry average of probability of occurrence of an event X,  
Wi  is the weight allocation of the Risk influencing factor and Qi represents an actual measure 
of the status of  Risk influencing factor at field. The severity of the Risk Influencing Factor 
(RIF) is ranked on a scale of A to E with A (representing outstanding practice in Industry) to 
E (Worst practice in industry) where C corresponds to industry average. Table 8 summarises 
all the input data, rating system and weights applied to the risk influencing factor and the 
adjustment ratio. 
 
Table 8: Risk Factor Code Table  
 
The modification factor (MF) depends on the product of allocated weights (Wi) and rated event 
probability (Qi).  
 
𝑀𝐹 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑄𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
 
 
(23) 
The weights are applied relative to the importance of each factor on scales 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 
1.0; where 0.2 means the least importance/influence and 1.0 meaning the utmost importance. 
Event probability (Q) is rated using a scale of A-E as shown in Table 8. The true value for the 
technical reliability index obtained from the new model is weighted together with the interview 
data obtained from survey for all factors in each category. 
 
4.2 Case Study 
The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate the applicability of the new model 
developed in Section 4.1 for reliability analysis and optimisation of a subsea compression 
system. 
Risk Factor Rank (Q) Code for Risk Factor (Q.Code) Meaning Revised Probability (Prev)
A 1 Good performance 0.00-0.15
B 2 Best Practice 0.16-0.25
C 3 Industry Average 0.26-0.35
D 4 Below Industry Average 0.36-0.45
E 5 Bad Practice 0.46 - 1.00
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4.2.1 Description of the case 
A major oil and gas firm wants to conduct a reliability assurance analysis on a subsea gas 
compression system proposed for the installation at the Escravos field off the coast of Nigeria, 
West Africa. The target reliability is 95% for the initial 300 days. To support decision making 
processes, the firm had requested for a numeric quantity of the subsea system’s survivability 
under operational stresses. The system which is directly synchronized with power units, a 
process system and control system is meant to take reservoir gas from the wellhead, through 
the compression system to a centrally positioned FPSO. The compression unit does the 
mechanical job of compressing well fluid while the power units provide electric power for the 
entire system. The control system conveys and receives sensor signals between the Subsea 
Engineers on deck. 
 
4.2.2 Case Analysis -Weibull-Corrosion Covariate Reliability Analysis 
The MTTF column of each component of the subsea compression system in table 9 seems 
to readily show the failure times however it is imperative to carry out a more detailed analysis 
to determine the systems contribution or insufficiencies towards 95% reliability target at a 
certain defined time. Majority of the failure data were obtained from OREDA [55].  Prior to 
the regression analysis of the MTTF data, some adjustments were performed to make the 
distribution a Weibull distribution. Firstly, the failure data is ranked in descending order as 
shown in the column ‘Rank’ of Table 9. The median rank for failure is then calculated to 
ascertain the proportion of the system component that will fail by the mean time in column 
MTTF. 
 
Using the Bernard’s equation for determining median rank [Dorner 1999]: 
 𝑋 − 0.3
𝑁 + 0.4
 
(24) 
 
where X represents the column rank and N is the sum of failed components being considered. 
In this case, there are 39 components as shown in Table 9.  
 
The median rank and MTTF are further transformed by taking their natural logs using Eq. 8 
and repeated with Eq. 9; so that regression analysis can take place more efficiently. A simple 
linear regression analysis is performed between ‘In MTTF’ and ln(ln(1/(1-Median Rank) in 
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order to obtain parameter estimates in determining the survival rate.  
 
Table 9: Derivation of Natural logs of component failure time (t) and Median Ranks 
 
 
The scale parameter and the shape parameter are obtained from linear regression analysis 
[Wells, 1996] of In(In(1-Median Rank)) and In MTTF columns in Table 9.  The coefficients 
obtained are 𝛼 = 473.36,  𝛽 = 0.47 and the intercept -2.9.  
 
The Weibull scale parameter (α) was obtained by substituting the b and β in Eq.  (25). 
𝛼 =  𝑒
− (
𝑏
𝛽
)
                                                                               (25) 
 
In line with Weibull’s principles, the characteristic life 𝛼 indicates the time at which 63% of 
system components would have failed irrespective of the value of 𝛽 [Nelson, 2009]. With an 
assumption that MTTF is expressed in days, the results from regression analysis indicate that 
     No SUBSEA COMPRESSION SYSTEM MTTFSOURCE Rank Rank1Median Ranks1/(1-Median Rank)ln(ln(1/(1-Median Rank)))ln(MTTF)
 Process System
1  Manifold Piping 3,048 OREDA 5.6 1 0.017766497 1.018087855 -4.021491042 1.7227666
2  Mechanical Connector 1,351 OREDA 6.1 2 0.043147208 1.045092838 -3.121165758 1.80828877
3  ROV Isolation Valve 1,389 OREDA 6.3 3 0.068527919 1.073569482 -2.645229481 1.84054963
4  EI Isolation Valve/Actuator 1,489 OREDA 7 4 0.093908629 1.103641457 -2.316530606 1.94591015
5 Check Valve 162 OREDA 8.1 5 0.11928934 1.135446686 -2.063362471 2.09186406
6 Scrubber 50 OREDA 9 6 0.144670051 1.169139466 -1.856182932 2.14006616
7 Scrubber Level Detector 98 Tracerco 24.5 7 0.170050761 1.204892966 -1.679910065 3.19867312
8 Magnetic Bearing System      Compressor 27 S2M Report 27 8 0.195431472 1.242902208 -1.525790316 3.3068867
9 Compressor 9 OREDA 32 9 0.220812183 1.283387622 -1.388283692 3.4657359
10 Electric Motor(Compressor) 5.6 Aker Solution 38.7 10 0.246192893 1.326599327 -1.26365639 3.6558396
11 PSD Sensors 124 OREDA 41 11 0.271573604 1.3728223 -1.149267807 3.71357207
12 Flow Meter for Anti Surge Control 650 OREDA 43 12 0.296954315 1.422382671 -1.043177384 3.76120012
13 Anti Surge Actuator 228 Aker Solution 50 13 0.322335025 1.475655431 -0.943913114 3.91202301
14 Anti Surge Valve 89 OREDA 70 14 0.347715736 1.53307393 -0.850327856 4.24849524
15 Cooler 84 OREDA 84 15 0.373096447 1.5951417 -0.761506169 4.4308168
16 Condensate Pump Unit 6.1 KOP 89 16 0.398477157 1.662447257 -0.676701617 4.48863637
17  Re-circulation choke valve 32 OREDA 89 17 0.423857868 1.735682819 -0.595293163 4.48863637
18 Meg Piping 309 OREDA 98 18 0.449238579 1.815668203 -0.516753902 4.58496748
19 Pressure and Volume Controller 89 OREDA 100 19 0.474619289 1.903381643 -0.440627964 4.60517019
Control System
20 Top Side Master Control Station 24.5 OREDA 108 20 0.5 2 -0.366512921 4.68213123
21 Wet Mate Connector 24980 OREDA 124 21 0.525380711 2.106951872 -0.294045889 4.82028157
22 Electrical Dry Mate Connector 4424 OREDA 162 22 0.550761421 2.225988701 -0.222892112 5.08759634
23 Electric Jumpers 72022 Teledyne 192 23 0.576142132 2.359281437 -0.152735069 5.25749537
24 Junction Boxes 41 Telecordia 228 24 0.601522843 2.50955414 -0.083267372 5.42934563
25 Magnetic Bearing Control Module 6.3 S2M Report 309 25 0.626903553 2.680272109 -0.014181765 5.73334128
26 Anti-Surge Compressor Control   Pod 38.7 CFD DOC 310 26 0.652284264 2.875912409 0.054838487 5.7365723
27 SCM 43 OREDA 358 27 0.677664975 3.102362205 0.124130689 5.88053299
28 UPS 8.1 OREDA 554 28 0.703045685 3.367521368 0.19406646 6.31716469
Power System
29 Topside Main Circuit Breaker 1116 OREDA 554 29 0.728426396 3.682242991 0.265069889 6.31716469
30 Topside Transformers 554 Vetco Gray 650 30 0.753807107 4.06185567 0.33764293 6.47697236
31 VSD 7 OREDA 675 31 0.779187817 4.528735632 0.412402847 6.51471269
32 Topside Umbilical Hang-off 358 OREDA 1116 32 0.804568528 5.116883117 0.490140445 7.01750614
33 Power Umbilical 108 OREDA 1,351 33 0.829949239 5.880597015 0.571915995 7.20860034
34 Umbilical Termination Assembly(UTA) 310 OREDA 1,389 34 0.855329949 6.912280702 0.659228202 7.23633934
35 Subsea Enclosures (Transformer) 675 OREDA 1,489 35 0.88071066 8.382978723 0.754337905 7.30586003
36 Subsea Main StepDown Transformer 554 Vetco Gray 3,048 36 0.906091371 10.64864865 0.86096109 8.02224092
37  Hv Penetrator/Dry Connector 192 Deutch 4424 37 0.931472081 14.59259259 0.986008583 8.39479954
38  Hv Power Jumper 100 OREDA 24980 38 0.956852792 23.17647059 1.145221526 10.1258308
39  Hv Wet Mate Connector 70 Deutch 72022 39 0.982233503 56.28571429 1.39387574 11.1847269
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at 473.36 (days), the unstressed reliability of the system in the absence of any repair or 
replacement work would be 37%. 
 
To check the fitness of Weibull 2-parameter modelling for analysis, a line fit plot as shown in 
Fig 10 between failure values and the natural log of the median is generated.  
 
Figure 10: Line Fit plot showing fitness of data for reliability analysis 
 
On close observation of fig 10, the fitted line has little doglegs which show that the failure 
modes affecting the system come from various origins [Abernethy 2006].  In the current case, 
these can be overlooked because such scatter plot is typical for the hydro-mechanical 
components. The MTTF failure data being used generates such shape parameter of the failure 
distribution as supported by [Kalbfleisch, 2011] proving that the straight line slope of such plot 
gives the shape parameter of the distribution. The plot has shown that the Weibull distribution 
modelling is a good choice and the generated values fit properly with theoretical values. 
A regression analysis is then performed on data sets In(In(1-Median Rank)) and In MTTF to 
obtain the model parameters shown in table 10. 
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Table 10: Regression Table 
 
 
 
The reliability of the subsea compression components under the influence of external 
operational stress was evaluated by applying a temperature-corrosion profile stressor since the 
basic Weibull reliability analysis only predicted cumulative failure times without due 
consideration of the external influential forces that could interfere and further reduce system 
reliability. 
 
Values of the boundary variables were obtained from experts at the Egina field Nigeria. The 
temperature profile for West African waters is shown in Fig 11. 
 
Figure 11: Temperature Profile for a West African Offshore Field [Akinde, et al 2014] 
Multiple R 0.95
R Square 0.90
Adjusted R Square 0.90
Standard Error 0.35
Observations 38.00
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1.00 39.03 39.03 325.84 0.00
Residual 36.00 4.31 0.12
Total 37.00 43.34
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -2.90 0.15 -19.86 0.00 -3.20 -2.60 -3.20 -2.60
1.722766598 0.47 0.03 18.05 0.00 0.42 0.52 0.42 0.52
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The corrosion profile, for the subsea compression system was obtained using  
𝑣 =  𝐾𝑇  ×   𝐹𝐶𝑂2
0.36   ×  𝐹(𝑝𝐻)𝑡                                                                   (26) 
 
If the water depth is 1500 metres, Temperature Constant at 5 degrees Celsius, KT = 0.42 
[Norsok 2005]: 
FCO2 = Fugacity of CO2 pressure = 5840psi = 40265kPa (Field data); 
F(𝑝𝐻)𝑡 = Fugacity of pH at West African Water at pH 9 = 0.2208 (Field data) 
Therefore, 𝑣 = 11.8. 
 
Having generated a covariate parameter to represent the influence of marine conditions, next 
step is to estimate the overall reliability index of the SCS system using Eq. 27 as shown below 
containing the values of the shape and scale parameters derived from the failure data: 
 
𝑅(𝑡,𝑣) =  𝑒
− (∫
2.9
𝑒11.8𝑡⁄
473
𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
)
0.47
 
    (27) 
 
A stressed survival equation has been proven to be an effective method to estimate the survival 
function of systems with multiple component [Feng, 2016] and Table 11 shows the values for 
both stressed and unstressed failure data using the new failure model. The contribution to 
unreliability by each failure data is taken into account and as a consequence, bounds of survival 
functions of the system and ratings of relative importance index values can be obtained using 
further optimization analysis. Reliability A refers to the reliability of system without 
considering. 
Table 11: Reliability Table for Basic Weibull Failure and Stressed Failure. 
 
Model Parameters Without Operational Stress With Operational Stress
Mean Time Hazard Rate Reliability A Hazard Rate Reliability B
β -Shape Parameter = 0.47 30 0.24 0.76 0.28 0.72
α-Characteristic Life = 473.00 60 0.32 0.68 0.41 0.59
b- Intercept = -2.90 90 0.37 0.63 0.50 0.50
Covariate = 11.80 120 0.41 0.59 0.59 0.41
150 0.44 0.56 0.66 0.34
180 0.47 0.53 0.73 0.27
210 0.49 0.51 0.79 0.21
240 0.52 0.48 0.85 0.15
270 0.54 0.46 0.90 0.10
300 0.55 0.45 0.95 0.05
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Figure 12: Basic Weibull failure vs Stressed Weibull-Corrosion failure. 
 
The result in Table 11 and Fig 12 show the impact of marine physical conditions on failure 
rate. The asset-life decline curve obtained from the stressed Weibull-covariate model gave a 
steeper decline curve compared to the unstressed Weibull failure model. This result further 
confirms that a catastrophic infant mortality is imminent if the quality and redundancy 
configurations of the components are not improved.  
 
4.2.2.1 Validation of the Weibull Model using Cox Regression Model. 
The model is validated using the cox proportionality model which a widely used model for 
survivability analysis. Cox model is unable to describe the shape of the failure unlike Weibull-
based models. A cox model specifies a multiplicative relationship between the underlying 
hazard function and the log-linear function of the covariates (Kleinbaum, 1996). A cox 
regression was performed on the failure data with corrosion covariate as stressor. The cox 
regression indicated that 62% of the components are unreliable at first failure and 38% survived 
and there is significant difference between the baseline distribution and the covariate regressed 
one as shown in the table in appendix. This corresponds with the pattern from the Weibull 
model applied however, cox model does not help to identify the shape of the failure curve or 
the failed items and that is why the Weibull based model is more suitable. The cox table is 
shown in appendix. 
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4.2.3 Root-Cause Analysis using Reliability Block Diagram. 
Boolean algebra expressions defined by the MTTFs data of each component from Table 8 
are used to determine minimal cut sets or the minimum combination of failures required to 
cause a system failure. The RBD calculates system failure frequency and unavailability based 
on the Vesely model. The fundamental law guiding the analysis using ITEM software used for 
the RBD decomposition is the Weibull failure distribution principle and an extrapolation of 
failure data by the Vesely theory [Jincheng, 1988]. The rationale guiding the combination of 
both laws is the assumption that there are no repairs thus failure is assumed as an exponential 
degradation curve. All failures are statistically independent. The failure rate of each subsea 
component is constant. After repair, the system will be as good as old, not as good as new based 
on the Weibull distribution model being applied. All component failures are statistically 
independent. The failure rate of each equipment is constant. The repair rate for each equipment 
item is constant. After repair, the system will be as good as new, (i.e., the repaired component 
is returned to the same initial state, with the same failure characteristics that it would have had 
if the failure had not occurred; repair is not considered to be a renewal process [CCPS 2000]. 
 
Let component failure rate be, 
 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) =  𝐾𝑖(1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [(−𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖)𝑡])                                                                            (28) 
𝑊𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑖 [1 − 𝑄𝑖(𝑡)]                                                                                                 (29) 
𝑉𝑖(𝑡) =  𝜇𝑖𝑄𝑖(𝑡)                                                                                                             (30) 
𝐾𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖/(𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖)                                                                                                          (31) 
 
where 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) represents time specific unreliability of the system, 𝑊𝑖(𝑡) is the time specific 
recovery frequency of the system, 𝑉𝑖(𝑡)  time-specific failure frequency of the system, 𝜆𝑖 is the 
time specific failure rate of the system, 𝜇𝑖the time specific recovery rate of the system, K is the 
phase of minimal cut set and t is time. More detailed derivation can be found in Jincheng 
[1988]. 
 
The Fusell-Vesely measurement highlights an event’s contribution to system unavailability 
because it gives an idea on the likelihood that a system is down because a component is down. 
It is very important to identify those components in a system which have the greatest impact 
on overall system reliability. In practice, this is done by first choosing a suitable measure of 
component importance, calculating them for each component and then ranking the importance 
of components according to that measure. In this paper, a presentation is made of the various 
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results for the power, process and control systems. This could be used to compare the relative 
importance of system components by calculating their Fussell–Vesely importance measures, 
when the components can be enhanced based on FMECA. These results help to quickly 
estimate optimizable components, because calculating the exact values of the component 
importance measures is very laborious in a large and complex system [Meng, 2000].  
The RBD analysis was based on an enhanced Vesely theory which allowed the allocation of 
reliability capabilities to each block based on the logical failure of the system with respect to 
series and parallel connections. In this study, it was applied to model and decompose the system 
failures into cut-sets in order to visualize how the system is set-up and measure the actual faulty 
components so that a good logic for their optimization analysis will suffice rather than using a 
generic fault tree which is more suitable for sensitivity analysis without optimization details. It 
should be noted that it was used in a different way in the present analysis to consider the cut-
sets on a node by node basis of process, control and power sub-systems. The clear advantage 
is that it simply allows the software to analyse the contribution of each component to 
unreliability.  
To trace the key contributors to unreliability, the system is unbundled into its components parts 
using parallel and series connections as obtainable in illustrative instrumentation diagram in 
Fig 13.   
 
Figure 13: Reliability Block Diagram of the Subsea Compression System 
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4.2.3.1 Reliability Analysis of the Process Sub-System 
The process sub-system is the section of the subsea compression plant where actual 
separation of well fluid and compression of gas occurs. An RBD diagram of the process sub-
system is cut out from the main subsea compression system and calibrated accordingly with 
the MTTF values of Table 9. A simulation is run using ITEM Reliability Software for a lifetime 
of 7200 hours or 300 days and an average Meat Time to Repair (MTTR) of 7 applied to each 
component. The component failure data is fed to the system. 100 iterations are run on each sub-
system as obtained from Piping and instrumentation drawings to determine the severity index 
and reliability importance of the components.  This iteration is repeated for all the sub-systems. 
The failure severity index measures the intensity of unreliability of each sub-system. 
 
The Failure Severity index is mathematically expressed as  
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝑆) = 𝑇 x  𝐹𝑓  x  𝐹𝐸                                                                   (32) 
where T represents Time, 𝐹𝑓  represents failure frequency and 𝐹𝐸 represents expected failures.  
 
The aim of the procedure is to capture the key components that contribute to unreliability and 
their various reliability importance for adequate system optimization. Fig 14 shows the 
reliability blocks configuration into a mix of series and parallel cut-sets as obtainable in 
realistic configuration. 
 
Figure 14: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of SCS Process Sub-System 
 
The reliability index of the process system was found to be 0. This implies that the system is 
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completely unreliable. The failure frequency was 12.3% and the total number of expected 
failures was 88.5. The risk severity factor using equation (29) is 170 which seems modest but 
does not count as reliable because the failure frequency of other critical components meant that 
the entire Sub-System has an infant premature failure. 
 
 
Figure 15: Time vs Unreliability for Process Sub-System 
 
 
The time and unreliability index graph shown in Fig 15 indicates that the unreliability of the 
process components rapidly increases and attains full unreliability value in 288 days which 
significantly deviates from the pre-set benchmark of 300 days or 7200 hours. The reliability of 
this system in relation to target operation benchmark is zero, therefore, all the critical 
components need to be optimized. 
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Figure 16: Reliability Importance for Process Sub-System Components Systems. 
 
Fig 16 shows the reliability importance chart of process components. To identify the critical 
components which need reliability upgrade the most, another analysis is subsequently run using 
Fusell-Vesely’s equation (FV). Fusell-Vesely Importance of the modelled plant feature 
(usually a component, train, or system) defines the fractional decrease in total risk level 
(usually CDF) when the plant feature is assumed perfectly reliable (failure rate = 0.0). If all the 
sequences comprising the total risk level (e.g. CDF) are minimal, the F-V also equals the 
fractional contribution to the total risk level of all sequences containing the (failed) feature of 
interest. Where F-V = 1-1/RRW and RRW is Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) [Kvassey, 2015].  
Change in unavailability of events with high importance values will have the most significant 
effect on system unavailability. 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑉) =
∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
                                   (33) 
 
Fig 16 above shows that the Meg Piping with zero reliability importance index, Mechanical 
connector and Isolation Valve contributes least to unreliability while the electric motor with an 
importance factor of 68%, the PSD Sensor and condensate pump are top contributors to 
frequent failure of the process sub-system. A trade-off on cost will then guide the choice of 
redundancy or quality improvement to be made on the components. 
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4.2.3.2 Analysis of the Control Sub-system.  
The control sub-system entails the auto-sensory segment which continuously monitors the 
overall condition of the subsea compression plant. As can be seen in Fig 17, the system is 
wired-up in reliability configuration and reliability analysis simulation is run through on the 
cut-sets.  
 
Figure 17: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the Control Sub-System. 
 
The reliability index of the control sub-system was found to be 0 with 498 failures and 4180 
total downtimes. This implies that the control sub-system is completely unreliable. Using 
ITEM software, the failure frequency was found to be 0.0685 and the total number of expected 
failures was 88.5. The risk severity factor was found to be 170 which appears relatively average 
but ironically does not impact positively on overall reliability since the failure frequency of 
other critical components meant the entire sub-system has an infant failure rate. 
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Figure 18: Time vs Unreliability of the Control Sub-System 
 
The control system chart in Fig 18 appears to be the main contributor to failure being that 
complete unreliability was reached within 72 days. The system fails rather earlier than the 
benchmark target therefore a further investigation to identify the contributors is justified. Recall 
some components in this sub-system has the highest MTTF with Wet Mate Connector and 
Electric Jumpers having 24980 and 72022 MTTFs respectively according to Table 7. This 
analysis reveals that a high MTTF does not directly translate to high reliability rather the 
cumulative MTTFs together with frequency and times of failure gives better prediction of 
system reliability.    
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Figure 19: Reliability Importance for the Control Sub-system. 
 
Fig 19 shows that the Subsea Control Module (SCM) and the Dry Connector did not contribute 
much to unreliability rather it is the Master Control and UPS that are critically important to 
reliability because they contribute to unreliability by 32% and 68% respectively. This implies 
that a significant upgrade of these two components will significantly improve the reliability of 
the control system cut set. 
 
4.2.3.3 Analysis of the Power Sub-System 
 The power system supplies the electric voltage that runs the subsea compression system. It 
is an integral part of the system that runs from the top side through the umbilical cable down 
to the base of the ocean where the compressor is located. Arhenius Law and Basquin Law 
posited that electronic components fail due to an increased ambient temperature [Fides, 2009]. 
It is possible to extend the life of the power components beyond the mean MTTF using pressure 
protective enclosures for the power sub-components as demonstrated by [Vedachalam, 2013], 
however this particular research seeks to identify how the system configuration contributes to 
reliability and failure severity for stochastic optimisation. This implies that temperature 
fluctuations underwater have serious impact on the lifespan of the power sub-components.  To 
account for this, the model law assumes a uniform fatality constant for stress based on the 
Weibull reliability index earlier estimated in 4.3.2. Fig 20 shows that the decomposition and of 
SC
M
M
BC
on
tro
lM
od
,
Ju
nc
tio
nB
ox
es
,
An
tiS
ur
ge
Co
nt
ro
l,
El
ec
tr
i c
Ju
m
pe
rs
,
W
et
M
at
eC
on
ne
ct
or
,
D
ry
Co
ne
ct
or
,
M
as
te
rC
on
tro
l,
U
PS
,
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Control System Components
V
e
s
e
ly
 R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 I
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 89 
 
power system in series connection based on instrumentation diagrams obtained for the case 
study.  
 
Figure 20: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the Power Sub-System 
 
Based on the RBD Fuselly-Vesely of the power system in Fig 20, the reliability index of the 
power sub-system was found to be 82% with 0.086 failures. The power sub-system was found 
to be the most reliable and of least reliability importance. The failure frequency was 0.167% 
for the sum of total number of expected failures was 0.176. The severity index was found to be 
0.002 disregarding the fact that it had 11 cut-sets. 
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Figure 21: Time Vs Unreliability of the Power Sub-system 
 
The power sub-system is the least contributor to failure of the whole subsea compression 
system being almost 99.9% of reliability was maintained further in time step than other sub-
systems. Fig 21 shows that, at maximal unreliability, the system maintains a total unreliability 
of 0.18 in 1 time step. System unreliability is relatively low and varies almost linearly with 
time. The three data points on Fig 21 established a sufficient convincing trend, however, in real 
field applications; curve fitting may be exercised on the graph to determine the best-fit decision 
for reliability improvement. 
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Figure 22: Reliability Importance of the Power Sub-system 
 
The Variable Speed Drive (VSD) was identified as the critical item to be improved in the power 
segment. The high voltage connector may also need to be optimized because under subsea 
operational circumstances, the failure rate would increase. Table 12 shows a break-down of the 
results from sub-systems reliability assessment. It showcases the severity table of the whole 
system based on the Weibull analysis and Fusell-Vesely of the minimal cut sets. Minimal cut 
sets depend on the number of blocks in connection in each sub-system. A two-tailed F-test 
reveals that there is no relationship between the number of cut sets and expected failure, 
reliability, unreliability and failure frequency but there seems to be relationship between 
number of cut sets and severity. Thus, the lower the cut sets, the higher the severity. The biggest 
contributor to severity factor is total downtime. 
 
Table 12: Summary Table of Sub-Systems Reliability 
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Subsea Compression Sub-Systems No of Cut Sets Unreliability (%) Reliability (%) Total Downtime Expected Failures Failure Frequency Severity
Process System 19 1 0 156.64 88.5 0.0123 170.51
Control System 9 1 0 4180 496 0.0685 142019.68
Power System 11 0.17 0.823 0.086 0.176 0.1617 0.002
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4.3 Optimisation of the Subsea Compression System 
 Optimisation of the whole Subsea Compression System requires a careful consideration of 
the Weibull-Corrosion Covariate results of Table (11) and Table (12). Since basic Weibull 
analysis has showed an infant mortality failure, it is imperative that the design is optimized to 
achieve the necessary reliability levels. Based on the requirement of 96% reliability at 300 
days, a close look at the system components’ MTTF indicates that that up to 25 components 
were under-designed while 14 were over-designed. The low survivability of majority of the 
individual components was responsible for the low value of β and the subsequent stress induced 
failure.  
 
An optimisation of the lope-sided reliability design can be achieved by enhanced process  
control at the design stage and subsequent identification of reliability importance of the various  
components. Fig 23 shows the process control chart of the system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Statistical Process Control Chart for Design Optimisation 
 
System optimization using control charts helps to identify design needs in a cumulative fashion. 
In Fig 23, it can be observed that the design violated the seven-point rule which suggests that 
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seven consecutive data points above or below the mean indicates a problem with the process. 
With a mean MTTF of 2945 as benchmark, a standard deviation of the mean (CL) 2945 gives 
an upper control limit (UCL) and a lower control limit (LCL) of 39703 and -33182 respectively. 
There is then room for process-smoothing and possibly cost balancing as these will help to 
prevent the discrepancy resulted from either over-design or poor designs. Whole failure time 
of any components that fall outside of the standard limits would need to have some of its value 
extracted and shared out to deficient components in the distribution. This further confirms that 
unavailability of the subsea compression system is due to poor design and process control of 
individual components therefore there is a need for further analysis of the sub-systems and 
components to trace the key contributors to unreliability. 
 
Table 13: Optimized Subsea Compression System 
 
 
     No SUBSEA COMPRESSION SYSTEM Initial MTTF Optimality Factor Reliability Importance Minimum MTTF Optimal MTTF 
 Process System
1  Manifold Piping 3,048 58,522 0 3,048 3,877
2  Mechanical Connector 1,351 25,939 0 1,351 2,180
3  ROV Isolation Valve 1,389 26,669 0.04 1066.752 1,895
4  EI Isolation Valve/Actuator 1,489 28,589 0 1,489 2,318
5 Check Valve 162 3,110 0.25 777.6 1,606
6 Scrubber 50 960 0.12 115.2 944
7 Scrubber Level Detector 98 1,882 0.56 1053.696 1,882
8 Magnetic Bearing System      Compressor 27 518 0.32 165.888 995
9 Compressor 9 173 0.43 74.304 903
10 Electric Motor(Compressor) 5.6 108 0.69 74.1888 903
11 PSD Sensors 124 2,381 0.44 1047.552 1,876
12 Flow Meter for Anti Surge Control 650 12,480 0.08 998.4 1,827
13 Anti Surge Actuator 228 4,378 0.18 787.968 1,617
14 Anti Surge Valve 89 1,709 0.44 751.872 1,581
15 Cooler 84 1,613 0.08 129.024 958
16 Condensate Pump Unit 6.1 117 0.44 51.5328 880
17  Re-circulation choke valve 32 614 0.22 135.168 964
18 Meg Piping 309 5,933 0 309 1,138
19 Pressure and Volume Controller 89 1,709 0.11 187.968 1,017
Control System
20 Top Side Master Control Station 24.5 470 0.32 150.528 979
21 Wet Mate Connector 24980 479,616 0 24980 25,809
22 Electrical Dry Mate Connector 4424 84,941 0 4424 5,253
23 Electric Jumpers 72022 1,382,822 0 39703 39,703
24 Junction Boxes 41 787 0 41 870
25 Magnetic Bearing Control Module 6.3 121 0 6.3 835
26 Anti-Surge Compressor Control   Pod 38.7 743 0 38.7 867
27 SCM 43 826 0 43 872
28 UPS 8.1 156 0.67 104.1984 933
Power System
29 Topside Main Circuit Breaker 1116 21,427 0 1116 1,945
30 Topside Transformers 554 10,637 0 554 1,383
31 VSD 7 134 0.72 96.768 925
32 Topside Umbilical Hang-off 358 6,874 0 358 1,187
33 Power Umbilical 108 2,074 0 108 937
34 Umbilical Termination Assembly(UTA) 310 5,952 0 310 1,139
35 Subsea Enclosures (Transformer) 675 12,960 0 675 1,504
36 Subsea Main StepDown Transformer 554 10,637 0 554 1,383
37  Hv Penetrator/Dry Connector 192 3,686 0.02 192 1,021
38  Hv Power Jumper 100 1,920 0.05 100 929
39  Hv Wet Mate Connector 70 1,344 0.08 70 899
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Using the formulas in 4.14, Table 13 shows the optimisation of the subsea compression system 
to maintain 96% reliability at 300 days. The RBD decomposition of the entire system into its 
constituent components and analysis with pre-set algorithms in the ITEM software helped to 
analyse the contribution of each component to overall reliability. Whilst some components 
needed an increased MTTF, others for instance No (13), (Electric Jumpers) had way too much 
uptime life and its optimal MTTF had to be smoothened to a lower value to accommodate other 
deficient components. The components whose reliability importance are 0 or less than 0.1 are 
left untouched as seen in No (1), (Manifold Piping) in Table 13 where 3048 was both the initial 
MTTF and minimum MTTF but only increased to 3877 by taking a percentage of the extracted 
excess life of the Electric Jumpers. 
 
 
4.4 Human-Factor Reliability Assessment 
 A questionnaire based on the Delphi method was developed by interviewing experts from 
the West African subsea sector. The questionnaire was reviewed by a reference panel to 
confirm its academic and ethical status. The panel was made up of engineering experts whose 
backgrounds were operation, maintenance, and subsea engineering. 
 
A pilot survey was launched and little adjustments were effected on the final draft before the 
proper interview was carried out. The first section of the interview was designed to discover 
the company’s main business activities, experience and technical know-how of the respondents 
in order to understand how the operations are shared-out within the company while at the 
second section, the company’s subsea personnel were required to highlight its strategy for 
offshore system maintenance activities and the operational challenges at play. Their opinions 
were measured on a scale and the same questionnaire was used in order to maintain uniformity 
of data from participants.  
 
Five key factors were analysed being that they are factors that affect the installation, production 
and maintenance stages of a typical West African oil field. Ten specialists were interviewed 
through phone calls. Five of the specialists work with operators, two specialists work with 
subsea manufacturing companies and the other two specialists work with a company providing 
subsea consultancy service.  
 
Each of the specialists possess a minimum four years’ experience with subsea systems and at 
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least 10 years’ experience in several engineering and management positions within the subsea 
oil and gas industry. Based on the respondents’ profiles, the study reasonably indicated current 
trends and rating regarding human factor and operation indices of subsea oil and gas production 
practices, problems and issues in the installation. 
 
For this case, the reliability value derived from the Weibull-Covariate analysis was fed to the 
slot for the technical condition/reliability system and the severity code read-off. The revised 
probability of failure in Tables 14 and 15 show that the most contributing Risk Influencing 
Factor (RIF) is the personnel factors with a 56% probability of failure and the overall least RIF 
is technical factors with a 29% probability of occurrence. The severity index could be 
transcribed into weighted financial consequences depending on pre-set benchmarks. From the 
results, urgent effort needs to be made towards smart resource allocation and staff scheduling 
in order to reduce human fatigue risks, improve occupational health and safety, and associated 
cost implications. Whilst the sum of Revised Probability (Prev) of Influence for the technical 
RIFs seem to be relatively low, a look at the modification factor shows that elements such as 
material properties and process complexity of the system were both significantly high at 1.2, 
thus, requires improvement. Table 14 entails an enhanced method for human reliability 
assessment by quantitatively assessing the risk in a particular scenario. 
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Table 14: Human Reliability Analysis Table  
 
 
Table 15:  Risk Matrix Table of the RIFs 
No RISK INFLUENCE FACTOR
Industry 
Average (Pave)
Weight 
(W)
Risk Influencing 
Factor (Q)
Code for Risk Influencing 
Factor (Q. Code)
Moderation 
Factor (MF)
Average Moderation 
Factor (MF Ave.)
Revised 
Probability (Prev)
1 PERSONNEL FACTORS 0.45 1.25 0.5625
1a Competence 0.8 C 3 2.4
1b Work Stress 0.2 D 2 0.4
1c Fatigue Rate 0.2 D 2 0.4
1d Health Condition 0.6 C 3 1.8
2 TASK FACTORS 0.44 1.01 0.4463
2a Ergonomics 0.5 C 3 1.5
2b Supervision 0.2 C 3 0.6
2c Methodology 0.4 D 2 0.8
2d Time Pressure 0.8 E 1 0.8
2e Sufficient Work Tools 0.2 D 2 0.4
2f Spares Availability 0.2 C 3 0.6
2d Explosivity/Inflamability 0.8 C 3 2.4
3 TECHNICAL ELEMENTS 0.37 0.77 0.2854
3a Equipment Design 0.2 C 3 0.6
3b Material Properties 0.4 C 3 1.2
3c Process Complexity 0.4 C 3 1.2
3d Human Machine Interface 0.2 D 2 0.4
4d Maintainability 0.2 D 2 0.4
5e System Feedback 0.4 D 2 0.8
5f Technical Condition/Reliability 0.8 E 1 0.8
4 ADMINISTRATIVE 0.33 1 0.33
4a Work Permit 0.2 C 3 0.6
4b Work Safety Analysis 0.4 C 3 1.2
4c Procedures/Protocols 0.4 C 3 1.2
5 OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 0.35 1.16 0.406
5a Trainings 0.6 C 3 1.8
5b Enterprise Feedback Loops 0.4 D 2 0.8
5c Communication 0.6 C 3 1.8
5d Regulation 0.4 D 2 0.8
5e Management of Changes 0.2 C 3 0.6
RATING
10 20 30 40 50 60
i Personnel Factor
ii Task Factor
iii Techanical Elements
iv Administrative
v Operational Philosophy
Severity Index(Percentage)
Risk Factor
 
 
 97  
 
4.5 Strengths and Limitations 
 The key contribution of the research is a new systematic methodology for stressing a low-
stress failure data such as OREDA MTTF in order to predict a realistic failure curve and 
optimize an asset which has little field records but bound to face exponential covariate 
vectors of operational stresses afield.  
 To model the reliability of a system in full water-wet condition, the Norsok’s Corrosion 
profile model was adopted and incorporated with the newly developed Weibull failure 
expression by implementing the principle of Arrhenius reaction model for accelerated life 
reliability analysis.  
 The present analysis reveals that a high component MTTF does not directly translate to 
high reliability, instead the cumulative MTTFs together with frequency and times of failure 
gives better prediction of system reliability as per first failure without consideration of 
maintenance. 
 The motivation of the current study is due to the unavailability of any known publication 
which addresses the reliability and optimization of a Subsea Gas Compression System - an 
emerging technology that had only been launched in 2015 at Asgard field, Norway.   
 Further development of the present reliability analysis method shows that the baseline 
reliability index of a system was stressed with statistical stress based on intended operating 
environment, in this case – a corrosion profile ; considering extended parameters such as 
subsea temperature, pressure, pH and fugacity variables, so that weak components are 
identified and an optimal MTTF is proposed (either increased, kept constant or decreased) 
for each component as shown in Table 10.  
 
The reliability analysis conducted in this study focused on an enhanced reliability model developed 
for the subsea compression system. It is a simplified representation of the true system, and for 
practical reasons, it cannot describe all features of the system with 100% accuracy. For instance, 
the inaccuracies may relate to the configuration of the system and the production capacities of the 
system for various equipment states.  
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Some degree of subjectivity might have affected the weights and responses received from the 
interviewees on human reliability. However, the strength of the overall reliability assessment 
model lies in its ability to visualize the life failure data, accelerate failure life and project optimal 
tolerances for subsea equipment subjected to operational influences of both the marine and human 
factors. The corrosion-Weibull covariate model produced valid benchmark which is vital for the 
improvement of the overall design of the subsea compression system for longer life. Redundancies 
and back-up systems were not considered in this study however, the detailed statistical analysis of 
the system has a 95% confidence status.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The study reported in this chapter constitutes a step forward in advanced qualitative and 
quantitative analysis for assessing the reliability of the emerging subsea compression system. 
 
 This paper reveals that a high MTTF component does not directly translate to high 
reliability of a system rather the cumulative MTTFs together with frequency and times of 
failure gives better prediction of system reliability. 
 
 It is more efficient and time-saving to (a) identify any infant mortality (b) identify over-
designed components by applying Weibull failure model and Fusell-Vesely theory to their 
minimal cut sets for optimizing overall reliability index based on criticality and reliability 
importance of components. The initial basic reliability of the system was optimized by a 
margin of 52% from 0.45 to 0.95 based on the confidence interval of the whole reliability 
analysis. 
 
 The analysis indicates that there is no significant relationship between the number of cut 
sets and expected failure, reliability, unreliability and failure frequency but there seems to 
be relationship between number of cut sets and severity. Thus, the lower the cut sets, the 
higher the severity risk. However, the biggest contributor to severity factor is total 
downtime. 
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 The operational requirements of a subsea gas compression system can be understood and 
optimized by embedding a high operational stressor using a covariate corrosion profile on 
a Weibull model of component failure distribution, then reliability decomposition of the 
sub-components to identify the critical components and an optimization analysis based on 
reliability importance of each sub-component. 
 
 Low subsea temperatures, high CO2 fugacity and pH variation has a significant impact on 
asset degradation rate, failure modes and frequency over a time series. Personnel factors 
such as competence of the operators, works stress, fatigue, stress, and ergonomics 
constitute the highest weight of risk influencing factors that could cause a subsea gas 
compression system to fail based on the geographical setting of the study.  
 
 The new model demonstrated a significant originality in producing more realistic failure 
rate compared to the basic reliability models which does not consider credible external 
influences. 
 
The newly developed method in this chapter combines the powerful calculative abilities of a 
Weibull with corrosion covariate model together with systematic decomposition of the whole 
system with RBD analysis, subsequent identification of the reliability importance of each 
component and the novel optimisation method therein.  
 
Using well-known physical based life-covariate relationships supported by systematic operational 
survey and optimisation through RBD decomposition, the model provides a suitable statistical 
approach for achieving in-depth knowledge on inherent risks towards a system and optimization. 
Future work may add more stress covariates and make an in-depth focus on the relationship 
between the cut sets and unreliability, failure frequency and failure times. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Subsea Oil Production and Efficiency Analysis Using Artificial Lifts and Nodal Analysis. 
 Front End Engineering Design (FEED) studies for determining the choice of an efficient 
subsea system with the least-cost is a challenge for most subsea oil field development.  This 
paper describes how the operational life of subsea wells can be predicted, analyzed and 
optimized using artificial lift systems. The novelty in this paper is the proposition of a 
concise methodology for production efficiency evaluation and selection of optimal 
artificial lift and pipe systems based on power requirement, pipe diameter, vertical and 
horizontal pressure drops, cost of pipe system and flow velocity.  
 
Firstly, an enhanced Hubbert method is developed and applied for determining production 
targets at pre-feed phase of project and the impact of artificial lifts on the economics of 
subsea wells facing hyperbolic decline in flow rates and pressure is examined. The 
principle of nodal analysis was highlighted and applied to optimize a proposed subsea 
production system consisting of configurations of a nominally rated progressive cavity 
pump (PCP), and an electrical submersible pump (ESP). The production systems were 
modeled in a black oil flow using software “Pipesim” and the production outputs were 
further used to carry out a least-cost efficiency analysis for optimal choice of pump-pipe 
production system. The efficiency-based methodology was then applied to a case study for 
selection of optimal design of the pipe-pump network with special considerations for 
parameters such as flow rate, pipe diameter, efficiency and pressure drop. 
 
It is revealed that over 88% of overall efficiency was achieved by the Electrical 
Submersible Pump (ESP) compared to the Progressive Cavity Pump (PCP) of same rating 
which achieved only 29% in efficiency. A methodology is developed to analyze and 
enhance the recovery curve of subsea oil production using artificial lift, nodal analysis and 
optimum efficiency principle. The benefit of this work is an enabling cost-effective 
approach for comparing contemporary artificial lift strategies in deep water oil and gas 
production
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5.1  Methodology 
 The concept of system analysis works on the principle of continuity This means that each point 
in the flow system has a pressure, and as well fluid flows from the underwater reservoir to the 
topside, a significant amount of pressure is lost through friction, bending moments and gravity 
[Douglas et al, 2005]. Fig 24 depicts inflow and outflow curves of a well flow. 
 
Figure 24: Depiction of inflow and outflow curves (Bates et al, 2004)  
   
Considering the bottom-hole node of an oil and gas well, the gross pressure differential between 
the reservoir pressure and the topside outflow would be gotten from the difference between the 
average reservoir pressures at the sink minus that at the bottom hole. 
 
Mathematically, assume that total inflow equals the total outflow when well flows naturally: 
 
𝑷𝑰 = 𝑷𝑶                                                                                                                                  (34) 
 
Then difference in pressure is , 
∆𝑷𝑻 =  𝑷𝑹  - 𝑷𝑺                                                                                                                      (35) 
 
Since the total drop in pressure along the pipe consists of irregular periods of drop encountered 
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from completion, through tubing, process equipment, wellhead and irregularities at bends in flow 
lines [Edgar Camargo et al, 2008]. From Eq.34, total pressure drop can also be expressed as the 
sum of individual pressure across the flow line. 
∆𝑷𝑻 = ∆𝑷𝟏 + ∆𝑷𝟐 + ∆𝑷𝟑                                                                                                       (36) 
 
Depending on the details of analysis, these discrete pressure losses can be broken into further 
pressure losses to identify the contribution of valves, external environment and other influences 
on the flow line. As mentioned previously, nodal analysis interestingly offers pliancy on the 
analysis of any point of scrutiny across the production system in order to evaluate a behaviour of 
the system. Although, most analysts place the node at the wellhead or at the bottom hole [George 
Guthrie et al 2010]; such that the reservoir is positioned at upstream terminal and the discharge 
point at the topside, the node could be placed directly on the well head and any point on the flow 
line. Once the node point is chosen, the outflow and inflow sections of the pipe are resolved using 
pressure relationships. 
 
The pressure loss in the production system varies as a function of flow rate. As a result, a reliable 
flow rates model could be applied to calculate node pressures for each part of the system. The 
Inflow Performance Relationship (IPR) of a single phase oil reservoir above bubble point pressure 
is given by Fattah et al, [2014], 
 
𝒒 = 𝑱 × (𝝆 − 𝝆𝑾𝑭 )                                                                                                                    (37) 
 
The Total Performance Relationship (TPR) is given by the Poet-mann Carpenter model which is  
 
𝝆𝒘𝒇 = 𝝆𝒘𝒉 + (𝝆 +
𝒌
𝝆
)
𝑳
𝟏𝟒𝟒
                                                                                                            (38) 
 
The node can be determined graphically by plotting the intersection of flow rate 𝑞 values against 
pressure values 𝜌𝑤𝑓. It can also be determined analytically by resolving both equations 
simultaneously to give equation 39. 
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𝒒 = 𝑱 × [𝒑 − 𝒑𝒘𝒉 + (𝒑 +
𝒌
𝒑
) 
𝑳
𝟏𝟒𝟒
]                                                                                             (39) 
 
While Eq. 39 provides flow rate relationship, it does not provide the productivity index which is a 
measure of how much a well can produce. 
 
The IPR defined can be expressed as a function of the production rate and the reservoir pressure 
of an active well. 
 
𝑱 =  
𝑸𝟎
𝑷𝒓−𝑷𝒘𝒇
                                                                                                                                 (40) 
 
Mathematically, it is represented as, 
 
𝑱 =
𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟎𝟖𝑲𝒐𝒉
𝝁𝟎𝑩𝒐[𝐥𝐧(
𝒓𝒆
𝒓𝒘
)−𝟎.𝟕𝟓+𝒔]
                                                                                                                (41) 
 
For multiphase flow in two-phase pseudo steady state, both TPR and IPR change with time 
because when the reservoir pressure drops under bubble point, some gas escape randomly within 
the reservoir and a liquid-gas ratio drives fluid production [Guo, 2007]. The Vogel correlation is 
applied to model TPR and flow rates. 
 
The flow rate q is given by Vogel’s relation [Fattah et al, 2014]. 
 
 
𝒒 =  
𝑱×𝒑
𝟏.𝟖
[𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟐 (
𝒑𝒘𝒇
𝒑
) − 𝟎. 𝟖 (
𝒑𝒘𝒇
𝒑
)
𝟐
]                                                                                      (42) 
 
and oil and gas ratio is given by  
 
𝑹𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏 = 𝑹𝑺 +
𝑲𝒓𝒈𝝁𝟎𝑩𝒐
𝑲𝒓𝒐𝝁𝒈𝑩𝒈
                                                                                                                (43) 
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In this work as applicable in most real situations, the Pipesim software applied these correlations 
once set on a well system. The production rate and pressure of the system being analysed is 
obtained by reading-off the intersection point of the node pressure curve and the flow/production 
rate curve. 
 
The point of intersection also known as operating point indicates the point of continuity and also 
expresses the production rate and pressure of the system. A case study has been carried out using 
Pipesim, a software tool which applies the principle of nodal analysis to evaluate production rates. 
 
5.2 Determination of Target Production at Pre-Feed Phase. 
 The estimation of oil production profile at the pre-feed phase of oil and gas production projects 
is regarded as one of the most crucial techno-economic tasks, vital for oil recovery plan over a 
period of time. Production forecasts allow for proper allocation of resources, capacity planning 
and most importantly, continuous production assurance during asset field life.  
 
Numerous models have been proposed by various researchers to help predict oil production at 
various stages of an oil field lifecycle. With varying levels of complexities, they are able to provide 
credible behavioral curve of oil recovery rate based on selected variables such as reservoir 
properties, time, energy, cost, man power and so on. Production forecast models are broadly 
grouped into Harmonic, Exponential and Hyperbolic models. Harmonic models such as the 
prominent Hubbert-type curve fitting models, may produce reasonable predictions with their linear 
expressions but provide little understanding of the drivers (physical or economic of oil 
production). Hubbert model works on the principle of Central Limit Theorem which alludes that 
under specified conditions, the arithmetic mean of a sufficiently large number of iterates of 
independent random variables, each with a well-defined expected value and well-defined variance, 
will be approximately normally distributed, regardless of whether the distribution is Gaussian or 
exponential. This model which assumes that oil production profile is symmetric is widely applied 
during pre-feed stages to estimate oil production capacity. 
Complex models on the other hand often show oil depletion trend that is difficult to predict from 
first principles, such that causal explanations cannot be generated and as such barely increases our 
understanding of the importance of various factors on future oil production. These sort of models 
  105  
exhibit the asymptotic and non-linear behavior of the variables considered to give hyperbolic oil 
recovery decline curves. 
 
In reality, neither the simplistic, exponential nor hyperbolic decline models can solely predict 
reliable production forecast for policy and decision making. It is imperative to develop a hybrid 
model encompassing desirable properties of both complex and simple decline model categories. 
 
This chapter proposes a hybrid production profile modelling approach crafted from the Hubert 
model with a hyperbolic-exponential. This model is suitable for pre-feed studies on subsea oil field 
development. To this effect, a semi-complex model is imperative. 
 
Using the Hubbert model, the estimated ultimate recovery of the oil field can be derived. The  
Hubbert model is described as: 
 
𝑸 =
𝟐𝑸𝑴
𝟏+𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒉[−𝒃(𝒕−𝒕𝒎)]
                                                                                                                  (44) 
 
  𝒃 =
𝟒𝑸𝑴
𝑬𝑼𝑹
=
𝟓
𝑪
                                                                                                                             (45) 
 
where EUR is the Estimated Ultimate Recovery, Q is the oil production at time t, Qm is peak 
production, tm time of the peak, b and c are parameters which account for the slope of the curve 
and the estimated average useful life of fields, respectively. 
A value of b = 0 corresponds to exponential decline, values of 0 < b < 1 correspond to hyperbolic 
decline, and a value of b = 1 corresponds to harmonic decline. It is noted that values of b > 1 are 
not consistent with decline curve theory, but they are sometimes encountered. 
 
Being that hyperbolic decline rate is the rate at which exponential decline rate starts, it makes more 
sense to incorporate it into the deterministic Hubbert for a more accurate result. The time at which 
the hyperbolic decline turns to exponential decline of a producing well could be expressed as: 
 
𝑻𝒆𝒙𝒑 = 𝒃(𝑫𝒆𝒙𝒑 − 𝑫𝟏)                                                                                                              (46) 
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where Texp is the time at which the hyperbolic behavior changes to exponential; 𝑫𝒆𝒙𝒑 is 
exponential decline rate while 𝑫𝟏 is initial decline rate and 𝒃  is the regional hyperbolic decline 
constant. 
 
Assuming that only the hyperbolic decline is the main focus and exponential decline is to be 
ignored, we have, 
 
𝑻𝑯𝒚𝒑 = 𝒃(𝑫)                                                                                                                               (47) 
where D is simply the average decline rate from historical data and 𝑇𝐻𝑦𝑝 is the time of hyperbolic 
decline. 
 
If b is assumed to be equal to D for a particular country or region, then we can confidently say that  
 
 𝑻𝑯𝒚𝒑 = 𝒃
𝟐                                                                                                                                  (48) 
 
This work proposes that an imposition of D into the Hubbert equation would enhance the reliability 
of forecasts by exploiting the symmetric capabilities of Hubbert model as well as the hyperbolic 
curve for the oil reserves. 
 
The target production for the field assuming a hyperbolic decline can be determined by 
incorporating the decline rate into the Hubbert equation to generate the new oil production rate 
model Qnew. The decline rate constant is raised to the power of two to give an optimum recovery 
rate in the presence of declining reserves. The new production target will give a higher oil 
production and sustained by artificial lifts in the face of reservoir pressure decline. 
 
𝑸𝒏𝒆𝒘 =
𝟐𝑸𝑴
𝟏+𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒉[−𝒃𝟐(𝒕−𝒕𝒎)]
                                                                                                          (49) 
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Figure 25: Historical Production Rate of Country X.  [Indexmundi, 2014] 
 
Given that b for country X is 0.192333 [Makinde et al, 2012], the Peak production Qm is 2627 from 
Table 16 and Time of Peak production Tm is 2005 as shown in Fig 25. The new model is validated 
by using real oil production data obtained from [Indexmundi, 2014]. Given that b for country X is 
0.192333 [Makinde et al, 2012], the Peak production Qm is 2627.44 from Fig 25, and Time of Peak 
production Tm is 2005 as shown in both Fig 25 and Table 16. Substituting these values into 
Equation 45, we get the values in Fig 26 and Table 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Graph Showing the Target Production and Prediction 
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Table 16: Various Prediction Methods versus Actual Output 
 
 
Table 16 shows that indeed the newly crafted model, Qnew could be used to predict the basis of 
production target for a declining reserve of country X. The results of the Qnew predicts a total of 
20,830 barrels per year (bpy) of cumulative production for the 8 years succeeding peak production. 
The Hubbert model gave a much lower production of 17,145 stb/year. In essence, Qnew represents 
the upper limits while the Hubbert model estimate represents lower production limits. A more 
realistic forecast is obtained by finding the mean of the upper and lower limits. The Prediction 
column (mean of Qnew and Hubbert column) shows that the new prediction closely tallies with the 
overall actual production obtained from 2006 to 2013; with only 63 barrels as inventory stock. 
 
5.3 Costing plan. 
 The optimization model is based on the fact that total cost involved in the design of a subsea 
pipeline transporting fluid is kept to a minimum. The present study makes use of the design 
Equations developed by (Asim, 2013) explicitly for on shore HCPs transporting spherical capsules 
and developing an optimal design methodology for such pipelines. The model presented is based 
on the principle of Integrated Resource Planning (IRP).  
 
Actual Qnew Hubbert
Year
2000 2,165.00 _ _
2001 2,256.16 _ _
2002 2,117.86 _ _
2003 2,275.00 _ _
2004 2,328.96 _ _
2005 2,627.44
2006 2,439.86 2,625.00        2,600.00    
2007 2,349.64 2,623.00        2,532.00    
2008 2,165.44 2,619.00        2,421.00    
2009 2,208.31 2,612.00        2,273.00    
2010 2,455.26 2,604.00        2,102.00    
2011 2,550.35 2,594.00        1,966.00    
2012 2,520.00 2,583.00        1,722.00    
2013 2,367.37 2,570.00        1,529.00    
Total 19,056.23  20,830.00      17,145.00  
Production in Million STB/Year
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Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) is the process of selecting the minimum cost for providing a 
certain level of service or benefit. It is a robust method for analysing a given level of output which 
could be different combinations of two or more variable inputs. In choosing between the two 
completing resources, the saving in the resource replaced must be greater than the cost of resource 
added. The principle of least cost combination states that if two factor inputs are considered for a 
given output the least cost combination will be such that their inverse price ratio is equal to their 
marginal rate of substitution. 
 
In this work, the IRP model makes use of equations developed by (Asim, 2013) for Hydraulic 
Capsule Pipelines (HCP) and Engineering Toolbox (2015). The total cost can be split into the sole 
cost of the pipeline and the sole cost of the fluid in it which is the oil and gas, then the cost of 
power. Power is usually the highest contributor to operational cost in pump-pipe flow 
configurations. 
 
𝑪𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 =  𝑪𝑷𝒊𝒑𝒆 +  𝑪𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘 +  𝑪𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓                                                                                            (50) 
where CTotal is Total cost, CPipe is pipe cost, CPower is power cost. 
 
5.3.1   Cost of Pipeline 
 The cost of pipeline material is given by (Menon et al, 2013)  
 
𝑷𝑴𝑪 =
𝟏𝟎.𝟔𝟖(𝑫−𝑻)𝑻𝑳𝑪 ×𝟓𝟐𝟒𝟎
𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟎
                                                                                                         (51)  
  
where PMC = Pipe material cost, 
L = Length of pipeline (m) 
D = Pipeline Outside Diameter 
T= Pipewall Thickness (m) 
C = Pipe Material Cost $/ton 
 
The pipe wall thickness can further be expressed as 𝑇 =  𝐶𝑐, where Cc is a constant of 
proportionality dependent on expected pressure and diameter ranges of the pipeline.  
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5.3.2 Cost of Power 
The cost of power per unit watt is given by  
 
𝑷 =  
𝑸𝑴 ×  ∆𝑷𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍
𝜼
                                                                                                                      (52) 
 
where Qm is the flow rate of the mixture, ΔPTotal signifies the total pressure drop in the pipeline 
transporting the oil while η signifies the efficiency of flow output and in essence the pumping 
system. For subsea application, the efficiency of pump should be high due to the long distances 
and heat loss in water. A range of 70% to 80% of efficiency is recommended. Industrial 
applications normally hedge the target to 60% to 70% of efficiency (Asim, 2013). In the 
calculation for this work, it was assumed to be 75% for the basic optimal pipe design before 
comparison with the flow rates results from nodal analysis of the ESP and PCP configurations. 
 
5.3.3 Total Pressure Drop  
 Bearing in mind the vertical and horizontal configuration of the pipeline system, the total 
pressure drop in the subsea pipeline can be expressed as the sum of the major pressure drop and 
minor pressure loss due to fittings and bends along the pipeline. The pressure drop can be 
estimated using the Darcy-Weibach formulae. Mathematically, it can be expressed as 
 
∆𝑷 =  𝑭𝑫
𝝆𝑽𝟐
𝟐
𝑳
𝑫
                                                                                                                            (53) 
The pressure drop in the riser can be calculated using Eq. (53) for horizontal pipes (Kiijarvi, 2011).  
It consists of head loss in horizontal pipe multiplied by pressure loss in the horizontal and the same 
for vertical riser and summed up. 
 
∆𝑷𝑴𝒂𝒋𝒐𝒓 = 𝒇𝒗  
𝑳𝒑
𝑫
.  𝝆𝒘 𝑽𝒂𝒗
𝟐
𝟐
 +    𝒇𝒉
𝑳𝒑 
𝑫
.  𝝆𝒘 𝑽𝒂𝒗
𝟐
𝟐
                                                                             (54) 
 
where ΔP = Pressure loss 
f = Darcy friction formula 
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L = Length of pipe 
D = Inner diameter of the pipe 
Ρ = Density of the fluid 
V = Flow velocity 
 
In the same way, the minor pressure drop can be expressed as 
 
∆𝑷𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 = 𝑲𝒍𝒘  
𝜼
𝑫
𝝆𝒘 𝑽𝒂𝒗
𝟐
𝟐
 +    𝑲𝒍𝒄
𝜼 
𝑫
𝝆𝒘 𝑽𝒂𝒗
𝟐
𝟐
                                                                               (55) 
  
where η represents the number of bends and corners in the pipeline. Here friction factor can be 
derived using Moody’s approximation tables. 𝐾𝑙𝑤 represents frictional factor. 
 
5.3.4 Volumetric Flow Rate  
 According to Liu (2013) the flow rate in a pipe is defined as the volumetric flow rate as an 
amount of fluid is passing through the pipe per instant time due to friction losses and the 
relationship between the inertial and viscous forces of fluid.  
 
𝑸 =  
𝝅𝑫𝟐𝑽𝒂𝒗
𝟒
                                                                                                                                   (56) 
 
where 𝑉𝑎𝑣 represents the average velocity of flow. 
 
In the turbulent regime of flow, there is always a thin layer of fluid at pipe wall which is moving 
in laminar flow. That layer is known as the boundary layer or laminar sub-layer 
 
𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑽𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚 (𝑽𝒂𝒗) =  
𝝁 × 𝑹𝒆
𝝆× 𝑫𝒉
                                                                                          (57) 
 
where 𝑉𝑎𝑣 is average velocity, 𝜌  is the density of the fluid, 𝜇 is viscosity while 𝑣 =  𝜇 𝜌⁄  is 
kinematic velocity. 
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A non-dimensional indicator, such as the Reynolds number, does not generally characterise the 
flow as a whole, but only serves as a feature chosen for the flow. The main aim of calculating the 
Reynolds number is to evaluate the importance of inertial effects vs viscous ones, therefore, for 
inertial effects, it makes sense to choose the highest density, the one of the liquid over the one for 
gas. The characteristic velocity should also be characteristic of the liquid phase since it is a 
turbulent flow with high fluid characteristics. To calculate the cross-sectional area of pipe, the 
formula 𝐴 = 0.785𝑑𝑖
2 is used. Where A is area and d represents diameter of pipe. 
 
5.4 Case Study - Problem Statement 
 In order to demonstrate the principle of nodal and system analysis for production assurance of 
a subsea well, a simple case study is set up. The case demands:  
 A unique demonstration of nodal and system analysis principles to determine the adequate 
artificial boost needed to maintain depletion of a West African offshore well with 12-year 
operating period.  
 It is also required to estimate the efficiencies of the two pump and pipe options based on 
pressure drops, power demand and optimum pipeline diameter for the system.   
 
5.4.1 Case Description 
 An oil and gas producer recently won a concession to produce from a marginal oilfield located 
offshore Nigeria for a maximum period of 12 years. The well would be tied-back to an FPSO 
located at a central processing station. Data about subsea flowing well with all its parameters are 
listed in Table 17. Well stream which contains a varying percentage of oil, and water flows from 
the reservoir will be transport to process facilities up to the topside where it is further processed. 
The fluid is expected to be served to customers at a nominal pressure of 2000 psig. 
 
At production kick-off, the reservoir pressure supports natural flow until later in field life when 
the back pressure is expected to dip across the system, thereby potentially causing flow problems 
ranging from to low recovery, time wastage, and increased slug flow. Meanwhile, according to 
preliminary forecasts, Table 17 shows the expected yield from the field. 
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The producer has asked for an optimum plan to make maximum recovery at least cost from the 
field during its 12-year lease period. For the pipe design, consider Reynolds number to be 4100, 
temperature 130F, mean velocity to be 13 feet per second.  
 
 
Table 17: Target Production  
 
 
 
5.4.2 Evaluation Strategy 
 The production system was set up using Pipesim, a steady-state simulation tool. The subsea 
production system was fed with the input data on Table 18 and iterated for each case. The 
simulation runs a calculation using pre-fed values to estimate the flow rate in standard barrels per 
day, the number of production years-represented by the water cut percentages and the output 
pressure. The calculation is based on proven differential pressure loss estimation models which 
are viable for different kinds of fluid flow systems. 
 
 
 
Year
Water Cut 
(% )
Oil 
Production 
Target 
(STB/d)
1 0 18,800           
2 0 18,800           
3 5 18,700           
4 15 18,500           
5 21 18,300           
6 27 18,200           
7 31 18,150           
8 35 18,100           
9 38 17,950           
10 39 17,900           
11 40 17,850           
12 41 17,820           
219,070        Total Production 
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Table 18: Input data 
 
 
 
 
The solution node or operating point is best selected at the well perforations when the following 
two subsystems will result in: (a) the formation and the well completion (the well’s IPR curve), 
and (b) the casing string, ESP pump, tubing string plus the surface flow line [Guo, 2007]. However, 
in this case, the node would be placed at the topside in order to divide the entire flow system in to 
inflow and topside output. The performance curves of these subsystems are calculated from the 
two known pressures; the exterior borderline of the drainage zone and at the topside facilities. 
These would intersect at a point where the fluid producing rates that would develop; given a range 
Design Parameters Values
Tubing Diameter 10''
Reservoir Temperature 250℉
Reservoir Pressure 9000psia
Production Index 20bpd(d.psi)
Tubing Depth 10000ft
Roughness of Tubing 0.0015''
U Value of Wellbore 2.0 Btu/FWh/0F
Completion TVD 2.0 Btu/FWh/0F
Subsea Data
Tie back distance 18,000ft
Flow line Distance 10,000ft
Water Depth 8,000ft
Riser Roughness 0.0015
Flow line Roughness 0.0015
Riser Height 9,000ft 
Rod Pump 15,000 STB/d
Electrical Submersible Pump(ESP) 10,000- 19000 STB/d
Multiphase Pump(MSP) 3000psi
Fluid Parameters(Black Oil) 
Fluid Gravity (API) 30
Gas Oil Ratio 400
Gas Specific Gravity 0.64
Water Specific Gravity 1.02
Topside
Platform Height 12ft
Fluid mimimum arrival pressure 2000psi
Minimum Arrival Temperature 100 ℉
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of assumed conditions. Unlike most well-centric cases where the node is placed on the well head, 
the node was placed at the topside in this case so that yield would be ascertained. The flow chart 
in Fig 27 describes the procedure for selecting optimal pipe-pump configuration based on 
efficiency. 
  
 
Figure 27: Methodology Process Flowchart 
 
5.4.3 System Architecture Design 
 Pump selection is an essential part of subsea system design whereby specifications, losses and 
tolerance of a proposed artificial lift are evaluated based on expected pressure output. Expected 
pressure losses, pump discharge pressure and distance. Although these variables have been pre-
coded on the software tool, it is important to express the principle guiding the selection of the 
pumps by using simplified relationships. 
 
The frictional loss in the flow line of production system can be calculated by [Saleh, 2002]: 
 
∆𝑷𝒇 = 𝒇 × 𝝆𝒇  ×
𝑳
𝒅
 ×
𝑽𝟐
𝟐𝒈
                                                                                                             (58) 
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where 𝑽 is the fluid velocity, 𝐿 is length, 𝑑 is diameter, 𝑔 is acceleration due to gravity and f is the 
moody friction factor. The moody factor is a dimensionless quantity which is based on the 
relationship between Reynold’s number, pipe roughness and the relative fluid flow in a round pipe; 
coupled with Darcy- Weisbach friction factor [Saleh, 2002].  
 
Fluid velocity (𝑽) = 
𝑸(𝑺𝑻𝑩 𝒅𝒂𝒚) ⁄ ×𝟓.𝟔𝟏𝟓(𝒇𝒕𝟑 𝒃𝒃𝒍⁄
𝟖𝟔𝟒𝟎𝟎(𝒔 𝒅𝒂𝒚)×(𝝅𝒅𝟐 𝟒)(𝒇𝒕𝟐)⁄⁄
 (𝒇𝒕 𝒔)⁄                                                                 (59) 
 
The pump discharge pressure can thus be evaluated using  
 
𝑷𝒅 = 𝑷𝑺 + ∆𝑷𝒇 + ∆𝑷𝒉𝒉(𝒇𝒕)                                                                                                        (60) 
where 𝑃𝑆 (𝑝𝑠𝑖) is the wellhead pressure required to transport fluid to topside, ∆𝑃𝑓 is the expected 
frictional loss across pipe and ∆𝑃ℎℎ  is the hydrostatic head due to column of fluid. To save time, 
the Pipesim software was used to select the appropriate pumps for each case with displacement 
pressures of 3800 psia. 
 
5.5 Results and Discussion. 
 One of the key objectives of nodal fluid analysis is the estimation of the flow rate of a given 
process system. This aim was accomplished by the analysis of a subsea well with a 12 year 
production concession. 
 
PCP and ESP fluid pumps of same capacity were placed at same down-hole depths and simulated. 
The ESP’s dynamic performance thumbed that of the PCP’s configuration with a difference of 
62% volumetric efficiency and was able to achieve the overall target production for the 12 years 
with a surplus amount of 530 standard fluid barrels as shown in Table 19. The PCP’s cumulative 
output of 83,812 against the production targets further confirms its limitations in terms of deep 
water oil production. It is still not economical since it negatively suppresses high fluid output due 
to its positive-displacement mechanism. 
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Table 19: Production Performance Comparison 
 
 
 5.5.1 Case 1: Artificial Lift with PCP Pump. 
 Case 1 involves artificial lift flow simulation with PCP at bottom hole and multiphase pump at 
base of riser. The PCP as highlighted earlier is quite reliable for volumetric efficiency. The only 
challenge is that it might not be able to sustain boosting pressures for long periods of years without 
other pressure supports. PCP with multiphase pump being placed at the base of riser, well fluid 
will flow through flow lines to the topside supply. The multiphase pump can add 3000psi boost to 
the flow. 
 
 
Figure 28: Production Performance of Progressive Cavity Pump over 12 years. 
 
Year Water Cut (%) Production Target(STB/d) PCP Pump (STB/d) ESP (STB/d)
1 0 18000 7013 18873
2 0 18000 7010 18873
3 5 18700 7010 18751
4 15 18500 7006 18513
5 21 18300 7002 18373
6 27 18200 6994 18236
7 31 18150 6988 18146
8 35 18100 6980 18056
9 38 17950 6971 17967
10 39 17900 6952 17945
11 40 17850 6944 17945
12 41 17820 6944 17945
219,070 83,812 219,600Total Production
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The production output in Fig 28 by the progressive cavity pump was rather not surprising because 
the production rates started out low and only kept decreasing by a little margin over the years. The 
flow output curve shows that peak mass flow rates of 7012 barrels per day was accomplished at 
1st year and ended at about 6988 barrels per day on 12th day. A total of 83,812 barrels against the 
expected 219, 070, was made during the 12 years of production.   
 
Although, the pump was calibrated as a 15,000 STB capacity pump, this awkward output pattern 
could be attributed to the limitation of the PCP in offshore water depths and wells with high water 
cuts. Indeed, the pumps seem to have even impeded free flow by discharging only about 6200 
STB/d due to its fixed positive displacement mechanism over time. Furthermore, the API of the 
well fluid with the tubing dimensions could also be contributors to its low performance, thereby 
making the choice of ESP very appealing for deep water operations [Fleshman et al, 1999]. The 
target production rate was not achieved with the pump set-up.  
 
5.5.2 Second Case: Electrical Submersible Pump Performance 
 System analysis of a subsea well producing an ESP Pump of 60 Hz with a capacity of 10000 
STB to 19000 STB was placed at 9200ft. 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Flow performance of ESP over 12 years. 
 
For the configuration with ESP pump of same capacity with PCP pump, the target production was 
overly met as shown in Fig 29. The output presented the best yield by yielding the production 
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target with an excess of 530 barrels - a rise of 2% from actual targets. The nodal operating point 
at first year as shown connotes an operating point of 2013psi with 18,873 flow rate (Fig 29). The 
initial year gave 18,634 STB/day while the last year gave 18562 STB/d. In other words, the field 
would be maximally exploited during the period of concession by installing an ESP. This result 
supports the notion that electric submersible pumps supports high volume production in deep 
waters and has a better volumetric efficiency than the much popular rod pumps. The target 
production was achieved with the artificial lift configuration of the third case involving an ESP at 
bottom-hole and at the base of riser.  
 
5.5.3 Pipe Cost Design 
Table 20: Pipe Selection Table 
 
  
 Using the formulas enumerated in sections 5.3 to 5.4 of this chapter, Table 20 shows that as the 
pipeline diameter reduces, the cost reduces. A larger amount of material is required for large sized 
pipes and this increases both power and material overall costs of operating the pump pipe 
configuration. However, it was found that an increase in volumetric flow leads to a consequent 
pressure drop in the pipe system and the cost of operation. This means that an inverse relationship 
is established between the volumetric rate of flow and the mean velocity of flow, thus, a 
consequent decrease in pipe diameter results in reduced operating costs, especially power costs. 
 
The Reynolds number was read off from as 0.015 from Moody’ chart in Fig 30. Pipe length of 
10,000ft was converted to meters and applied to the calculations. 
OD(m) ID (m) Qm (m3/sec) ΔP(psig) Power(KW) Cost Power(£) Cost Pipe(£) Total Cost (£)
0.254 0.234 12.813 137.605 23.509 35263.133 21.338 35284.471
0.203 0.183 8.184 107.614 11.743 17614.924 13.629 17628.553
0.152 0.132 4.589 77.623 4.749 7123.587 7.641 7131.228
0.105 0.085 2.190 49.985 1.459 2188.946 3.646 2192.593
0.051 0.031 0.517 18.230 0.126 188.339 0.860 189.199
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Figure 30: The Moody Chart 
 
The efficiency is then estimated to determine overall advantage. Optimal Efficiency is calculated 
from Eq. (61). However, actual efficiency is estimated as ratio of flow rate given by pumps and 
target flow rate then multiplied by optimal efficiency obtained from the cost-efficient design. 
Mathematically it could be expressed as  
 
𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 (𝑬) =
𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑷𝒖𝒎𝒑 ×  𝑶𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 
𝑻𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆
                                         (61) 
 
Table 21: Pipe-Pump Efficiency Table 
 
 
In Table 21, the efficiency of the output of both lift systems under consideration were compared 
ID (m) Optimal Efficiency Case A(%) Case B(%)
0.234 132.0962065 44.76593663 137.967149
0.183 84.37523362 28.59382917 88.125244
0.132 47.3053313 16.03125116 49.40779047
0.085 22.57363563 7.649954296 23.57690832
0.031 5.325535263 1.804764728 5.562225719
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with the standard design to determine which of the cases: whether PCP pump or ESP gives better 
value for money in terms of capital expenditure. Since the initial Pipesim simulation results did 
not factor in inputs such as pipe size and power costs, the efficiency of the pipe diameter range is 
estimated for an optimum choice. Efficiency being a function of flow rate, pressure drop and pipe 
diameter compared against gives a general indication about the flow. The result shows that the 
ESP gives a better overall efficiency compared to the PCP pump. The highlighted blue strip in 
Table 21 represents the ideal choice. Ideal pipe diameter for the system is the 0.183m diameter 
based on power costs, efficiency of 88% which corresponds with industry target.   
 
 
 
Figure 31: Comparison of the Optimal Efficiency and Pipe Diameters. 
 
Fig 31 shows that case B, the ESP curve, matches more closely to the optimal efficiency. Pressure 
drop and power requirement across the various pipe diameters under consideration has a direct 
relationship as shown in Fig 32. As pressure drop increases, more power is needed to boost 
production. The optimum power consumption based on ESP which is the chosen pump is a 12 
Kilowatt pump based on 107 psig pressure drop. 
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Figure 32: Power versus Pressure Drop 
 
Fig 33 shows the variations in optimal pipeline diameter and pumping power at various cost rates. 
It can be seen that as more energy is required, the cost rises. As the diameter increases, more power 
is needed to transport the fluid through the pipeline with a length of 18000ft. 
 
 
Figure 33: Variations of Optimal Diameter and Pumping Power with respect to cost. 
 
Fig 33 also shows that the power requirement for fluid flow varies directly with pipe diameter in 
design. This implies that the bigger the diameter of a pipe, the more the power expended in moving 
fluid up or down its volume. 
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In contrast to many previous studies which did not estimate the overall life cycle cost of an asset, 
the present research demonstrated that it could be done using a combination of physical 
calculations and projections. 
 
5.6 Summary  
 This chapter presented how system analysis can be combined with nodal analysis to make 
meaningful cost-efficient optimization of a well by selecting and placing appropriate artificial lifts 
at the right spots for production assurance. This work contributes to the existing knowledge in 
subsea field development by comparing the topside pressures and liquid flow rates of an ESP and 
a PCP artificial lift of same capacities using Nodal and system analysis. Results demonstrated that 
the volumetric efficiency of Electric Submersible Pumps in deep water subsea wells outperforms 
that of the PCP artificial lift under the same subsea and oil well conditions. While progressive 
cavity pumps seem to be have good cost efficiency and low operating costs, the recent spike in 
offshore oil production could spell a corresponding and sharp increase in ESP field application far 
more than even rod pumps or PCPs which do not lift as much volume. 
 
Suggestively, the efficiency of the PCP could be enhanced by embarking on research for corrosion 
resistant designs, reliable components for underwater reservoirs. Perhaps a robust design 
configured with wear-resistant underwater gears could increase rod’s compression action and 
consequently, high volumetric output. 
 
In summary, 
 A system made up of Electrical Submersible Pump (ESP) at bottom hole and multiphase 
pump at riser base can give higher flow rate and sustained pressure over longer time periods 
than a Progressive Cavity Pump (PCP) installed down-hole supported by multiphase pump. 
The study showed that production output of the ESP was better that the PCP configuration 
over the 12 years of production. It gave an excess of 530 STB while a shortage of 135,258 
STB was recorded on the PCP.  
 
 The pressure differential on the flow lines is very crucial for production assurance and 
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operations safety; given that most subsea wells do prematurely become unproductive in 
mid-life as a result of back pressure and weak bottom-hole pressure. 
 
 The diameter of a pipeline has direct relationship with the power requirements of the pump 
needed to lift fluids from a subsea well to the topside. 
 
 As pressure drops along the pipe, efficiency reduces therefore more power in required to 
lift fluid. 
 
 Water cut has a much lower impact on the production index of an ESP pump compared to 
a PCP. However, depth and reservoir pressure does affect both production index and flow 
rate. 
 
The lessons from this study highlight the practicality and comprehensiveness of using nodal 
system analysis to enhanced the recovery rates in a subsea well aided by an appropriate artificial 
lifts. Future work in this area will focus on analyzing system behavior when separators and 
compressors are added to the system. There is also a need to address the failure mode analysis of 
both systems under same conditions and also compare the lifecycle requirements of gas lift through 
artificial lift which is another promising technology for subsea field development. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analysis of Offshore Drilling Risk Using Severity Matrix Method  
This chapter presents a statistical analysis method for analysing risks facing offshore 
drilling. As part of the overall integrated model being developed in this thesis, the new 
methodology developed and applied in this chapter focuses on the use of historical risk data to 
evaluate the consequences of risk as the product of event frequency and event magnitude in a 
subsea system. An offshore drill rig which is meant to drill nine locations is used as case study.  
 
6.1 Methodology 
 Assuming that an offshore drill rig is to drill nine satellite wells within a block. Each route 
has five key Risk Influential Factors (RIF) or characteristics, namely diameter, mean pressure, 
and distance, cost and temperature which could be iterated with other variables to determine 
the severity of risk in a system. These RIFs are made up of constant and variable data across 
the nine drill spots. For each risk event and drill spot, two quantities are iterated which are the 
number of events where that risk type occurs and the typical magnitude of such a risk. These 
are then aggregated to find the severities of the risk types, by spot and sum over all the spots. 
In a nutshell, this work hopes to propose a method which uses a 3 by 3 matrix to capture and 
calculate the severity of risks based on a number of co-variates. 
The model assumes that sufficient historical data is available to estimate regression equations 
relating the frequency and the mean magnitude of each risk type to the characteristics of the 
routes. The resulting coefficients appear in the parameter sheet. Besides the usual constant and 
variable coefficients, there are also “Errors” which are pre-determined error data. When 
simulating either a risk frequency or a mean risk magnitude, this error coefficient is multiplied 
by a standard normal random variable to provide extra variability so that the calculated 
parameters do not lie directly on the regression lines. The risk frequencies then effectively 
become Poisson distributions’ means from the regressions while the event magnitudes are 
assumed to be lognormally distributed with means from the regressions and standard deviations 
equal to given percentages of the means. These percentages are in the "Coeff of var" column 
in the Parameters sheet. 
To accumulate the total severity for any risk type and route, one possibility is to multiply the 
frequency with the typical magnitude. However, this would assume that all events for that risk 
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type/spot combination have the same magnitude. A better way is to use the RiskCompound 
function of excel. A results sheet is set up to display summary statistics and a histogram for 
each risk type, and for the total of all risk types. By running the simulation, the results will 
come alive. A major highlight of the method is the consideration and iteration of five risk 
constants namely pressure, drill mean diameter, temperature, cost and distance alongside the 
frequency. 
 
6.1.1 Sequence of Analysis 
Step 1: The format of the function is to multiply matrices in given arrays:  array1 and array2. 
In excel, MMULT command is used where array1 and array2 are arrays of numeric 
parameters which represent matrices, and the number of columns in array1 is equal to the 
number of rows in array2. 
The resulting matrix has the same number of rows as array1 and the same number of columns 
as array2. If that is the case, the mean of risk severity is estimated to make the next set of arrays 
to form a Poisson and lognormal distribution which represent the frequency and magnitude of 
risk respectively.   
 
Given the two matrices representing the frequency and magnitude coefficients of the risks 
being evaluated: 
 
𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 (𝑨) =
𝒂𝟏𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟐 𝒂𝟏𝟑 … ∞
𝒂𝟐𝟏 𝒂𝟐𝟐 𝒂𝟐𝟑 … ∞
                                                                                    (62)                                                                             
 
 
  𝑴𝒂𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆 (𝑩) =
𝒃𝟏𝟏 𝒃𝟐𝟏 𝒃𝟑𝟏 … ∞
𝒃𝟏𝟐 𝒃𝟐𝟐 𝒃𝟑𝟐 … ∞
                                                                          (63)             
 
 
The product of any of the matrices is obtained mathematically in the form 
𝑨𝑩 =
𝒂𝟏𝟏𝒃𝟏𝟏 + 𝒂𝟏𝟐𝒃𝟐𝟏 + 𝒂𝟏𝟑𝒂𝟑𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟏𝒃𝟏𝟐 + 𝒂𝟏𝟐𝒃𝟐𝟐 + 𝒂𝟏𝟑𝒂𝟑𝟐
𝒂𝟐𝟏𝒃𝟏𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐𝟐𝒃𝟐𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐𝟑𝒂𝟑𝟏 𝒂𝟐𝟏𝒃𝟏𝟐 + 𝒂𝟐𝟐𝒃𝟐𝟐 + 𝒂𝟐𝟑𝒂𝟑𝟐
                                      (64) 
 
Since the frequencies are influenced by the statistical errors of both frequency coefficient and 
magnitude coefficients. It is therefore important to incorporate these into the matrix to get the 
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statistical means which will give the standard deviation of the severities from regression 
iteration.  
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 (𝑨𝑴𝑭) = 𝒇𝒄 + ([ 
𝒂𝟏𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟐 𝒂𝟏𝟑 … ∞
𝒂𝟐𝟏 𝒂𝟐𝟐 𝒂𝟐𝟑 … ∞  
] 𝑹𝒇) + 𝑬𝒇  × (𝑹𝒒)       (65) 
 
where fc is the frequency constant,  
a11…a23 represents the coefficients in the frequency matrix, 
Rf represents the risk influencing factors,   
Ef stands for error constant of the coefficient of frequency, 
Rq represents the normal natural quantities for which could be 0 or 1. 
 
The mean of frequency is converted to a Poisson distribution by c 
  
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆 (𝑩𝑴𝑭) = 𝑴𝒄 + ([ 
𝒃𝟏𝟏 𝒃𝟐𝟏 𝒃𝟑𝟏 …
𝒃𝟏𝟐 𝒃𝟐𝟐 𝒃𝟑𝟐 …
] 𝑹𝒎) + 𝑬𝒎  × (𝑹𝒏)           (66) 
 
where Mc is the magnitude constant 
b11…b23 represents the coefficients in the frequency matrix 
Rm represents the risk influencing factors   
Em stands for error constant of the coefficient of magnitude 
Rt represents the normal risk tolerance level which could be 0 or 1. 
 
The risk influencing factor could be a single value or several. If it consists of several values, 
then it put in the form of a single vertical matrix and worked out.  In this work, five factors 
which include diameter, temperature, distance, cost and mean pressure were calibrated and 
designed values into calculation.  
 
Step 2: The second major step is to convert the magnitude and frequency means to the form of 
poisson and lognormal distribution respectively.  The frequency mean matrix is converted to a 
poisson distribution  to create a discrete frequency distribution which gives the probability of 
a number of independent events occurring in a fixed time. In a similar manner, the means of 
the magnitude matrix is simulated to convert it to a lognormal distribution results. The 
conversion is easily done with a computer code or on excel.  
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Mathematically, event frequency which assumes a Poisson distribution is derived by assuming 
that Y denotes the number of events occurring in an interval with mean λ and variance λ. Now, 
if X1, X2, ..., Xλ are independent Poisson random variables with mean 1, then: 
𝒀 = ∑ 𝒙𝒊
𝛌 
𝒊=𝟏                                                                                                                             (67) 
 
Eq 68 represents a Poisson random variable with mean λ. Then, the Central Limit Theorem can 
be applied when 𝜆 is sufficiently big using: 
𝒁 =  
𝒀− 𝛌
√𝛌
→ 𝑵 (𝟎, 𝟏)                                                                                                                    (68) 
 
For the magnitude of event which assumes a lognormal distribution, a lognormal distribution 
is normally parameterized by, 
𝝁 = 𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝒎)                                                                                                                                      (69) 
 
 𝜇  is the mean of the log of the distribution where m is the mean. 
Step 3: In most cases, the coefficient of variance can be given or estimated from historical 
data. The standard deviation is calculated by multiplying the matrix containing the coefficient 
of variance and the mean of magnitude matrix already calculated.  
Step 4:  The severity is calculated lastly and plotted. This severity is obtained from the product 
of the Poisson (frequency) and Lognormal (magnitude) distributions obtained from the 
previous steps. They both represent the frequency and magnitude of each risk respectively.  
These can be plotted on graphs to show statistical upper limits and lower limits of each of the 
risk event severity. 
Mathematically, the severity of the risk is; 
 
(S) = 𝒀 ∗   𝝁                                                                                                                      (70) 
 
where 𝑌 represents Poisson frequency  and 𝜇 represents lognormal magnitude. 
Step 5: Determination of Failure event tree and calculation of event failure from failure rate .  
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6.2 Case Study 
 A given subsea drilling rig faces a certain amount of risk ranging from technical to man-
made but these collectively has serious implications for efficient production. A data gathering 
survey has identified a number of risks facing a drill pipe on a rig. There are nine identified 
key risks and there are nine different wells facing the operation. Each well has five risk 
influencing constants as listed in the Table 20. They are diameter, mean pressure, distance, 
temperature and cost. The case tasks are: 
 Determine the risks based on the magnitude, frequency and risk influencing constants. 
 Determine the severity of each of the risks. 
 Determine the critical failure mode of the pipeline based on the identified risks. 
 
6.3 Analysis and Discussion 
 Table 22 shows historical input data obtained from an industry partner. It is used to obtain 
the regression expression with respect to frequency and magnitude of each risk in accordance 
with the probability of risk event at the drill locations of the drill pipes. Nine different risks 
were being analysed based on regression analysis of the frequency and magnitudes coefficients. 
There are nine spots to drill and each spot has five characteristics as shown at the drill pipe 
parameters in table 24. The means and standard deviation of the regression are computed and 
analysed in order to derive the values of overall severity for each risk type on the subsea drilling 
operation for each spot and the total for all spots. Table 22 is derived from historical input 
values of the frequency coefficient of these risks obtained from the region being analysed.  
 
Table 22: Frequency coefficients table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Index Risk Type Diameter Pressure Distance Temperature Cost Constant Error
1 Caught In,Under, Between 0.0001 0.0068 0.0029 0.0085 0.0089 0.0018 0.0006
2 Explosion, Burns 0.0014 0.0038 0.0024 0.0035 0.0090 0.0044 0.0068
3 Electric Exposure/Power Failure 0.0015 0.0074 0.0063 0.0031 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032
4 BOP Failure 0.0019 0.0039 0.0025 0.0095 0.0059 0.0041 0.0074
5 Falls from Height 0.0022 0.0058 0.0072 0.0041 0.0055 0.0058 0.0052
6 Pressure Releases/Kick 0.0027 0.0022 0.0045 0.0054 0.0034 0.0034 0.0002
7 Struck By 0.0032 0.0005 0.0038 0.0018 0.0061 0.0002 0.0032
8 Sensor Failure and Data Delay 0.0034 0.0057 0.0005 0.0034 0.0077 0.0035 0.0027
9 Drownings 0.0054 0.0010 0.0037 0.0048 0.0032 0.0056 0.0063
Frequency Coefficients
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Table 23: Magnitude Coefficients Table.   
 
Table 23 shows corresponding values for the magnitude parameters. Table 24 shows the major 
risk influencing factors which are five in number. The routes of drilling have nine spot wells 
within the same surrounding and each one requires a different distinct mean diameter,the  
distance and  temperature. The offshore drilling risk influence factors (RIF) are absolute values 
which exist in the subsea domain. The cost of each drilling spot is indicated in pounds, ranging 
from £10,000 to £40,000. The mean hydrostatic pressure ranges from 1100 to 1400 psi.  
Table 24: Offshore Drill Risk Influencing Factors (RIF) 
 
The first step to risk analysis according in this methodology is the computation of the means 
of both the frequency matrix and the magnitude matrix.  MMULT excel command is used to 
generate the frequency mean from the product of matrices and RIFs. The Poisson distribution 
which represents the frequency of event on the drill system is obtained by iterating the means 
using the RiskPoisson command on Palisade Risk software. The event frequency is shown in 
Table 25. The table shows that explosion and burns with a frequency of 454 is the most 
frequently occurring event with drowings with drill pipe six the least being the frequent. The 
means and standard deviation table is attached at appendix. 
Table 25: Event Frequency in Poisson distribution.    
 
The lognormal distribution in Table 26 shows the magnitude of the events generated from the 
means of the lognormal distribution. At first sight, Explosion/burns and Drownings appear to 
Index
Diameter Pressure Distance Temperature Cost Constant Error Coeff of var
1 Caught In,Under, Between 3.45 0.47 21.00 105.00 32.00 42.31 64.75 20%
2 Explosion, Burns 117.68 0.67 104.18 89.00 23.00 1.30 28.58 12%
3 Electric Exposure/Power Failure 10.09 0.92 0.30 3.00 10.00 12.19 8.22 45%
4 BOP Failure 4.75 0.58 102.26 14.00 14.00 22.38 32.78 70%
5 Falls from Height 2.09 0.11 116.52 10.00 13.00 100.14 31.50 300%
6 Pressure Releases/Kick 3.00 0.75 95.83 7.00 22.00 24.44 37.10 9%
7 Struck By 32.00 1.08 93.08 42.00 44.00 39.66 23.48 62%
8 Sensor Failure and Data Delay 39.84 0.18 3.45 34.00 38.00 23.00 91.80 35%
9 Drownings 116.32 0.61 124.76 13.00 11.00 3.23 100.10 250%
Magnitude coefficientsRisk Type
Drill Pipe Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Diameter (mm) 250 250 200 200 150 200 100 150 250
Mean Pressure (PSI) 1120 1000 1000 1200 1300 1400 1100 1100 1100
Distance (miles) Accesibility 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Temperature (Celsius) 4 4 3 3 2 0 2 2 1
Cost (£) 20000 50000 30000 25000 20000 10000 15000 25000 40000
Offshore Drilling Risk Influencing Factors
Event type\Drill Pipe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Caught In,Under, Between 186 452 274 231 187 99 141 230 364
Explosion, Burns 185 454 274 230 185 96 139 229 365
Electric Exposure/Power Failure 73 168 104 89 74 43 56 88 137
BOP Failure 123 299 181 153 123 65 93 152 241
Falls from Height 117 281 171 145 118 64 89 144 227
Pressure Releases/Kick 71 173 105 88 71 38 54 88 139
Struck By 123 306 184 154 123 62 92 154 245
Sensor Failure and Data Delay 161 392 237 200 162 86 122 199 315
Drownings 66 162 98 82 66 34 50 82 130
Simulation of Event Frequencies (Poisson Distribution)
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have the overall magnitude of risky events respectively. Falls from height is the lowest event 
magnitude across all drill pipes. However, the table does not clearly indicate the margins by 
which they influence overall risk because they are dependent on the frequency on occurrence. 
A further severity analysis is performed to reveal hidden patterns of risk over a number of 
iterations. 
Table 26: Event Magnitude in Lognormal Distribution. 
 
The total event severity table (27) shows the severity level of each risk and is derived from the 
product of lognormal distribution of event magnitude in table (26), Poisson distribution of 
frequency coefficients in table (25), RIFs in table (24) generated.  
 
Table 27: Simulation of Total Event Severities  
 
 
6.3.1 Risk Severity 
 To accumulate the total severity for any risk type and route, one possibility is to multiply 
the frequency with the typical magnitude. However, this would assume that all events for that 
risk type/route combination have the same magnitude. The results sheet is set up to display 
summary statistics and a histogram for each risk type, and for the total of all risk types.  
 
The histograms in Fig 34 which generated using the Palisade software shows 90% percentile 
of risk spread otherwise known as the severity of each risk event. 90% percentile was made 
the optimal benchmark risk value based on an 80/20 rule. A careful look at the graphs show 
the various disparities and values of the risk in millions after 100 iterations. The axis represents 
the risk severities in both millions (macro) and micro units. The values do not have any unit, 
Event type\Drill Pipe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Caught In,Under, Between 1,505 1,448 1,276 1,370 1,245 1,429 942 1,115 1,460
Explosion, Burns 30,525 30,444 24,560 24,694 18,876 24,650 12,682 18,566 30,334
Electric Exposure/Power Failure 3,561 3,451 2,947 3,130 2,717 3,312 2,029 2,533 3,542
BOP Failure 2,212 2,142 1,904 2,021 1,842 1,964 1,314 1,551 2,026
Falls from Height 1,142 1,129 1,024 1,046 953 870 628 733 942
Pressure Releases/Kick 1,946 1,855 1,705 1,856 1,781 1,844 1,318 1,468 1,768
Struck By 9,566 9,436 7,836 8,052 6,560 8,110 4,586 6,186 9,386
Sensor Failure and Data Delay 10,199 10,177 8,185 8,222 6,249 8,253 4,214 6,206 10,190
Drownings 30,194 30,120 24,304 24,427 18,673 24,338 12,522 18,338 29,970
Simulation of Event Magnitudes (Lognormal Distributions)
Event type\Drill Pipe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Totals
Caught In,Under, Between 279,116 654,391 348,656 315,500 232,459 140,476 132,691 255,938 530,196 2,889,422
Explosion, Burns 5,633,002 13,826,078 6,723,640 5,669,857 3,494,218 2,352,218 1,765,707 4,256,321 11,052,969 54,774,010
Electric Exposure/Power Failure 257,769 577,117 304,922 276,723 199,358 141,537 114,151 222,475 480,227 2,574,280
BOP Failure 268,701 633,536 342,561 305,453 224,469 126,373 120,170 482,884 2,504,147
Falls from Height 125,589 296,637 167,685 141,896 104,999 51,685 52,129 99,162 200,936 1,240,719
Pressure Releases/Kick 138,420 320,550 178,544 163,410 126,992 69,372 70,665 128,848 245,742 1,442,543
Struck By 1,168,559 2,860,762 1,434,257 1,229,710 799,019 505,640 417,582 942,816 2,280,198 11,638,543
Sensor Failure and Data Delay 1,638,927 3,986,855 1,936,612 1,639,999 1,007,713 705,549 511,440 1,232,250 3,197,156 15,856,501
Drownings 1,903,769 4,605,922 2,264,223 1,916,760 1,172,115 830,295 607,134 1,431,472 3,733,006 18,464,695
Totals 11,413,854 27,761,848 13,701,099 11,659,307 7,361,343 4,923,144 3,791,669 8,569,283 22,203,314 111,384,862
Simulation of Total Event Severities
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however, they could be tied to cost or other relevant metrics in realistic cases. It is interesting 
to find out that Drownings severities with a standard deviation of 1,811, 510.46 was the biggest 
among the risk events being evaluated rather than the Explosions which had a higher mean 
value for risk index among all the events at all nine rigs. Each of the risk event can be further 
analyzed into more depth for adequate controls to be set up.  
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Figure 34: Chart of Risk Severities 
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6.4 Summary 
 The risks facing an offshore drill rig can be modelled and understood using a combined 
Monte Carlo-type and Fault Tree Analysis. The main contribution of this chapter is a robust 
stochastic method for identifying risk consequences based on the characteristics of a system in 
order to set-up adequate controls based on failure modes identified. The Monte Carlo-type 
simulation is used to determine event severity by iterating the covariates of Risk Influencing 
Factors, Frequencies, Magnitude and their respective Coefficients.  
The main methods adopted in this chapter are theoretical and quantitative analysis combining 
on-site investigation, expert visits and computer simulation. The demand and capability of drill 
pipe fragility under typical system risks are systematically analysed. Pipeline overall reliability 
model based on internal and external dangers and on fragility is established as a theoretical 
basis for oil / gas drill rig system’s quantitative risk assessment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Measuring the Practice of Asset Integrity, Reliability And Risk For Production 
Assurance in Subsea Production Firms. 
 
 As outlined in the research methodology, the target respondents from the survey were 
employees of small, medium and large-scale West African Subsea operators that are familiar 
with operations management, asset reliability and risk management in their respective 
companies. The questionnaire was designed comprising of 10 questions; some of which were 
mixed options for multiple choice answers, scale ratings, agreement and disagreement levels 
and lastly an some open-ended opportunity for comments. The structure of the questionnaire 
reflects the issues which have been pin-pointed in the literature review. All the questions were 
answered. 
The survey was conducted in the West Africa, therefore all the responses shall be used to 
generalise respondents’ opinion across the West Africa subsea production industry. Again, the 
total number of response is 82. 
 
7.1 Background Of Respondents 
Q1. What kind of product or service does your company offer? 
 
The answers to this question were categorised into eight sub groups, with each sub-group 
representing a subsea affiliated company. This question was asked in order to obtain baseline 
information about the sample popluation before delving into more complex questions. Out of 
the 82 responses received, over 55% of the respondents were from core oil and gas firms while 
the rest came from support servvices such as offshore construction, consultancy and academia 
as shown in Fig 38.  
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Figure 35: Industry segmentation chart  
 
The Pie-chart  in Fig 37 is showing the distribution of the industries based on respondents in 
the survey. The result shows a fair representation across the petroleum sector. Oil and Gas 
Equipment manufacturers had the highest response. It is interesting to know that their 
perspective on the next few questions further validates this survey since reliability is a primary 
focus when designing and manufacturing subsea hardware. 
 
7.2 Role, Responsibility and Fitness for Survey 
Q2. What is your role at current job? 
The aim of the first question was to find out the roles of the respondents in their respective 
companies. It was a good way of starting the questionnaire since it is a simple question meant 
to further attract the interest of the intented respondent. 
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                                               Figure 36: Distrubution of  Survey Respondents. 
 
The survey result for this question shows that  majority of the respondents are in positions 
believed to expose them to engineering and operational actvities within subsea firms. The chart 
in Fig 36 shows that majority of respondents were Engineers and operational analysts making 
up 61% of the sample.  operations and logistics who are indeed at the core of operations within 
their respective firms. This result helps to improve the validity of the report since majority of 
the respondents are key players within the operation functions of their respective subsea 
production enterprises. Hence, they believed to be knowledgeable regarding the operations at 
their firms, giving significant credibility to their responses for the purpose of this research.   
 
7.3 Size of Participants’ Organisation 
Q3.  What is the size of your organisation? 
 
The objective of this question was to evaluate the size of the organisation  where respondents 
belonged. The aim was to measure the relationship between Subsea Reliabity and Risk 
Analysis practice and the size of the company. The researcher was faced with the option of 
choosing between the two commonly used indicators for measuring organisation size, which 
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are: annual total revenue and number of employees. The best indicator for measuring  the size 
of the firms was the employee size chosen. The annual turn-over was not used as an indicator 
because it does not seem to directly affect the implemetation of Reliability and Risk practices 
in the companies.  
 
Figure 37: Bar chart showing the sizes of respondents’ organisations. 
 
There is normally distributed job roles with the majority for the medium-sized companies and 
less condensation on small and large sized companies. The sizes were divided up into small, 
medium, large and mega companies based on the sizes as shown in Fig 37. Out of 82 responses 
obtained, the biggest response 40.24% was from medium sized companies where from large 
and mega-scale companies jointly accounted for 46.34% of responses. 
 
Fig 37 indicates that there is a significant amount of awareness about Subsea Reliability and 
Risk across all sizes of industries irrespective of its size. It could be inferred that the awareness 
or subsea risks and reliability concerns is not limited by the size of an organisation  in 
accordance with the discussion cited in the literature review.  
 
7.4 Adherance to a defined regulatory standard. 
Q4. Do you think your organisation adheres to a defined standard for preventing downtimes 
from technical and operational risks? 
 
  139  
The question was meant to measure if the organisations practice any form of risk management 
regarding their operations. This would help to explore how well risk management standards 
are recognised and utilised among the population.  
 
 
Figure 38: Distribution of organizations with and without risk management strategies. 
 
The chart in Fig 38 shows that 92.15 % of the the surveyed respondents indicated that their 
organizations had an some form of standard for controlling risks. Half of total respondents had 
both technical and operational risk standards in th firms. Only about 16 %  do not adhere or 
know whether were their organisations had no provisional standards for asset risks and 
reliability management. 
 
Using Chi squared test of independence, the question of whether the organization adhere to a  
defined standard and to what extent is not independent. It is dependent on product or service  
company offer, Role in current job and whether implementation of recognized Standards 
adds economic value and size of company at 10% confidence level. 
 
The inference here is that majority of the subsea operating firms have one form of  strategy or 
the other for ORM, while a few others do not have any strategy in practice. This does not 
necessarily mean that the strategies are  the formal ISO or API or similar standard. It could be 
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formal as well as internally created stand-alone ones but one thing is clear, majority of the 
companies are making effort to control offshore risks. 
 
7.5 Value Perception of Risk and Reliability and Production Assurance Regulations 
Q5: Do you think that the implementation of any recognised Standards for Subsea Risk,  
 
Reliability and Production Assurance adds economic value to the company. The aim of this 
question was to discover respondents’ opinion on how they regard the value of subsea risk and 
reliability regulation as an essential tool for competitive advantage. It was done in order to 
assess the risk awareness level and culture among the population. The responses are shown in 
Fig 39. 
 
Figure 39: Recognition and Awareness Chart  
 
Almost 70% of the respondents think that implementation of recognized Standards 
adds economic value while 17% do not believe so. 
Using Chi squared test of independence, implementation of recognized Standards 
adds economic value is not independent, it changes with respect to; product or service company 
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offer, Role in current job and as mentioned earlier adherence to a defined standard for 
preventing downtimes at 10% confidence level. 
 
7.6 Implementation Preferences for Regulations and Standards 
Q7. Which of these standards does your organisation implement to manage risks, system 
reliability and production assurance? 
 
This question was informed by the literature review in the sense that certain companies use 
discrete ‘stand-alone’ frameworks for managing risks, while other use integrated approaches 
by applying various risk management standards. The aim of gathering this data was to get a 
sense of the preferences of the population in terms of the most popular subsea risk regulations. 
Respondents were asked to select as much possible correct answers/choices as possible. 
 
Figure 40: Implementation Level Chart 
 
The result in Fig 40 shows that majority of the respondents use multiple frameworks for risk 
management with about 71.95% out of the 82 saying their organisations implement the API 17 
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N RP. The DNV RP 002 was being implemented by 50% of the population while about 
declared they use just one defined policy. About 20.73% do not know all or some of the 
standards being used at their organisation. This is of great concern; perhaps there is no proper 
awareness concerning the frameworks used within the company. This calls for proper employee 
involvement and motivation. 
7.7 Respondent Opinion on Best-Fit Standard. 
Q7. In your own opinion, which of the following standards do you think has the best approach 
to reliability, integrity, risk and production assurance management for the subsea oil and gas 
industry.  
 
Figure 41: Standard with Best-Approach Nomination Chart 
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Figure 42: Correlation of Standards Implemented and Best Approach Nominations. 
 
From Fig 42, it could be inferred that, Standards that are thought to have the best approach to 
reliability, integrity, risk and production assurance management for the subsea oil and gas 
industry are implemented within the organization with permissible deviations reflected in lower 
percentage which could simply be due to cost restrictions or a different approach taken by the 
administration. 
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Figure 43: Factors for Effective Subsea Production Assurance 
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Table 28: Descriptive Statistics of respondents on Factors for Effective Subsea 
Production Assurance 
 
 
Table 28 indicates that proper risk analysis and management, routine performance 
measurement and feedback and employee awareness and motivation are keys to successful 
implementation of subsea production assurance. However, there could be hidden patterns 
within the data. Therefore, a quick hypothesis and test may need to be performed to reveal any 
trend in the data. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Is there a specific notion that shapes views regarding specific standards as 
the best approach to reliability, integrity, risk and production assurance management 
for the subsea oil and gas industry? 
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Factor analysis can magnify and uncover this latent notion as shown in Table 29. So applying 
it to the chosen standards, there were two factors emerging explaining about 61% in the 
variations of standards that are seen as best approaches. 
 
Table 29: Factor loadings to risk standards. 
  
Standard 
Component 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
API 17N RP (Subsea Reliability and 
Technical Risk Management) 
-.201 .748 
DNV RP 0002 (Integrity Management 
of Subsea Production Systems) 
.084 .839 
NORSOK Standard .486 .619 
ISO 20815 (Petroleum Production 
Assurance and Reliability Management) 
.614 -.100 
COSO Enterprise Framework .766 .148 
ISO 31000 .754 -.178 
None/I do not know .809 .167 
 
The extraction method used in this analysis is the Principal Component Analysis and the 
Rotation Method was Oblimin and Kaiser Normalization [Ogasawara, 1999; Jolliffe, 2002]. 
The rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
On applying factor analysis to standards that has the best approach to reliability, integrity, risk 
and production assurance management for the subsea oil and gas industry, there were two 
factors emerging explaining about 61% in the variations of best approaches. 
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 The first factor is related to API 17N RP (Subsea Reliability and Technical Risk 
Management) and DNV RP 0002 (Integrity Management of Subsea Production 
Systems) as the best approach and not regarding ISO 31000. 
 The other factor is related to COSO Enterprise Framework, ISO 31000 and Production 
Assurance and Reliability Management) and not regarding API 17N RP (Subsea 
Reliability and Technical Risk Management). 
 
Hypothesis 2: How is evaluation factors for an effective Subsea Production Assurance 
related to each other? 
 
Using Principal Component Analysis, it can be seen that the respondents can be divided into 
three segments by graphing the first principle component with product or service provided 
(positive values, large negative values and small negative values).  
 
 
Figure 44: Average of the first principle component by kind of product or service 
 
Applying cluster analysis to this dataset, we can derive the three following groups: 
 First group will tend to have high evaluation for Employee Awareness and 
Motivation and Risk Analysis and Management but low evaluation for Performance 
Measurement and Feedback. 
 Second group will have high evaluation Leadership Support, Integration with Overall 
Business Strategy and Training and Career Development but low Risk Analysis and 
Management. 
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 Third group will have high evaluation for Risk Analysis and Management but low for 
Integration with Overall Business Strategy and for Employee Awareness and 
Motivation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: What affects evaluation of factors, for an effective Subsea Production 
Assurance? 
The extent to which an organization adheres to a defined standard for preventing downtimes 
from technical and operational risks is highly correlated with the evaluation of factors 
according to what type of product or service presented by the company, role in current job and 
size of organization. Table 30 presents the correlation of respondents’ groups and their 
company's profile with evaluation of every separate factor.  
 
Table 30: Correlation of factors and evaluation of adherence to a defined standard 
according to respondents' characteristics. 
 
 
 
** Negative correlations indicate a higher evaluation with less adherence to a defined standard 
for preventing downtimes from technical and operational risks, while positive 
correlations indicate higher evaluation with more adherence. 
 
The highest correlations are reflected as following: 
 Evaluation of Leadership support is highly correlated depending on; the kind of product 
or service presented especially to consultancy companies (0.7) and respondent’s role at 
current job with a very high correlation for human resources (0.98). 
Factor
Leadership 
Support
Integration 
with Overall 
Business 
Strategy
Performance 
Measurement 
and Feedback
Employee 
Awareness and 
Motivation
Risk Analysis 
and 
Management
Training and 
Career 
Development
Kind of product / service the company offer Oil and Gas Servicing
Oil and Gas Equipment 
Manufacturer -0.54
Exploration and Production -0.66 0.77
Construction -0.51
Consultancy -0.7
Inspection, Verification and 
Certification -0.91 0.71
Academia
Role in the your current job Engineering
Operations -0.55 0.64
Human Resources -0.98 -0.87 -0.87 0.5 -0.5
Finance -0.66 0.65 0.6 -0.56
Senior Management -0.51
Research and Development -0.58 -0.76 -0.55 -0.6
Size of your organization 0-9 Employees 0.74
10-49 Employees -0.51
50-249 Employees -0.55
Above 250 Employees
Greatest factor for an Effective Subsea Production Assurance 
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 Evaluation of Integration with Overall Business Strategy is only highly correlated with 
Inspection, ‘Verification and Certification’ type of companies, job roles as human 
resources (0.87) and Research and Development (0.76) and more correlated for medium 
sized companies formed of 10-49 or 50-249 employees. 
 Evaluation Risk Analysis and Management is the most correlated factor depending on 
Exploration and Production company type (0.77) and for an ‘Operations’ job role 
(0.64). 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Average evaluation for factors according to company size. 
 
Fig 45 describes the relationship between the important success factors for subsea production 
assurance and size of the companies as obtained from the survey. Recall that 0-9 employees 
mean small companies. 10-49 employees indicate medium size companies while 50-249 
employees indicate big companies and above 250 employees indicate mega-companies.  
For medium and large companies, risk analysis and management was identified as the most 
important factor vital for subsea production assurance and reliability. This could be attributed 
to their size and decentralised structure which makes it easier to enforce policies and controls. 
Mega companies on the contrary, indicated that employee motivation and awareness are the 
most important challenge vital for subsea production assurance. It can be deduced that as the 
companies get bigger, the focus shifts from awareness to implementation basis of the sheer size 
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of the companies. The smaller subsea companies possibly face less risks due to their scale of 
operations and as such were not as keen on the risk management factor, but were more 
concerned about aligning production with their overall business strategy. 
 
7.8 Which of these is the most frequent failure mode in a subsea production system. 
The most frequent failure mode in a subsea production system is unprecedented mechanical 
failures as indicated by 29% of respondents. Power failures, sensors and pipeline fracture are 
also major problems while pre-salt oil processing problems is one of the least problems. The 
challenge reliability assurance requires that subsea oil and gas firms need to focus and invest 
more on the mechanical integrity of subsea hardware using robust qualification and verification 
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programs at the design stages of the modules. The accelerated life testing model recommended 
in this thesis should be used to model, analyze and forestall unprecedented and catastrophic 
failure of subsea hardware components and pipeline. Adequate redundancy for sensors and 
data relay systems are crucial for condition monitoring using a mix of lasers, sensors and fiber 
optics since they are often semi-conductors with varying life span. It would prevent data loss, 
power loss or cut in transmission since most of them are non-repairable. This demands that 
robust verification programs as recommended by DNV 306 RP are routinely implemented to 
ensure that only well-tested components with high tolerances and adequate redundancy make 
it to the sea. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Practical Implications of this Work 
 
 This chapter describes the integrated model developed with specific focus on the lessons 
drawn from the survey and how the previously proposed numerical models fit into a whole-
system lifecycle framework for optimal performance of subsea assets. The results and 
discussions in this chapter will give clear recommendation for controlling the risks in subsea 
production operations in alignment with the objectives stated at the beginning of this thesis. 
 
 
8.1 Implication of the Quantitative Data Analysis in the Research 
What problem is the study trying to solve, and is it important?  
The research is trying to solve the problem of unplanned failure of oil and gas equipment during 
operation in subsea environments because OREDA data only considers individual failure time 
of each component and not how the interaction among the components and with how external 
forces lead to failure. This is important because unplanned failure of a subsea oil and gas 
production system could result in economic loss, safety risk, fatality or even sanctions.   
 
To what extent does the paper solve the problem it describes?   
It solves the problem by considering and modelling the key factors that could stress the 
equipment and make it fail using a probabilistic distribution in the form of Weibull model. This 
was applied to the much rougher and deeper West African Offshore environment since OREDA 
data mainly comes from equipment usage in the Norwegian and North Sea Oil fields which are 
much shallower.  This means that OREDA data is used as baseline data prior to application of 
an external stress on the Weibull probability distribution for a realistic reliability index. 
  
What is the “intellectual nugget”?   
The key ‘intellectual nugget’  of the research is the development and proposition of a new a 
model for stressing a low-stress failure data such as OREDA MTTF in order to predict a 
realistic failure curve and optimize an asset which has little or no documented field records but 
is bound to face exponential covariate operational stresses afield. In essence, the reliable 
operating window of a subsea equipment can be predicted and optimized based on the 
Accelerated Failure Testing method described in this paper to prevent unplanned downtimes, 
costs and safety issues. 
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What is the main contribution or conclusion?  Is it important?   
Yes it is very important. The contributions of [Barabadi, 2014] and few others authors enlisted 
in the reference list support the fact that the research made some valid positive contribution to 
existing knowledge because it not only did consider the impact of temperature [as in Barabadi 
2014 for instance] on a piece of marine hardware but additionally considered pH and pressure 
(Co2 fugacity) in addition to temperature which were all primarily sourced, measured and 
embedded in the Norsok’ corrosion profile equation based on physical data conditions from 
West Africa Offshore region. System failure results from a combination of failure events or 
failed components and this assumes a continuous probability. Therefore, the covariate external 
stress was further incorporated into a generated Weibull reliability model to develop a new 
reliability model which was validated in the case study.  
The applied concept is quite new, justified and makes sense. More so because this is a much 
detailed method - never used in this form anywhere, applied to a new subsea system (the first 
compact SCS was installed at Asgard in 2015 wherein only very little is known about its field 
performance yet), applied to a location that has not been analysed previously – Offshore West 
Africa.  
Furthermore, human factor reliability was also addressed using an improved Barrier and 
Operational Analysis method. The major improvement was the modification factor calculation 
and the expression of the revised risk probability as a percentage not as an abstract number. In 
so doing, it becomes easier to add and analyse technical reliability indices which is normally 
expressed in percentages according to the method prescribed in the work as a risk influencing 
factor. 
The analysis reveals that a high component MTTF does not directly translate to high reliability, 
instead the cumulative MTTFs together with frequency and times of failure gives better 
prediction of system reliability 
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8.2 SWOT Analysis of Major Findings from Survey. 
 Considering the findings from the survey, Table 31 presents a snapshot using a SWOT 
diagram which contains the findings from the survey. 
 
Table 31: SWOT Table of Findings 
Strengths 
 The survey opinions have high validity 
because it came from a sample size of 
82 whom are subsea experts 55% of 
them were from production activities. 
Engineers and operations personnel 
made up majority of respondents. 
 
 Subsea reliability and risk awareness 
cut across all subsea company sizes as 
about 92% of the companies adhere to 
a form of technical and/or operational 
risk standard. Respondents believe that 
reliability and risk management adds 
measurable economic value to the firm 
 
 Two third of the population have a key 
personnel who co-ordinates risk and 
reliability management activities. 
 
 Most of the organisations surveyed 
only have a fairly well-defined 
reliability and risk management policy 
especially the API 17N RP and DNV 
002 RP accounting for 70% and 50% 
respectively. 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 Up to 17% are not aware that risk 
management adds measurable 
economic value to firms’ operations. 
 
 20 % do not know if any standards are 
being used in their organisations. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that most of 
the companies have ORM systems, a 
sizable fraction of the respondents do 
not know the requirement of the policy 
and its implementation plans since 
there is huge lack of communication, 
risk culture and a big hindrance caused 
by the silo-approach which is 
obtainable in many of the organisations. 
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Opportunities 
 The belief that recognized Standards 
adds economic value is not 
independent, it changes with respect to; 
product or service company offer, Role 
in current job. 
 Majority believe that risk management 
is a key tool that could deliver 
competitive advantage and help to 
minimise losses due to operational 
failures in firms.  . 
 A good number of the respondents 
(65%) think that ISO 31000 has a more 
comprehensive risk management 
approach. This is so because it is easy 
to understand. 
 Respondents indicated that the most  
important factors for a successful 
implementation of reliability and risk 
are leadership support, risk 
communication Employee participation 
and motivation. 
Threats  
  
 Size of company does affect the 
perception of risk areas as bigger 
companies tend to focus more risk 
analysis while small companies focus 
on overall integration of programs for 
production assurance. 
 Majority of the firms affirmed that the 
key threat to reliability and production 
assurance are mechanical failures, 
power failures, data 
management/sensory relays, and 
pipeline failures. 
 Lack of awareness and leadership 
commitment in some of the firms 
especially the small businesses is also 
considered a threat. 
 
Considering the issues pointed out by the survey, a SWOT analysis was performed in order to 
summarise several pertinent issues which could be seen in quadrants above. This following 
discussion focuses on enhancing the strengths identified, remedying the weaknesses, exploiting 
the opportunities and suggesting solutions for the threats. Reliability and Risk Management is 
a strategy which requires both technical and business input as it heavily relies on people, 
processes, management approaches and a whole lot of commitment from each team. In order 
to achieve efficiency in subsea production firms, key advice which centred on integrating 
Subsea Asset Reliability and Risk with Organisational Structure, People, Process and Human 
factors, are discussed in alignment with the research questions that informed the survey. 
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Discussion and Recommendation on Subsea Asset Risk Awareness Level  
One of the rationale for the survey was to test the awareness level of subsea production firms. 
Based on the survey finding, the level of risk and reliability management awareness was found 
to be high for technical-inclined business organisation, however, its implementation and 
control is highly influenced by the size of a company and the number of employees in the value 
chain who actually get involved in the process. Large subsea firms take risk assessment 
seriously while the small firms were not as keen. Interestingly, the pattern may indicate that 
the bigger the subsea production capacity, the bigger the risks seemingly. 
 
It is commendable to discover that various risk and reliability management policies either 
purely technical, operational or both are being adopted by majority of the companies. 
Notwithstanding, subsea companies irrespective of size need more enterprise-wide awareness 
campaign highlighting  the economic merits and importance of Operational Risk Management 
and Asset Reliability. This will enable the employees to familiarize with the intricate first 
principles of the standards and policies particularly their role towards raising alarm on any 
perceived human factor or operational risk.  Although, a reliability or risk engineers job is to 
keep track of the reliability register, the task cannot be effectively done in isolation or by just 
a single person but rather collectively thorough open communication channels and risk 
reporting across all teams. Risk awareness, alertness and control has to be enmeshed in  every 
functional department within the firm and their roles within the subsea production  system so 
that risk control can start at the very heart of machine-human-process. Subsea operators that 
wish to carry out risk or reliability assessment may need to engage a risk/reliability expert 
whose first immediate task would be to assess each operational sector/activity against required 
deliverables to prevalent failure and then advise the operators/employees on the how to 
habitually generate activity-based risk reports so that appropriate measures are taken to prevent 
the fatality of losses or huge economic losses. The key strategy here is creating a risk culture 
based on a bottom-to-top approach and not the usually unperforming silo-type strategy which 
is obtainable at some subsea firms. A bottom-to-top approach focuses better on the tiny details 
of a system and not just the broad perspective as per top-to-bottom. These could be done using 
the checklists and relevant standards, depending on operations and business needs. A top-to-
bottom approach is then routinely applied as an appropriate audit for aligning risk and 
reliability activities with overall company aims. 
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Discussion of Key Challenges  
Majority of firms affirmed that key threats to production are mechanical failures, power 
failures, data management/sensory relays, and pipeline failures while natural disasters, salt 
management, and hydrostatic pressure were rated low challenges. A careful examination of the 
pattern of responses show that the key problem is hardware failure – a reliability issue. 
 
The integrated model presented in this chapter will provide details of how to ensure that asset 
reliability and risk severity of each event for production assurance at all times. It could be 
supported by the established standards such as API 17N RP, DNV 002, ISO 20815 and many 
more robust frameworks. Meanwhile the SAIRR checklist incorporated the best aspects of all 
these standards discussed. 
 
Regarding production assurance problems, these can be managed by adopting any of the 
following factors (Kusiatan, 2005),  
(a) Simulation of processes using software packages or small prototypes prior to full 
deployment so that operation dynamics would be reasonably comprehended.  For 
instance, this was done using the Pipesim software for analysis flow output conditions 
in order to derive the parameters for evaluating pipe-pump efficiency options as 
containedin Chapter 5. The RBD analysis and optimization using the ALD reliability 
software is another example of how operation dynamics of a system can be visualized 
first to identify the failure modes so that an adequate optimization is effected. 
 
(b) Alternative solutions may include creation of redundant links for failures, creating 
robust tolerance and continuous improvement through business decisions. 
 
On a serious note, production assurance risks are very dynamic and eruptive. Therefore, they 
require more proactive measures by making smart reliability and risk analysis using the high 
stress model recommened in this work. The choice of risk management policy has to be 
supported by the organisations top echelon for it to be taken seriously across the firm. Risk 
awareness audits starts form the top management down to the lowest ranks and coupled with 
adequate communication between functional multi-disciplinary groups and alignment of risk 
control strategies with overall organisational goals thereby integrating People, Process, Assets 
and the Petroleum Product or Subsea Service. Implementation is a collective task which starts 
from the roots which could be the shop floor, rig men at platform at sea or controls personnel 
at remote station and up through the organisational ranks. 
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As observed in the survey, leadership support, performance measurement and employee 
motivation were the requirements indicated by the expert respondents for full implementation 
of a risk-reliability policy. 
Discussion and Recommendation Emphasis on the Human Factor. 
Subsea Asset Reliability and risk management is widely seen by the respondents as an 
assured tool for risk management for safety and economic advantage. The major challenge with 
it is the capability of understanding the various RIFs in subsea environment and integration 
and implementation of the chosen framework. This may require special training, especially 
technical reliability analysis for the mechanical failures. The integrated model proposed a 
methodology for calibrating sorting these into human reliability analysis for commercially 
oriented staff and technical reliability for technically inclined analysts. The other problem is 
the silo approach which exist in many companies who either do not share information across 
departments or simply just appoint a chief risk personnel to take care of all the organisation-
wide risk management with slight negligence towards the human factor risk originators 
themselves, the employees who ought to partake in the process of risk enculturation. These 
problems constitute threats and weaknesses to realising the full potentials of ORM. 
Increased demands of safety and operational uncertainties in the oil and gas sector require that 
a robust team of employees who are well-informed are allowed to run the business. Since 
majority of the respondents expressed enthusiasm towards the adoption and practice of risk 
management, it would be worthwhile to exploit the enthusiasm expressed by inculcating a risk 
culture within teams. The enhanced BORA framework proposed in Chapter 4 is a good way to 
account for human factor risks because it identifies the various Risk Influencing Factors, ranks 
and compares them against industry average and generates an index score of its probability of 
occurrence. Most importantly, staff must be encouraged to communicate any hazard observed 
no matter how little so that it may be controlled before it grows into an accident or disaster. 
This communication could be encouraged through rewards for memo submissions to the risk 
/reliability chief or each risk control designed or suggested. 
 
Discussion and Recommendation Emphasis on Subsea Production Assurance 
Subsea production assurance matters is certainly a topic that has a direct clear impact on 
stakeholders such as customers, clients, partners, employees, government, suppliers, 
distributors thus it is imperative to establish a production management strategy which 
incorporates reliability of assets and risk control of the subsea production business. The idea is 
to have a wider perception of risk and not localize it just on the technical rotating parts of a 
subsea facility. 
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From the survey, production assurance and reliability appears as a serious concern but since 
risk and reliability has become more and more a predictive concept it could be extrapolated to 
ensure improve performance in production capacity design and assessment. The nature of 
subsea environment makes subsea personnel more vulnerable to occupational risks which could 
hinder production, therefore routine safety assessment should be carried out on the subsea 
facility and equipment to ensure compliance with regulations and to detect any potential 
hazards.  
 
The enhanced Hubbert method which was developed in this work for production forecasting 
and planning could be merged with more modern and information technology systems such as 
SAP’s (Systems, Applications and Products) Material Resource Planning (MRP) systems or 
the Material Production Schedule (MPS) applications. These tools, though beyond the focus of 
this research, could be incorporated into the results from process flow software such as Pipesim 
and Olga to visualize the subsea production system bottle-necks in real time and plan ahead 
for repair lead times and adequate artificial lift installation. Production normally targets the 
best efficiency possible in terms of cost, material usage and output delivery times. The key 
metrics to consider for efficient low cost production have been established and emphasised in 
Chapter 5 and these include power consumption, pipe diameter, fluid pressure and cost of pipe 
and velocity of flow.  
 
8.3 Features of the Integrated Asset Reliability and Risk Analysis Model 
 One of the key objectives of this thesis is to develop an enhanced model of managing subsea 
assets and operational risks through a new robust system model. To accomplish this, lessons 
were drawn from the gaps and challenges highlighted in the literature review, numerical 
developments in case studies at the preceding chapters, the survey responses and the 
weaknesses in existing standards and methodologies. The newly proposed model is essentially 
an extraction of the best practises from existing standards, particularly, DNV OSS 306, API 15 
RP N and ISO 31000 which were particularly based on the statistics from the surveyed subsea 
engineers and risk practitioners. 
 
The strategic model consolidates crucial factors responsible for effective reliability, risk and 
subsea production assurance. The new model comes with a newly crafted checklist. The 
checklist is intended to guide both small, medium and large subsea oil and gas operators since 
the literature review and survey analysis results showed that the size of a firm is not necessarily 
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an obstruction against the full implementation of subsea risk, reliability and production 
assurance. The model essentially focuses on: 
 Transparency of risks across the key subsea production components of man, machine 
and process. 
 Specifics on the numerical evaluations to be made in accounting Risk Influencing 
Factors. 
 Leadership involvement and communication across functional groups.  
 Awareness and training of employees in order to manage operational risks. 
 Design considerations. 
 
8.4 The Proposed Integrated Model 
 
The integrated structural model presented in Fig 46 is the suggested guideline for the 
management of subsea asset integrity, reliability and risks. On a foundational level, the model 
design was fundamentally inspired by the good old Deming’s PDCA ideology- a 
fundamentalist view of modern risk management. The new integrated model is clearly different 
in numerous ways due to the incorporation of specifics in terms of the type of Quantitative 
Risk Analysis (QRA) for the subsea production, analysis to carry out, for each of the risk areas 
in –man-machine-process dynamics. Human factor risks such as risk in communication, 
alignment with overall organisational vision, training and development, leadership support and 
risk awareness campaigns which were either completely absent or not clearly emphasised in 
existing risk management methodologies/frameworks,were clearly incorporated in the new 
model and checklist.  
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 Figure 46: The Proposed Integrated Model 
 
Another striking feature in the new model is that users can make a choice to use either the 
reliability Weibull covariate model for futuristic asset reliability estimations or the matrix 
severity model which depends on historical information as discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
The Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) are calibrated based on the key human reliability risks 
facing an asset or region and these are discovered through a combination of Hazard 
Identification (HAZID) study using a Delphi-style data collection method.  
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Other highlights of the model include the consideration of design variables at the start of the 
risk management process and also the consideration of external risks using PESTLE AND 
SWOT framework. This was done in order to further mitigate any interplaying risks from 
external sources which may be the root cause of the internal or operational ones. 
 
Perhaps the most significant part of the model, was the inclusion of a Subsea Asset Integrity, 
Risk and Reliability Management (SAIRR) Integrated Checklist. This is an extensive but not 
exhaustive list of key requirements and considerations to make during risk and reliability as  
 
The communication across functional teams in order to implement identify, analyse and 
evaluate the risks. This is clearly demonstrated by the feedback loops enmeshed into the new 
system model. Thereafter, the dangers/risks identified are analysed and prioritised before 
choosing and applying treatment. The cycle continues with performance review on those key 
design considerations at START as the cycle starts all over again from the take-off point for 
continuous improvement. The model could still be adapted to any subsea asset anywhere in the 
world as deemed fit according to the needs of the intending user but care must be taken in order 
not to distort logic, sequence and intentions of the models. 
 
Other risk identification tools such as SWOT and PESTLE or FTA FMECA could be used at 
any stage to identify the potential operational risks as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
8.4.1 Sequence for Implementation of the Proposed Model 
The implementation of the new model is a crucial part of this work because without a clear 
implementation plan.  
8.4.2 Determination of Design Considerations  
The first step towards implementation of the model is to establish the asset design 
specifications based on its intended working environment. The aim is to have a clear overall 
goal for the subsea system availability and efficiency. This could be done at the beginning of 
a fresh project or mid-life of an existing asset. The crucial activity here is to align risk and 
reliability exercise with the wider company objectives. Thereafter, the physical conditions of 
the sea which may include temperature, pressure, pH are established. Historical failure data or 
risks from man, machine or process are collected and the target operational costs are 
established. Based on this information, a reliability index is set. An efficiency index is also set 
and risk tolerance margin is established before proper system analysis starts in earnest.  
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8.4.3 Support from Leadership  
Firstly, leadership support has to be sought. This will inspire the rest of both technical and 
operational employees to engage in the process within the company. The cost-benefit analysis 
of the process should be explained to the top management in a language they can understand 
which is economics, safety, reliability and risk metrics. Once this is done, it will be easier to 
win over the subordinates due to support and encouragement from the top leaders. The meeting 
with the top management may be done informally or formally. 
 
8.4.4 Training and Awareness  
Based on the support and mandate gotten from the company leadership and management, a 
sensitisation program shall be planned and delivered in-house to the rest of the employees. 
This can be accomplished within total contact session of about 7 hours; spread over a month 
depending on organisational operations. During these contact times, the risks in various 
systems are identified based on historical incidents and as mentioned earlier in the 
brainstorming session; parameters such as company objectives, current challenges, competitors 
are evaluated in order to develop a risk management strategy. The training shall consist of 
alerting the employees on the dangers, the risks within their respective working environment, 
the benefits of managing those risks and the essence of communication within interfacing 
teams for the prevention of mishaps. This is the rubrics for Risk and Reliability Assurance in 
an organisation.  
 
8.4.5 Plan and Define Risk Policy  
The setting of objectives involves defining the targets to be met by the risk management 
approach, how the targets will be achieved, and the participants of the programme. Specifics 
about the tolerance levels about a firm’s corporate objectives is depicted at this stage. This 
could be delivered by means of in-house workshops over a period of time depending on 
business engagement of the various and then supported massively by motivation from the 
organisations’ leadership and top management. Thereafter, the details of any supporting subsea 
standards, policy or framework with respect the requirements from each employee is 
adequately defined so that each employee is aware of his/her role. This aligns with the findings 
of the survey where respondents stated that employees’ participation is a major strategy which 
will booster the efficacy of Risk and Reliability Analysis. 
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8.4.6 Risk Identification 
This crucial stage involves risk identification of both asset specific technical risks otherwise 
referred to as internal risks and the external risks. The technical risk assessment is evaluated 
using HAZID while the general external risks is analysed using a combination of SWOT and 
PESTLE. At this stage, the reliability Engineer runs a SWOT analysis of the operational 
activities of the firm. This will expose all the loop holes, challenges, opportunities and strong 
areas to be further fortified. A review of historical data from records or verbal interviews is 
conducted across the entire operational areas. These may include failure rates, waves severity, 
currents, corrosion profiles. 
 
These data is obtained from the various operational departments within the firm which could 
be drilling, wells, production, mechanical, supply chain, management, human resources. The 
risks from trends and competition such as price of petroleum, new entrants and trends. The 
results of the SWOT analysis are then reviewed alongside the firms’ corporate objectives in 
order to set an appropriate target. This would also provide the decision making team with the 
whole picture of the issues at stake and help in to deciding the best approach to manage the 
discovered risks. The model recommended in this work could be used since it has been tailored 
to suit the oil and gas subsea production industry. 
 
8.4.7 Risk Analysis and Control 
The step towards the actual risk analysis starts by calibration of risks inherent in a system. 
These could be technical and consist of cost parameters, temperature, pressure drop, efficiency. 
Others may include Human factors which is further split into task factors, administrative 
elements, personal factors, operational philosophy ratings using the enhanced BORA model 
presented in Chapter 4.  
 
Whilst, there are several tools for risk identification, the approach recommended as depicted 
in the SAIRR checklist. This would not only help to identify as many risks as possible but also 
help to trace their root cause. It incorporates the PESTLE framework which is a proven and 
valuable tool for whole-system risk identification.  
 
Historical data is used if available otherwise accelerated failure testing is carried out using the 
Weibull covariate reliability modelling and optimization principle proposed in Chapter 4. The 
latter gives a reliability index while the former gives a severity index based on four key factors, 
  165  
the risks themselves, the risk influencing factors, the magnitude and frequency of occurrence 
of the identified risks as shown in Chapter 6. For historical data, the matrix iteration method 
of Chapter 6 is used to calculate the severity of the risks so that a benchmark is decided for 
production assurance. 
 
Process feasibility has become an integral part of risk analysis, therefore a clear methodology 
has been mapped out in Chapter 5 for predicting flow using Nodal analysis and pipe-pump 
flow efficiency calculation. This allows for selection of an optimum configuration of flow 
system from a range of physical parameters such as pressure drop, pipe diameter, power 
requirements and cost which are used to determine efficiency. These risks are quantified across 
all subsea production operations with the help of a risk matrix which may show the relationship 
between the severity, cost impact and urgency of a risk challenge using the formulae: Risk 
Probability x Impact. 
 
Risk control in a subsea environment requires a preventive measure with an aim to have more 
automated/fail safe subsea systems and preventive identification strategy rather than manual 
processes and detective controls. The accelerated life testing method recommended in this 
thesis is a good preventive strategy which could provide information for the design of 
automatic redundant systems or sensor retrofits. From a commercial perspective, certain risks 
could either be treated, transferred by insurance or sharing with other operators, tolerated or 
terminated depending on circumstances. Whilst machine failures may not be completely 
terminated, they certainly could be treated and transferred or tolerated depending on impact on 
safety and project economics. 
 
8.4.8 The SAIRR Checklist 
The Subsea Asset Integrity, Risk and Reliability (SAIRR) checklist in Table 32 was 
developed based on the results of the survey and integrated model standards. It focuses on 
actions to be carried out by firms based on their size, scales and kind of operations. It addresses 
the specific key risk component areas to be investigated when making risk control decisions. 
It is aimed at helping subsea operators towards a thorough evaluation of risk areas in subsea 
operations. A pass or fail is ticked for each activity in such a way that a pass ends the query 
for the activity. However, a fail suggests a need for further action which could be any/or a 
combination of treatment, transfer or toleration or termination of a risk process. 
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Table 32: Subsea Asset Integrity, Risk and Reliability Checklist (SAIRR) 
ID Activity Pass Fail Treat Transfer Tolerate Terminate 
1.1 Has the expected production 
been evaluated? 
        
1.2 Have the subsea production 
assets been selected based on 
expected output performance? 
For example, recovery rate 
      
1.3 Was the selection based on 
efficient least-cost options? 
      
1.4 Has the power requirement been 
identified and assured? 
      
1.5 Is there a historical data for the 
asset failure mechanisms if not 
has the failure modes been 
predicted? 
      
1.6 Has the reliability index of the 
system been evaluated? 
        
1.7 Are the reliability indices 
stressed enough with peculiar 
prevailing conditions of the 
subsea domain? 
        
1.8 Have the critical failure 
components been identified and 
optimized? 
        
1.9 Are there enough redundancies 
and fail-safe systems for the 
critical components? 
        
1.10 Has human reliability been 
considered? 
        
2.1 Is there a risk management 
policy or standard in place? 
        
2.2 Do all the relevant team 
members know the details of the 
standard and what their roles are? 
        
2.3 Is risk management decentralized 
across the teams? 
        
2.4 Are the managers highly 
supportive towards of the risk 
culture program? 
        
2.5 Is there continuous and adequate 
training for staff? 
        
2.6 Is there an adequate performance 
measurement for risk reporting 
and optimization? 
        
2.7 Are the lessons-learnt properly 
indexed and communicated? 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
The operational requirements of a subsea processing system can be understood and 
improved using a combination of physical, computational and stochastic projections. This 
study provides a significant piece of new knowledge which is obtained by intelligently 
crafting-out and building a selection of robust numerical models into an integrated whole-
system model for realistically evaluating the production capacity, reliability, risk and cost-
efficiency of emerging subsea oil production systems.   
 
9.1 Research Findings and Conclusions. 
 High MTTF of individual components is not directly proportional to high overall 
reliability of a system, rather the total cumulative of stressed MTTFs along with 
frequency and times of failure gives a better prediction of a system’s reliability. 
 
 It is more efficient and time-saving to (a) identify any infant mortality (b) identify over-
designed components by applying Weibull failure model and Fusell-Vesely theory to 
their minimal cut sets for optimizing overall reliability index based on criticality and 
reliability importance of components. The initial basic reliability of the system was 
optimized by a margin of 52% from 0.45 to 0.95 based on the confidence interval of 
the whole reliability analysis. The failure rate of the components of a system can be 
stressed statistically for optimal smoothening of over-designed components and under-
designed ones. 
 
 The research revealed that there is no significant relationship linking the number of 
component cut- sets and expected failure, reliability, unreliability and failure frequency, 
but there seems to be a relationship between the number of cut-sets and severity index. 
Thus, the lower the cut sets, the higher the severity risk. However, the biggest 
contributor to the severity index is total downtime. 
 
 Low subsea temperatures, high CO2 fugacity and pH variation has a significant impact 
on asset degradation rate, failure modes and frequency over a time series. Personnel 
factors such as competence of the operators, works stress, fatigue, stress, and 
ergonomics constitute the highest probability of risk influencing factors that could 
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cause failure in a subsea gas compression system. 
 
 The volumetric efficiency output of Electric Submersible Pumps in deep water subsea 
wells outperforms the PCP artificial lifts under the same subsea and oil-well conditions. 
While PCP technology seems to have good cost efficiency and low operating costs, the 
continuous rise in offshore oil production could trigger a proportionate increase in ESP 
field application far more than even rod pumps or PCPs which from this study have 
shown inefficiency towards lifting high fluid volumes in offshore situations. The study 
showed that production target was over the 12 years of production with an excess of 
530 STB with 88% efficiency obtained. 
 
 Based on the industry data received and analysis performed, latent sensor failure in drill 
bits is the top level failure with the most impact during offshore drilling. They are of 
high reliability importance because they help to control torque, annular pressure, load, 
vibration, temperature and pressure of drilling bit. 
 
 
 Risk management is being implemented across all scales of the subsea industry. This 
survey result has confirmed that the size of subsea operation does not hinder 
implementation because it is a cultural concept and not a mere regulatory standard. 
Notwithstanding, bigger subsea companies expressed more awareness and know-how 
than the smaller and medium ones. This could be attributed to decentralisation of risk 
management in bigger firms rather than the silo-based approach in smaller firms. 
 
9.2 Contributions of the Thesis: Highlights 
This research is original and significant in a number of ways: 
 This research produced a new Weibull-corrosion covariate reliability model for 
stressing baseline OREDA data of subsea components in order to obtain more realistic 
failure times and enhance their reliability designs or make adequate plans for tolerances 
and redundancies.    
 
 A new methodology was developed for selecting optimal pump and pipe configurations 
for subsea oil and gas production based on flow output, power requirement and least 
capital cost. 
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 A new method was developed for calculating the severity of complex risk scenarios 
based on frequency and magnitude of perceived the risks. 
 
 A survey was conducted on subsea oil and gas operators to understand how reliability 
and risk in being managed. The qualitative aspects of the integrated model. 
 
 A new integrated model was developed for estimating present risks and predicting 
expected risks in the operation of a subsea oil and gas asset. 
 
 
9.2 Recommendations: 
 The accelerated life testing model based on Weibull-Corrosion covariate reliability is 
recommended for predicting a realistic failure rate compared to the basic reliability 
models which does not consider credible external influences. Reliability optimisation 
using the enhanced block diagrams recommended in chapter 4 and enhanced Fusell-
Vesely analysis approach can be used to identify components’ failure mode, critical 
reliability importance and optimize them thereby preventing costs associated with 
unplanned failures. 
 
 The selection of an efficient subsea pump and/or pipe system requires a holistic 
consideration of the key physical and economic parameters that affect production 
performance. 
 
 Subsea production firms should adopt a preventative approach for asset reliability and 
risk management by employing the proposed risk management model in Fig 7 rather 
than relying on crisis management or total neglect of operational risks. 
 
 It is necessary that risk severity is evaluated from both a human reliability perspective 
as well as within a process/equipment scope for a broad picture and adequate control. 
 
 
 All sizes of subsea production industry can apply risk and subsea reliability 
management to its subsea production system provided that the details of the policy are 
well-defined and the participants (no matter the size) are clearly furnished with their 
respective roles.  
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 There is need to create adequate redundancy for sensors used in offshore drilling bits. 
 
The efficiency of PCP could be enhanced by improving on corrosion resistant designs, 
large cavities and reliable components for underwater performance. Perhaps a robust 
design configured with wear-resistant underwater gears could increase rod’s 
compression action and consequently, high volumetric output. 
 
 The structural framework, guideline and the SAIRR checklist has for effective subsea 
production assurance incorporated the models developed in the study, the lessons learnt 
from literature and the discovery from the survey. 
  
9.3 Strengths of the Research  
The major strengths are enumerated below. 
 In combining the statistical confidence bounds of a two parameter Weibull model and 
a corrosion-based covariate model to develop a new reliability model technical failure 
assessment, this study demonstrates that the lifecycle operational requirements of a 
subsea system can be understood and improved by analysing the effect of a corrosion 
stress on a Weibull failure data in addition to fuzzy scaling of human and operational 
barriers A case study of a subsea compression system was used to demonstrate the 
applicability of the model. The poor reliability index of the system can be optimized 
by breaking down component parts using Reliability-Block-Diagrams (RBD) and 
prioritizing the components based on reliability importance. 
 
 The unique feature of the method is its focus on the integration of the supporting 
systems of a subsea asset. From the perspective of a subsea engineer, it implies a more 
holistic view of the system design including both the technically dependent main 
process and organisationally dependent supporting processes.  
 
 The approach supports the step by step reduction of system complexity, from process 
to individual activities, and thus gives operators and technical staff the opportunity to 
recognise their role in the supporting processes. It thereby provides realistic inputs in 
terms of activity scope, time and required variables and resources. This approach has 
been found to result in a high acceptance of the model by the staff involved in the 
project.  
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 One important and unique feature of the subsea reliability and risk model proposed in 
this work is the inclusion of a measure of implementation and performance 
improvement and how this is expected to be looped back into system design for 
continuous improvement.  
 
 It provided a structured analytical process which incorporates proven standards for the 
identification and optimization of main risk variables in a subsea system. 
 
 
9.4 Future Research 
The author acknowledges the benefits of this research, the relevant issues treated and the 
limitations therein. Further study on the topic could focus on the following issues: 
 Results from a three-parameter Weibull covariate model could be compared against a 
two-parameter model using a larger failure data set. 
 
 Validation of models with a real case study. 
 
 Analysis may be performed on failure modes of subsea assets operating in cold Arctic 
waters beyond a 4000m depth especially those facing the stress of iceberg gouging. 
 
 The reliability models could be applied to many other subsea processing equipment 
incorporating key influencing factors. 
 
 Nodal analysis and production risk analysis on longer tiebacks from well to platforms 
or to shore. 
 
 Determination of the relationship between reliability drivers and survivability 
variables. 
 
 A more detailed questionnaire may be repeated over a larger sample size in order to 
actually measure the performance levels and concerns across each scale of subsea 
production. For instance, across small, medium and large scale companies.  
 
 Future research may compare reliability management practices at contemporary subsea 
hotspots such as Brazil, West Africa and the Arctic to come up with a more robust risk 
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management framework. This will help to bring out the best practices in each of the 
various cultures and further help to verify Hofstede’s (1984) findings about uncertainty 
in work culture.  
 
Finally, the information presented in this thesis is reliable at the time it was written and is 
meant to be beneficial to researchers, operation managers and risk practitioners who work in 
the subsea oil and gas sector. The work contains original specific advice as regards the common 
challenges to be expected, a proposed model for its management and recommendations on how 
to implement the model effectively in alignment with the overall business strategy so as to 
mitigate losses, enhance productivity and improve safety records. 
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